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This thesis considers the emergence and diffusion of British 
Petroleum's (BP) Refinery Information Systems (RIS). Insights from the 
associology of translation are coupled with the Foucauldian concepts 
of discourse and power /knowledge in order to analyse accounts of the 
system provided by organisational participants. The analysis suggests 
that a new form of managerialism, or "new commercial agenda" is being 
selectively deployed both within BP and within the wider commercial 
world. This transformed managerialism seeks to maintain control and 
heighten commercialism through a re- working of hierarchical relations 
within the organisation. Artefacts and practices of organisational 
life are revealed as prime vehicles for instantiating this new agenda 
and BP's Refinery Information Systems are thus seen to be both a 
condition and a consequence of the changes underway. 
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"Who makes up real things, dad ?" 
"Nobody and everybody; they just make themselves up. The thing is 
that because the real stories just happen, they don't always tell 
you very much. Sometimes they do, but usually they're too... 
messy." 
The Crow Road, Iain Banks. 
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The empirical material presented in this thesis is made up of accounts 
provided by organisational participants of how the task of oil 
refining within British Petroleum has changed and how new 
technological artefacts have been created to support the activities 
involved. In particular, the thesis seeks to examine the emergence of 
a Refinery Information System (RIS) at BP Oil's Grangemouth Refinery 
in Scotland. 
The thesis is organised into ten chapters. Following this introductory 
piece, Chapter two examines recent work on "technology" by writers 
such as Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law. The chapter seeks to 
assess the applicability of the insights offered by these writers to 
the task at hand. The advantages of their conceptions of 
sociotechnical transformation are weighed against the dangers inherent 
in the approach and the chapter concludes by accepting the basic 
orientations of this literature, with some important caveats. 
Chapter three uses the Foucauldian concept of discourse to apprehend 
the emergence of a "new commercial agenda" (Munro and Hatherly, 
forthcoming) that seeks to re- engineer organisational reality. 
Understandings mobilized by this literature are being progressively 
embodied in organisational participants, practices and artefacts. 
Computerised information systems and "technology" in general may be 
seen to be both a condition and consequence of this emergent agenda 
and a key aim of this thesis is to examine its relations with RIS. 
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Having sensitised the reader to the concerns of the research and the 
approach adopted to meet them, we start to present empirical material 
on BP's RIS systems in Chapter four. The chapter focuses on the 
emergence of the concept of RIS within BP and its first two physical 
instantiations. Chapter five examines early intentions to develop a 
RIS type system at Grangemouth while Chapter six considers the 
resulting "Grangemouth RIS Project Feasibility Study ". 
In Chapter seven we note important changes to the physical starting 
point for RIS at Grangemouth that were suggested and accepted after 
the completion of the Feasibility Study. Chapter eight examines how 
these changes were instantiated at Grangemouth as we consider the 
processes involved in engineering the system. Chapter nine considers 
users' responses to the system so- built. 
Chapter ten draws together the empirical material and the theoretical 
grounding that preceded it. Some judgements are offered on the 
processes involved in the construction of RIS and their links with the 
emergent new commercial agenda. In particular, this allows us to 
demonstrate RIS's role in the realisation of that agenda. 
NOTES AND REFERENCES 
Munro, R. and Hatherly, D. (forthcoming) "Accountability and the New 
Commercial Agenda ", Critical Perspectives on Accounting. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SURVEYING TOOLS FOR SURVEILLANCE OF THE SYSTEM 
Introduction 
The social shaping (e.g. MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985b) approach to an 
understanding of technology seeks to broaden conceptions of 
technology. Rather than merely addressing the "effects" and "impact" 
of technology, the approach demands an answer to the question: 
What has shaped the technology that is having "effects "? What has 
caused and is causing the technological changes whose "impact" we 
are experiencing? (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985a, p.2) 
The approach cautions against the potentially dangerous simplification 
of "technological determinism ". This opens up the possibility of new 
ways of viewing the technological. 
Our technology becomes, like our economy or our political system, 
an aspect of the way we live socially. It becomes something whose 
changes are part of wider changes in the way we live. It even 
becomes something whose changes we might think of consciously 
shaping - though we must warn right at the beginning that to say 
that technology is socially shaped is not to say that it can 
necessarily be altered easily. (ibid. p. 3) 
The definition of technology mobilised in this literature is broad, 
encompassing artefacts, what people do with those artefacts, and what 
people know. The demands of the approach do not entail an abandoning 
of research on the effects of technology on society, rather the 
approach seeks a balance, with "at least equal time for the study of 
the effects of society on technology" (ibid. p.2). This call for a 
balance mitigates against another extreme position, that of social 
reductionism. It seeks a mode of analysis that is both open to, and 
cognizant of, the social in the technological and the technological in 
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the social. An exclusionary emphasis on the "effects" of technology is 
counterbalanced by consideration of the "effects" of society. The 
question to be answered is whether or not such an approach can enable 
a synergy of positions, an understanding of the world that is not 
dependent upon the twin simplifications of social reductionism and 
technological determinism. Or does it merely degenerate into 
"reciprocal accusation of myopia between sociology and what (for the 
purposes of brevity) I will call STS (science, technology and 
society)" (Law, 1991a). 
There are two key objections to such a balancing act. The first 
concerns the indictment of social science on the grounds of its 
"speciesism" (see, for example, Law, 1986; 1991a; 1991b; Woolgar, 
1991; Callon, 1986; 1991; Latour, 1986; 1987; 1988; 1991); its 
ignorance of machines. 
The problem has something to do with the absence of a method for 
juggling simultaneously with both the social and the technical. 
Sociologists., tend to switch registers. They talk of the social. 
And then (if they talk of it at all which most do not) they talk 
of the technical. And, if it appears, the technical acts either 
as a kind of explanatory deus ex machina (technological 
determinism). Or it is treated as an expression of social 
relations (social reductionism). Or (with difficulty) the two are 
treated as two classes of objects which interact and mutually 
shape one another. (Law, 1991a, p. 8) 
We are dealing with a form of distribution built deep into 
sociology - the distribution between people on the one hand, and 
machines on the other. (ibid. p. 8) 
Sociology may know about class, or about gender. But how much 
does it know about speciesism - the systematic practice of 
discrimination against other species? And how much does it know 
or care about machines? (ibid. p. 6) 
Technology is not determined by the social order and the social order 
is not determined by technology. Law (1991a) conceives of this problem 
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as one of "heterogeneity" and sees in it a re- presentation of the age 
old "problem" of the social order. The solution to such a problem is 
to "find a way of talking about the- social- and -the -technical, all in 
one breath" (ibid. p. 8). 
The social order is not a social order at all. Rather it is a 
sociotechnical order. What appears to be social is partly 
technical. What we usually call technical is partly social. In 
practice nothing is purely technical. Neither is anything purely 
social... [W]herever we scrape the social surface we will find 
that it is composed of networks of heterogeneous materials. 
(ibid. p. 10) 
The social shaping approach sensitises us to these issues but provides 
only a partial solution. As a slogan and research programme it does 
allow a counterbalancing of the more prominent but often implicit 
diagnoses of technology's "effects ". But by so doing it can serve to 
perpetuate the "switching of registers" and "speciesism" identified by 
Law. It does not, in itself, provide "a way of talking about the - 
social- and -technical, all in one breath ". 
The second objection to a register switching approach is the claim 
that the very use of the terms "society" and "technology" can play 
fundamental roles in the shaping of sociotechnical networks (Latour, 
1988; 1991; Callon; 1991; Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1992). "Society" 
and "technology" may be seen as rhetorical devices that seek to 
structure and obtain a reality in the process of network building. The 
success of conceiving of and creating a reality using such terms is 
one of the outcomes that requires description and explanation. The 
terms cannot therefore function as explanatory variables themselves. 
As Latour (1988) puts it: 
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Technology and society are two artefacts created by the analysts' 
duplicity. (p. 22) 
This is why, instead of the empty distinction between social ties 
and technical bonds, we prefer to talk of association. To the 
twin question "is it social ? /is it technical "' we prefer to ask 
"is this association stronger or weaker than that one ?" (Callon 
and Latour, 1981; Latour, 1986; 1987) (p. 27) 
An Associology of Translation? 
The solution proposed to this problematic by writers such as John Law, 
Bruno Latour and Michel Callon is to apprehend the (re)construction of 
the sociotechnical through the notion of translation. The approach is 
predicated upon three core principles: 
agnosticism (impartiality between actors engaged in controversy), 
generalised symmetry (the commitment to explain conflicting view 
points in the same terms) and free association (the abandonment 
of all a priori distinctions between the natural and the social). 
(Callon, 1986, p. 196) 
Thus, the researcher seeks to account for the (always temporary) 
stabilisation of a sociotechnical network through consideration of the 
elements that make up that network and the relations that hold them in 
place. This task must be undertaken with the three principles outlined 
above in mind. The researcher must be alive to the fact that the 
designations and descriptions of entities and their relational links 
provided by actors involved in the network building process are 
themselves an important facet of that network building process. 
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Instead of imposing a pre -established grid of analyses upon 
these, the observer follows the actors in order to identify the 
manner in which these define and associate the different elements 
by which they build and explain their world, whether it be social 
or natural. (Callon, 1986, p. 201) 
The terms used to explain [1] the (re)production of a sociotechnical 
network are primarily actors and their translations. Actors (be they 
"social" or "technical ") are accorded agency in such an approach. Thus 
one witnesses the mutual translation of actors by other actors. Actors 
in this sense are attributed a quasi- reality; they are seen as quasi - 
objects (see Serres, 1987) since the designation, description and 
prescription of actors is part and parcel of the process of 
translation. Utilising a linguistic analogy, Latour proposes 
consideration of actors or entities in terms of texts or statements. 
Actors and their network building programs are "read" by other actors 
and through this reading process both the readers and the text are 
transformed. Thus, 
we are not to follow a given statement through a context. We are 
to follow the simultaneous production of a "text" and a 
"context ". (Latour, 1991, p. 106) 
we never work in a world filled with actors to which fixed 
contours may be granted. It is not merely that their degree of 
attachment to a statement varies; their competence, and even 
their definition can be transformed. These transformations 
undergone by actors are of crucial importance to us.. because 
they reveal that the unified actor is itself an association made 
up of elements which can be redistributed. (ibid., p.109) 
Indeed, the extent of agreement between various actors' readings of 
each other provides us with an indication of the "reality" of the 
network that they constitute. "Reality" is the outcome of network 
building. In the process of translation reality is created as "the 
identity of actors, the possibility of interaction and the margins of 
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manoeuvre are negotiated and delimited" (Callon, 1986, p. 203). Or to 
put it another way, considering translation allows us to apprehend.. 
the simultaneous production of knowledge and construction of a 
network of relationships in which social and natural entities 
mutually control who they are and what they want. (ibid., p. 203) 
The Translation Process 
Callon (1986) identifies four "moments" of translation, although he is 
at pains to point out that they do not necessarily occur in a tidy 
sequence (see also Knights et al, forthcoming, who attempt to apply 
this approach to understand the construction of a computerised 
"network "). Through translation actors attempt to impose themselves 
and their definition of a situation on the other actors implicated in 
that definition. In the first moment, a primary actor [2] 
problematizes (Callon, 1986) an issue. The "problems" and identities 
of other actors are defined in such a way as to render the enunciator 
as an "obligatory passage point" (Callon, 1986). The enunciator 
defines others and their situation in order to become indispensable to 
both. The network of relations, or solution to other actors' 
"problems ", can only be constructed through the enunciator. Thus the 
enunciator defines for itself an integral role in the construction of 
its product (the network) and defines this product as the solution to 
a problem; a defined problem for defined other actors. 
problematization describes a system of alliances or associations, 
between entities, thereby defining their identity and what they 
"want ". (Callon, 1986, p. 206) 
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However, as we noted above, all the entities or actors that describe a 
network are themselves granted agency in an account based upon 
translation. And thus, potentially, they may not agree with the 
designation provided by the primary actor in the problematization 
statement. The primary actor must work to establish the identities and 
relations as they are rendered in the problematization. This work is 
termed interessement (Callon, 1986). 
Each entity enlisted by the problematization can submit to being 
integrated into the initial plan, or inversely, refuse the 
transaction by defining its identity, its goals, projects, 
orientations, motivations, or interests in another manner. In 
fact the situation is never so clear cut. As the phase of 
problematization has shown, it would be absurd for the observer 
[or researcher] to describe the entities as formulating their 
identity and goals in a totally independent manner. They are 
formed and are adjusted only during action. 
Interessement is the group of actions by which an entity.. 
attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of the other actors 
it defines through its problematization. (ibid. p. 207 - 8) 
In essence, the method by which actors interesse other actors is 
through the building of devices or networks which can be placed 
between the actors to be interessed and "all other entities who want 
to define their identities otherwise" (ibid. p. 208). These notions of 
political analysis and (re)synthesis reveal the strategic nature of 
network building. And as Callon notes: 
The range of possible strategies and mechanisms that are adopted 
to bring about these interruptions is unlimited. (ibid. p. 209) 
Pejorative pre- definitions of possible strategies and mechanisms would 
violate the spirit of the translation approach. These strategies are 
defined in situ and are predicated upon interpretations of what those 
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actors yet to be enrolled want and how they are currently defined 
through their associations with other entities. 
[I]nteressement helps corner the entities to ue enrolled. In 
addition, it attempts to interrupt all competing associations and 
to construct a system of alliances.. [S]tructures comprising both 
social and natural entities are shaped and consolidated. (ibid. 
p. 211) 
Defining and Co- ordinating Roles: The Process of Enrolment 
As we noted above, the "identities" and "links" formed during the 
process of interessement are always contingent and thus potentially 
temporary in their effects [3]. The extended problematization and 
interessement process: the definition of actors and their putative 
links with each other; does not necessarily lead to firmer alliances 
between those entities. The effort to bond described /ascribed entities 
together is termed by Callon the phase of enrolment. "The issue here 
is to transform a question into a series of statements which are more 
certain" (ibid., p. 211). Enrolment is the successful outcome of the 
problematization and interessement process. It entails a number of 
conflicts or battles between entities in a struggle to convince them 
to play the roles to which they are ascribed. As Munro and Kernan 
(1993), following Latour (1987) note, the process of enrolment entails 
the re- presentation of the interests of (potentially) interested 
others (see also, Robson, 1993). Describing the overall process of 
translation, Latour suggests that.. 
it means that one version [of (putative) reality] translates 
every other, acquiring a certain hegemony: whatever you want, you 
want this as weil. (1987, p. 121) 
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Such a statement aptly describes the microcosm of translation that 
Latour and Callon term enrolment. Without the adoption of such an 
approach the Machiavellian nature of the translation process would 
simply be too visible to the entities ascribed roles by the 
enunciator. 
To establish a functioning network entails a translation of the 
interests of others into one's own interests. Translation, 
however, should be conducted in ways which make one indispensable 
to others and render their detour invisible to themselves 
(Latour, 1987, p. 108 - 121). The desired effects of translation 
are first, control, in that the work of others acts to propel 
one's own interest and, second, invisibility, in that one's own 
interests can successfully be re- presented in the name of others. 
(Munro and Kernan, 1993, p. 2, emphasis in original) [4] 
Through the process of enrolment a number of entities and putative 
networks engage in trials of strength that seek to instantiate the 
network of entities rendered in the problematization of the 
enunciator. If the enunciator's definitions are relatively victorious, 
the other entities are successfully ascribed /described, or enrolled 
within the relational network set in motion by the enunciator. 
However, once enrolled the entities and the network they make up must 
be mobilised to act in the interests of the enunciator. In the next 
section we examine how Callon (1986) apprehends the notion of 
mobilisation. 
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Mobilising Enrolled Entities to Act for the Enunciator 
The issue of representation, so far raised only obliquely and largely 
implicitly in our account of translation, takes centre stage in the 
phase of mobilisation. Although, as this thesis attempts to 
demonstrate, the notion of re(- )presentation may be seen to be a key 
resource in the apprehension of the entire translation process. Munro 
and Kernan's (1993) account of translation provides a crossover 
between the processes of enrolment and mobilisation. And consideration 
of representation allows us to examine some of the dangers of the 
translation approach. These will be dealt with after a brief 
consideration of the role of representation in the process of 
mobilisation. 
For the "power effects" (see Foucault, 1977a; 1978; 1991) of the 
enunciator's network to accrue, the entities enrolled or re- presented 
in the network must not contradict their representation in that 
network. To put it bluntly, if the entities present themselves in ways 
discordant with their re- presentations in the emergent network the 
programmatic ambitions of that network will remain unfulfilled. Or to 
use Latour /Callon's terminology the network will be translated from 
its rendering by the enunciator. 
To speak for others is to first silence those in whose name we 
speak. 
[C]hains of intermediaries which result in a sole and ultimate 
spokesman can be described as the progressive mobilisation of 
actors who render.. [certain] propositions credible and 
indisputable by forming alliances and acting as a unit of force. 
(Callon, 1986, p. 216) 
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The notion of mobilization is perfectly adapted to the 
mechanisms.. described. This is because this term emphasizes all 
the necessary displacements. To mobilize, as the word indicates, 
is to render identities mobile which were not so beforehand.. 
Through the designation of the successive spokesmen (sic.) and 
the settlement of a series of equivalencies,.. actors are first 
displaced and then reassembled at a certain place at a particular 
time. This mobilization or concentration has a definite physical 
reality which is materialized through a series of displacements 
(Law, 1985b). (Callon, 1986, p. 216 - 7) 
Mobilization is the outcome of a successful and successive process of 
decontextualisation from prior relations coupled with subsequent 
recontextualisation in the emergent network (see also Letiche, 1993). 
Network building, the establishment and stabilisation of entities and 
their relations, entails the simultaneous construction of text and 
context (Latour, 1991). Entities are re- presented through a process of 
description /ascription that (temporarily) re- defines their essence in 
terms of the demands and relations of the network in which they are to 
be mobilized. The (successful) result is a functioning network of 
acting entities mobilized in support of the enunciator [5]. There is 
still, however, no guarantee that these mobilizations will persist. 
Various entities may betray their network as they seek and achieve 
enrolment in counter networks. 
The Role of Re(- )presentation 
Woolgar (1991) provides some illustrative comments on the links 
between the notions of representation and translation, although the 
latter term is not explicit in this account. Woolgar is particularly 
interested in the role played by putative boundaries in any process of 
sociotechnical stability or change. He notes that: 
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Much of our mundane discourse.. presupposes and exemplifies the 
assumption that the characteristics of an entity can be 
associated with a particular bounded space. (1991, p. 63) 
By problematizing these notions of boundary /boundedness Woolgar is 
able to challenge their necessity (see also Hines, 1988). This opens 
up space for a form of analysis that doesn't take entities as given. 
Rather entities are to be conceived as quasi- objects (Serres, 1987) 
and one is able to throw "into relief one of the foundational ordering 
principles of our phenomenal world: the presumption that entities are 
bounded" (L' - . tAp. 64) . One may see, from such a perspective, not 
only the general form of the presumption of boundedness as "both 
culturally and historically relative" (ibid. p. 64). Specific forms of 
the representation of entities in more or less putative sociotechnical 
networks may also be seen to exhibit such relativity. Given such an 
understanding one obvious question springs to mind: What are the power 
relations that produce such effects? 
For Woolgar the problem is solved through the invocation of what he 
terms "The Moral Order of Representation" (Woolgar, 1989; 1991). 
we can refer to any existing complex of relationships as the 
moral order of representation (Woolgar, 1989). It is a world view 
which embodies notions about the character and capacity of 
different entities, the relationship between them, their relative 
boundedness, and the associated sanctioned procedures for 
representation. Thus, one knows and can adequately represent the 
views of any one entity in virtue of how it relates to and 
differs from others in the matrix. (Woolgar, 1q91, p. 66) 
From such a perspective the moral order of representation is seen to 
be productive of reality. The power effects of the moral order are 
visible in the reality so created. It is worth noting here how such a 
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view on representation takes us close to the Foucauldian conception of 
discourse discussed in the following chapter. 
Re(- )presentation, Mobility, and Technolog 
Cooper (1992, 1993) has also addressed the intertwinings of technology 
and representation (see also Lynch and Woolgar, 1988). 
Technology and representation are immemorially connected. 
(Cooper, 1993, p. 2) 
He notes that for the ancient Greeks techne described the process of 
realisation, the art of making present. However, the modern conception 
of technology is seen to entail a "curious twist" in meaning. 
Instead of the concern with making present, with the art of 
constructing something for the apprehension of the senses, the 
modern interest in technology puts the stress on immediacy of 
use, constant availability and the easing of effort. (ibid.,p. 2) 
Modern technology is seen as re- presenting... 
actions in space and time according to an economics of mastery 
and control. (ibid., p. 2) 
Cooper examines the archaeology of the word techne to reveal its 
derivation from the old Greek tuche, "meaning chance, fate, or that 
which lies beyond human control" (ibid., p. 2). Thus techne is seen as 
that which turns chance to advantage. For Cooper modern technology is 
seen to differ from the ancient techne in terms of its degree of 
detachment from the vagaries of the natural world. 
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Ancient techne was directly dependent on the powers and 
contingencies of the natural world; it took advantage where it 
could. Modern technology, in contrast, is distinguished by its 
detachment from nature and this separation enables it to increase 
its advantage at will. (ibid., p. 3) 
This advantage is seen to derive from the moral order of (modern) 
representation and its associations with the (modern) technological 
project. 
Following Foucault (1977), Cooper conceives of the body as a key 
source of tuche and an ongoing (potential) impediment to the 
realisation of the power effects of human agency. The certainty and 
detachment that agency requires are undermined by the instability of 
the body: "a volume in perpetual disintegration" (Foucault, 1977b, p. 
148 quoted in Cooper, 1993). Thus for Cooper: 
All representations originate in the instability of the body. All 
techne, all making, flows from this need of the body to re- 
present itself in terms of more durable external structures. 
(ibid., p. 3) 
Cooper draws upon Scarry's (1985) insights into the "counterfactual 
structure" of representation /technology. Through this structure 
representation re- presents. "Inadequacies" of the body are apprehended 
in such a way that the process enables their turning to advantage. 
Representation thus involves two complementary steps: (1) the 
separation and objectification of bodily attributes and (2) the 
recovery by the body of the objectified attributes in an act of 
self- appropriation. 
A major consequence of the body being able to represent itself in 
external artifacts is that the human agent can more easily 
control and modify the latter than it can its own body. (Cooper, 
1993, p. 4 - 5) 
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This move enables a detachability of bodily attributes, parts and 
functions. Thus, the re- presented body is open to re- design and 
recombination. The body as "a volume in perpetual disintegration" is 
not so (easily) open to such processes. The relative stability of the 
"self" (Foucault, 1978) is required to act as overseer and manipulator 
(or manager) of the world and body. 
If you can't change the world. Change yourself. 
And if you can't change yourself then...change the world. 
(Johnson, 1992) 
With the advent of industrial production this process is accelerated 
and qualitatively altered. The world is represented as, and hence 
shaped into, a stock of parts that can be recombined at will. Objects, 
or re- presentations lose their "essence ", derived from the specifics 
of their bodily appropriation, and take on a mode of being that is 
metaphorically exemplified by Lego and Mechano. 
The detachability of bodily parts and functions enables an ars 
combinatoria to be applied to the act of representation... The 
whole object, formerly a creation of techne, "now becomes a 
transient aggregate given to assembly, disassembly and 
reassembly" (Fisher, 1978, p. 142). (Cooper, 1993, p. 5) 
Drawing on the work of Heidegger (1977) and Latour (1987), Cooper 
notes that the appearance of detached representations is productive of 
a new form of power. A power that enables a view of the world "as a 
table top ruled by the human hand and eye" (Fisher, 1978, p. 144). 
Without detached representation entities would not be mobile and hence 
mobilizable. Thus we see that detached representation is a pre- 
requisite of translation. 
27 
Just as bodily re- presentation enables "solutions" through the 
appropriation of "problems ", modern technologies of representation 
enable power /knowledge effects through their appropriation of re- 
presented items on a grander scale [6]. (See for example the excellent 
paper by Law (1986b) concerning the Portugese expansion). 
modern technologies of representation know in advance by 
simulating within themselves all the critical features of the 
external conditions they seek to control. (Cooper, 1993, p. 8 -9) 
Modern technologies /representations produce power by constructing and 
colonising a place called the future through their "technical" 
detachment from, and colonisation of, the "lifeworld ". However, there 
is a price to be paid. For such a system to function effectively the 
world must be changed "in the direction of representational 
convenience so that the world becomes more like our representations 
and less like the world" (Cooper, 1993, p. 10). As Vickers (1970) puts 
it, such a system provides us with something akin to "freedom in a 
rocking boat ". 
Pressed to its extreme, this process tends towards finality 
through the construction of large -scale systems of certainty 
which seek to master what remains of uncertainty; a continuous 
chain of terms is forged which must reinforce each term's 
certainty. Heidegger calls this process "the gigantic ". (c , fV-03 
p. 13 - 14) 
But such a process is like a dog chasing its tail. The attempt to trap 
all uncertainty in the world tends towards an overall world system. As 
a result everything is dragged closer together and made smaller. The 
world becomes displaced and abbreviated in order to facilitate remote 
control (Cooper, 1992; see also, Roszak, 1986; Zuboff, 1988). 
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Here, everything is doubled on itself - the big becomes the 
small, the strange becomes the familiar, what is far becomes 
near. All detachment becomes attachment. It is the return of 
tuche. (Cooper, 1993, p. 14) 
Weber (1992) makes a similar point when considerirg the specific 
technology of television. Television can only live up to its name and 
set before us the certainty of distant events through the re- ordering 
of the world and the certainty expunging "doubling" that televisual 
systems entail. As Weber puts it "it sets only by unsettling" (p. 15). 
The diffusion of information technology may be seen as another classic 
example of this process at work. The deployment of IT holds out the 
dream of grasping the uncertainty created by its dispersal (see also 
Robb, 1990; 1993). This is a theme we return to in the next chapter. 
Cooper (1993) conceives of this tuche returning characteristic of 
modern technology /representation, following Heidegger (1977) and 
Foucault (1970; 1977a) in terms of the spatial logic of the fold. The 
return of tuche marks a shift from representation to simulation. 
despite the never ending effort of representation there is always 
the fold that refuses unfoldment. (Cooper, 1993, p. 28 - 29) 
Foucault (1970) notes the impossibility of representing 
representation. This tail chasing nature of modern 
representation /technology is what gives rise to simulation. 
The real is produced from miniaturised units, from matrices, 
memory banks and command models - and with these it can be 
reproduced an indefinite number of times.. In fact, it is no 
longer real at all. It is hyperreal, the product of an 
irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace.. the 
age of simulation thus begins with a liquidation of all 
referentials. (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 3 - 4, quoted in Cooper, 
1993, p. 30) 
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Simulation has gone beyond the stage of detachability.. which 
enabled the world to be manipulated as "transient aggregates 
given to assembly, disassembly and reassembly ", by abolishing the 
very notion of a substantive reference. (Cooper, 1993, p. 30 - 
31) 
Representation gives way to simulation (see also, Roszak, 1986). The 
recalcitrance of the world provided the representation process with 
continual grounds for its perpetuation (see Zuboff, 1988). With the 
emergence of simulation the "system" becomes self sustaining. 
"Simulation folds back on itself in.. [a] process of 
dedifferentiation" (CoTb- 13 p. 31). The project has a self- collapsing 
characteristic of "implosion" (Baudrillard, 1983) which inevitably 
leads to the undermining of the rigidities of categorical thought upon 
which representation depends. Technology and it's representational and 
simulational objectives become the source of uncertainty rather than 
its solution [7]. The world functions as a gigantic simulacrum 
(Baudrillard, 1983). 
Simulation, for Baudrillard, thus appears as a quasi - 
representation whose stability is constantly threatened by its 
dividedness or reversible imminence. (Cooper, 1993, p. 40) 
The "congenitally failing" nature of managerial practices and 
technologies (Miller and O'Leary, 1993; Lilley, 1993; see also Munro 
and Kernan, 1993; and Maclntyre, 1985) may thus be seen as a 
consequence of the logic of representation and its degeneration into 
simulation. 
Managerial expertise, and the government of the enterprise more 
generally, is a congenitally "failing" activity to the extent 
that a succession of programmes is the norm rather than the 
exception. (Miller and O'Leary, 1993). 
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We return to these themes when discussing the empirical material 
presented in this thesis in a later analytical chapter. To conclude 
our survey of the tools for surveillance of the system we consider the 
dangers associated with an associology of translation. 
Apprehending Translation From the Safety of the Veranda 
To speak for others is to first silence those in whose name we 
speak. (Callon, 1986, p. 216) 
Such a comment is just as applicable to those who attempt to 
understand the translation process from "outside" as it is to those 
involved entities we seek to understand. This thesis seeks to account 
for the transformation of a sociotechnical network at and surrounding 
BP Oil's Grangemouth Refinery. It utilises accounts of that process 
provided by organisational participants. It attempts to reveal their 
translations of a variety of representations (simulations ?) in this 
process of network (re)building. It reveals how the entities that make 
up this network, and the network itself, are realised through the 
"simultaneous production of.. 'text' and.. 'context " (Latour, 1991, 
p. 106). But what of this thesis itself? What happens when the 
associologist takes a reflexive turn? What is the "truth" of the 
account provided in this thesis? What is its context? What "interests" 
are imputed to the re- presented (simulated) entities? Would they (if 
they could) represent themselves in the same way? What are the 
interests of the entity termed "author "? [8]. 
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The function of representation is to translate difficult or 
intransigent material into a form that facilitates control. 
(Cooper, 1992, p. 255) 
The re- presented accounts of organisational participants that form the 
"empirical" basis of this thesis are translated by the author in order 
that they may be bent to his will, to his objectives [9]. Most 
obviously these objectives entail a relatively easy passage through 
the rituals of examination (Foucault, 1978) or inspection (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) in order to grant himself access to the academic 
priesthood. But there is plenty of space for action within such an 
objective. Objectives are further honed, but not determined, by the 
choice of examiners and the specific form of "priestliness" desired. 
These choices too are informed by more or less traditional 
"political ", "social" and "economic" objectives [10]. However, in the 
logics of simulation and translation such statements do not provide 
answers, they merely serve to generate further questions in a 
"gigantic" list. Perhaps in the best traditions of interest analysis 
(see Robson, 1993) the solution to this problem lies with others as 
they extend the chain. 
actions [are] explained by.. interests; interests are revealed 
by.. actions. (Robson, 1993, p. 5) 
Although empirical demonstration of interests may be theoretically 
tautological (Hindess, 1986; 1988) such practices are not 
pragmatically closed. New interests are imputed and new actions 
observed as a Whiggish history (re)assesses the text. Despite my 
attempts to "configure" (Woolgar, 1991) the reader, the destiny of 
this text and imputations ascribed to it are (largely) beyond my 
control. 
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The fate of a statement is in the hands of others. (Latour, 1991, 
p. 105 - 106) 
In one sense these objections matter little - social scientists are 
continually chastised for their views from the veranda or ivory tower. 
The associology of translation and consideration of issues of 
representation and simulation merely serve to make these issues more 
explicit. It is not that they are absent from other approaches, just 
less explicitly acknowledged. This leads us to the other sense of the 
objection. Associology, in making these points explicit, should make 
some attempt to deal with them. We must accept that to produce an 
account of entities entails a further representation /simulation of 
those entities. Undoubtedly, we must give up pretensions to "truth ". 
But we must also seek to produce an account that is workable, that 
will "hold ", in the network of entities that constitute the readership 
of that account. How do we provide a "reasonable" account? 
Callon (1986) provides us with some way forward. We must attempt to be 
faithful to the methodological principles seen to underlie an 
associology of translation: agnosticism, generalised symmetry, and 
free association. Still, the reader has little guarantee, the "quality 
control" of the text is a slippery eel. 
Having opted in this text for a vocabulary of translation we know 
that our narrative is no more, but no less valid, than any 
other.. Our hope is that the translation repertoire, which is not 
that of the actors studied, will convince the reader. (Callon, 
1986, p. 200) 
To make visible the translations implicit in the production of this 
thesis, in an attempt to convince the reader, a number of secondary 
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methodological principles have been adhered to. The middle section of 
this thesis provides an account of the translation process in the 
terms of the actors involved, in their own repertoires. An attempt has 
been made to assemble a rich picture of the processes involved. 
Entities who "spoke" to the researcher are quoted at length and a 
minimal commentary is provided that seeks to link these snippets of 
organisational participants' accounts. Other entities, through their 
re- presentation (simulation) in these accounts speak only at a 
distance, their own voices silenced in the process. But this silencing 
is never complete, unworkable renderings are negotiated away as their 
inoperability is revealed, or work is done to alter notions of 
operability. All the entities enrolled in the account seek to speak 
for themselves and the author has, as far as possible - given the 
institutional demands on thesis production, tried to help them to do 
so. 
Snippets of accounts are derived from taped interviews, carefully 
noted interviews where taping was impossible, and both internal and 
external company documentation. The researcher gained access to the 
refinery, the wider BP Group and their participant members, through 
contact with the refinery's Information Technology Superintendent. 
Ostensibly the researcher presented himself as interested in the 
organisational and business issues surrounding large scale system 
implementation and use. Thus, interviewees were asked to account for 
the system and its relations with their jobs and the wider purposes of 
the organisation. Most interviewees were comfortable with such a task. 
Some may have used the interviews as a method of serving their 
interests by making anonymised soundings about the system but all such 
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attempts are grist to the mill of an associological approach. Attempts 
to account for the system "disingenuously" were apprehended but not 
ignored by comparison of a variety of sources of accounts. 
Whilst these sources may be acceptable, themes and statements within 
them have been mobilized by the author. That is, they have been 
decontextualised from their relations of production and 
recontextualised to meet the demands of the story constructed in the 
thesis. The author's activities were informed and sensitised in this 
respect by the principles of translation outlined above, but were 
obviously not entirely determined by such an orientation. Judgements 
of the adequacy of these attempts are still, unavoidably, in the hands 
of the readers. Little more can be said. Still, one set of questions 
remains. What's it all about? What's the point? In terms of the logic 
of mastery underlying modern technology /representation /simulation, 
what does the approach enable? 
Associology and Judgement 
The relativity inherent in an approach based upon translation and 
representation /simulation suggests superficially that there is no room 
left for judgement. Such a characterisation only holds under the 
mirage of epistemological transcendence and certainty. As Latour puts 
it: 
In order to make a diagnosis or decision about the absurdity, the 
danger, the amorality or the unrealism of an innovation, one must 
first describe the network. If the capability of making 
judgements gives up its vain appeals to transcendence it loses 
none of its acuity. (1991, p. 130) 
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The approach allows us to juxtapose representations /simulations 
provided by a number of authors to ascertain their convergence. We can 
glimpse the construction of reality at work as certain power effects 
and relations are established. It allows us to challenge the necessity 
of these arrangements and demonstrate the contingent nature of their 
perpetuation. 
The repertoire of translation is not only designed to give a 
symmetrical and tolerant description of a complex process which 
constantly mixes together a variety of social and natural 
entities. It also permits an explanation of how a few obtain the 
right to express and represent the many silent actors of the 
social and natural worlds they have mobilized. (Callon, 1986, p. 
224) 
And as Callon notes, such a position makes visible the links between 
the approach and "the notion of the political economy of power 
proposed by Michel Foucault" (ibid., p. 230). We investigate the 
possibilities of a Foucauldian orientation in the next chapter. 
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NOTES AND REFERENCES 
1. In the account provided in following chapters and in the sociology 
of translation more generally, description slides into explanation. To 
quote Latour again: 
Explanation does not follow from description; it is description 
taken that much further. (Latour, 1991, p. 121) 
2. Or the enunciator of a statement (Latour, 1991); a Prince (Latour, 
1988); an heterogeneous engineer (Law, 1985a); or a system builder 
(Hughes, 1983). 
3. As should be abundantly apparent by now, all networks are to be 
seen as temporary, contingent stabilisations. However, in the terms of 
translation, entities that are enrolled are seen to be more tightly 
bonded and more "permanent" than those that are merely interessed. 
4. One should not forget that defining one's own interests and the 
interests of others entails the mutual definition of oneself and one's 
others, both in terms of their otherness and sameness, and in terms of 
a presupposed essence or nature. 
5. One must bear in mind that it is likely that the enunciator and its 
enunciation will have also been translated through this process. 
Translation entails negotiation between putative entities in the 
mutual mediation of a workable network. Workable is an operative word 
here. As Latour (1987) puts it, the truth or reality of a network are 
the effects of enrolment. These relations are "true" because they 
hold. That is they are workable and will remain "true" for as long as 
they remain workable. 
6. As we noted earlier: "All representations originate in the 
instability of the body ". It is the extension of this process and 
recombination of the subjects /objects so produced that distinguishes 
modern technologies /representations. 
7. See also Perrow's (1984) conception of "normal accidents ". 
8. I am grateful to Fenton Robb and Peter Case for explicitly drawing 
the importance of these questions to the forefront of my attention. 
9. Such a characterisation of the thesis production process entails an 
assumption of a highly centred subject as author. It should be 
abundantly clear by now that this assumption is untenable. The author 
and his interests have undoubtedly been translated through his 
interaction with the material. 
10. Sociotechnical objectives? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A SELF FULFILLING DISCOURSE? : A NEW COMMERCIAL AGENDA FOR A NEW 
COMMERCIAL WORLD 
Introduction 
This chapter briefly considers recent publications concerning both 
changes in the commercial environment and changes in what is deemed to 
be the "appropriate" way to conduct business in such an environment. 
It is suggested that these two bodies of work have together brought 
about a sea change in the commercial world. That is, regardless of the 
"reality" underlying initial contributions to the debate, the 
complementarity of the analyses and prescriptions provided by this 
literature is such that the conditions and actions originally 
"described" are necessarily (re)produced by the diffusion of the 
themes set out in the texts. These strands of literature form a self 
fulfilling body of work. 
The chapter seeks to examine how the themes of this literature have 
gained ascendancy in the commercial world. How have the old watchwords 
of effectiveness, efficiency and economy been supplemented and /or 
transformed, and what are the implications of the new watchwords that 
are emerging to reinforce and replace them? New themes, such as 
flexibility, quality, and culture are deployed in rationalisations of 
organisational activity provided by organisational participants and 
hence the ways in which these themes are used may be expected to play 
a significant role in the shaping of organisational artefacts. 
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Considering the pre -eminent position afforded to information and 
communication technologies in this literature, the shaping role of 
these themes on computerised information systems and the wider 
networks in which they are embedded would seem to be particularly 
significant. And, as we noted in the previous chapter, this shaping is 
unlikely to be unidirectional. 
The Concept of Discourse 
In order to explicate these changes the chapter draws upon the 
insights offered by the Foucauldian conceptualisation of discourse. In 
common sense terms a discourse is simply a coherent body of speech or 
text. In Foucauldian terms "..a discourse is a group of statements 
which provide a language for talking about - i.e. a way of 
representing - a particular kind of knowledge about a topic" (Hall, 
1992, p.291). 
A discourse is similar to..an "ideology ": a set of statements or 
beliefs which produce knowledge that serves the interests of a 
particular group or class. Why, then, use "discourse" rather than 
"ideology "? 
One reason which Foucault gives is that ideology is based on a 
distinction between true statements about the world (science) and 
false statements (ideology), and the belief that facts about the 
world help us to decide between true and false statements. But 
Foucault argues that statements about the social, political or 
moral world are rarely ever simply true or false; and "the facts" 
do not enable us to decide definitively about their truth or 
falsehood, partly because "facts" can be construed in different 
ways. The very language we use to describe the so- called facts 
interferes in this process of finally deciding what is true and 
what false. (Hall, 1992, p.292) 
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The Althusserian conception of Ideology is perhaps the most 
"productive" rendering of this notion. Ideology (Althusser, 1970; 
1971) is seen to be productive of subjects through a process of 
subjectification. The results of this process, subjects and objects, 
are seen to be made so evident by the action of Ideology that the 
imaginary nature of the process itself is hidden through an act of 
misrecognition. Ideology, the evidentness of subjects and objects, is 
seen to be imaginary in respect to (true) knowledge. Such a position 
is derived from the materialist project of Marxist thinking and the 
associated dichotomy between science and illusion. Conversely, 
Foucault does not seek to arbitrate between "true" and "false" 
discourses. Foucault's analytical strategy is based upon... 
the methodological postulate that there is no meaning to 
discourses beyond what they say; it implies a denial of the 
general categories of illusion or misrecognition (Cousins and 
Hussain, 1986, p. 178) 
Foucault's aim is to investigate... 
...historically how effects of truth are produced within 
discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false. 
(Foucault, 1980, p.118) 
According to Foucault, it is power, not "facts" about reality, which 
makes things "true ". Thus, if two discourses are in competition, with 
both producing knowledge attempting to provide a "true" depiction of 
reality, one may assume that each of the discourses is linked to a 
contestation over power. It is the outcome of the struggle over power 
that will arbitrate the truth. 
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[T]ruth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted 
solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in 
liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is 
produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 131) 
We should admit that power produces knowledge... That power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute... power relations. (Foucault, 1980, reproduced in 
Hall, 1992, p.293) 
So what is power in the Foucauldian sense? A relationship of power... 
...is a mode of action which does not act directly and 
immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an 
action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may 
arise in the present or the future. (Foucault, 1982, p.220) 
The conceptualisation of power employed by Foucault is not one of a 
purely negative, repressive and prohibitory force. Rather, power is 
seen to be productive and creative and Foucault seeks to describe a 
positive "economy" of Through their effects 
not only constrain but also enable action. Indeed, power may be said 
to distinguish (Robb, personal communication) appropriate actions. 
Discourses create and order representations. And representation 
enables and prefigures action through the prior retrieval of critical 
aspects of the "future" into representational space. A purely negative 
power would be sorely limited in its potential. 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did 
anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought 
to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, 
is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force 
that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it 
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs 
to be considered as a productive network which runs through the 
whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose 
function is repressive. (Foucault, 1980, p.119) 
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It is the intention of this account to suggest that managerial 
technologies are particularly significant products of managerial 
discourse. This importance, in large part, derives from the (partial) 
irreversibility of "technology" (Callon, 1991; Latour; 1991; Winner, 
1977; 1985) and its concomitant pre- supposed neutrality and 
inevitability. The "duplicity" of a segregation of technology from the 
social enables its partial insulation from political interrogation. 
Discursive Coherence 
A discourse consists of a number of statements that together 
constitute a discursive formation. These groups of statements have a 
coherence that does not derive from shared authorship, or from shared 
meanings or intentions underlying the texts. Their unity results from 
...the presence of a systematic dispersion of elements. Where 
between objects, types of statements, concepts and thematic 
choices there exists an order, correlations, "positions in 
commonspace, reciprocal functioning" (Smart, 1985, p.39) 
This unity reveals a "moral order of representation" (Woolgar, 1991). 
The statements hold together as a formation (or "network ", Callon, 
1986; 1991, Latour, 1987; 1991) because each of the statements implies 
a relation to all the others. Discourse constitutes the construction, 
interplay, and self reflection of representational entities. 
Discursive statements are mutually dependent and reciprocally linked. 
They refer to the same object, share the same style and support 
"a strategy ..a common institutional.. or political drift or 
pattern ". (Cousins and Hussain, 1984, pp. 84 - 85) 
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The systems of rules, regularities and relations that govern the 
formation and perpetuation of a discourse are not conceived of as 
constraints "emanating from the consciousness or thoughts of a 
sovereign subject nor are they determinations arising from 
institutions, or social or economic relations" (Smart, 1985, p. 39). 
These "rules of formation of statements" (Foucault, 1980, p.112) are 
located by Foucault at the "prediscursive" level. They are the 
unquestioned assumptions and bases of our way of going on in the 
world. The continuation of "normal service" is predicated upon the 
perpetuation of these "conditions of possibility" of the discourse. 
The rules of formation of a discourse are the inaccessible and 
unquestionable self evidences that are drawn upon in our language and 
practices and in our thoughts and actions and maintained through our 
participation in these activities. They constitute.. 
what must be related, in a particular discursive practice, for 
such and such an enunciation to be made, for such and such a 
concept to be used, for such and such a strategy to be organized. 
(Foucault, 1972, p.74) 
These systems of formation are not immobile, they do not constitute 
"static forms that are imposed on discourse from the outside...that 
define once and for all its characteristics and possibilities" 
(Foucault, 1972, pp.73 - 4). They... 
reside in discourse itself; or rather..on its frontier, at that 
limit at which the specific rules that enable it to exist as such 
are defined. (Foucault, 1972, p.74) 
The notion of discourse is not predicated upon the conventional 
(artificial) distinction set up between language and thought on the 
one hand, and action and practice on the other. 
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Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. 
But it is itself produced by a practice: "discursive practice" - 
the practice of producing meaning. Since all social practices 
entail meaning, all practices have a discursive aspect. So 
discourse enters into and influences all social practices. (Hall, 
1992, p.291) 
The aim of this chapter is to identify and characterise the discourse 
providing the new organisational orthodoxy to the commercial world and 
hence creating and giving meaning to that world, in order that its 
influences on the practices of British Petroleum, and the accounts of 
those practices provided by organisational participants, may be 
examined. Thus the notions of discourse and discursive practice offer 
us another opportunity "to follow the simultaneous production of.. 
'text' and.. 'context" (Latour, 1991, p. 106). In order to do this a 
number of questions must be answered: What is this new orthodoxy, how 
did it emerge, and what are its implications? Foucault suggests 
that... 
the exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new 
objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information. 
(1980, p.51) 
The following section attempts to address the specific exercise of 
power implicated in the emergence of the new commercial agenda, 
although as we will hopefully demonstrate, from our contemporary stand 
point very little of this discourse appears to be "new ". 
48 
The Discourse and Practices of Management 
The work of Burnham (1941) provides us with a useful, if somewhat 
arbitrary starting point for consideration of the discourse of 
management. Burnham's thesis concerns "The Managerial Revolution ". It 
is a somewhat late addition to the burgeoning literature on 
managerialism that emerged in the early part of the century, 
particularly in America. Following on from the traditions of 
Scientific Management (Taylor, 1947) and the Sloan school (Sloan, 
1965) (see, also, Fayol, 1948) which sought to provide a theoretical 
basis for the emerging "profession" of management (Chandler, 1977), 
Burnham's account sought to situate the rise of management in a wider 
sociohistorical context. 
Burnham suggested that following a widespread separation of ownership 
and control in capitalist enterprises and a technicisation and 
professionalisation of the discipline(s) of management, a new social 
group was acquiring dominance, in terms of its privileged position 
with regard to the control of resources. This ascendant group 
consisted of "those whom we call the managers" (Burnham, 1941, p. 
101). Whilst nominally still in the service of capitalists, this new 
class of managers was seen to be in a position of potential social 
dominance through its actual rather than nominal control of resources, 
in particular the means of production. 
The instruments of production are the seat of social domination; 
who controls them, in fact not in name, controls society, for 
they are the means whereby society lives. (ibid., p. 102) 
Burnham saw the emergent creed of managers as a new political vanguard 
on the verge of assuming societal control. 
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[T]he managers will exploit the rest of society as a corporate 
body, their rights belonging to them not as individuals but 
through the position of actual directing responsibility which 
they occupy. They.., through the position of privilege, power, 
and command of educational facilities, will be able to control, 
within limits, the personnel of the managerial recruits; and the 
ruling class of managers will thus achieve a certain continuity 
from generation to generation. (ibid., p. 126) 
Although the benefit of hindsight allows us to see a fair amount of 
exaggeration in the predictions of Burnham's thesis (see, for example, 
Knights et al, forthcoming), it is clear that a class that we may term 
managers did indeed increase in size and influence during the middle 
decades of this century (see, for example, Prestus, 1962; Lash and 
Urry, 1987; Burns and Stalker, 1966). However, the more profound 
implication of these changes, in terms of the arguments mobilised in 
our account of sociotechnical transformation at BP, is the emergence 
and solidification of a form of knowledge and practices, implicating a 
certain moral representation. We may this discursive 
formation "management" or "managerialism ". The emergence of a distinct 
class of managers who could potentially appropriate control of the 
means of production is in some senses a secondary effect, produced by, 
but also productive of, managerialism. For Burnham this is the primary 
effect of the changes he attempts to apprehend since his discourse is 
predicated on the notion of an a priori sovereign subject who is 
capable (however imperfectly) of knowing his or her interests and how 
to further them. In Burnham's terms for example, a rational 
capitalist, reading the writing on the wall, would attempt to 
transform him or herself into a manager. 
From a Foucauldian perspective, managerial discourse may be seen to be 
productive of the (privileged) organisational position that we term 
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management, and, moreover, of those (privileged) bodies that inhabit 
this space, that we term managers. Thus we may conceive of management 
as discourse, practice and person. The particular forms taken by this 
triptych during the middle decades of the twentieth century were 
congruent with, and indeed productive of, emergent forms of 
corporatist or Fordist sociotechnical organisation. A highly 
segregated and segmented large scale production process [1] was 
designed by a managerial function, populated with managers who were 
fueled by managerial understandings. Resynthesis of divided labour 
required an hierarchical overview provided by such understandings. The 
visible hand of management sought to tame the vagaries of the 
invisible hand of the market. Managerialism held out the promise of 
control of the enterprise in the corporatist market environment 
through the capturing of uncertainty in specific forms of re- 
presentation, most notably hierarchically and laterally segregated 
production relations. Hierarchy was legitimised as "rational" (Weber, 
1947) [2] and indeed necessitated by the "bounded rationality" (Simon, 
1957) of managerial subjects. 
However, as we noted in the previous chapter, attempts to capture what 
remains of uncertainty through the endless diffusion and refining of 
representations that seek to facilitate control lead inevitably to an 
enfoldment of representation. Representational activity becomes a 
source of uncertainty rather than an antidote for its ubiquitous 
presence. In this respect, the increasing scale of the enterprise has 
instantiated a centrifugal separation of "professional" managerial 
expertise. As Robb (1993) suggests.. 
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Over time, different institutions have emerged from various 
conversations and communications addressing particular aspects of 
the activities in managerial organisations. This has resulted in 
a partitioning of managerial activities and the specialisation of 
these into discrete functions dividing the organisation 
"laterally" so that mutually dependent activities have become 
separated from each other by institutionalised divisions. 
Concurrently institutionalised interpretive schemes have divided 
the organisation "vertically" so that hierarchies of operatives, 
supervisors, managers and executive directors have developed. 
(P. 99) 
The increasing dynamism of the commercial world, brought about in 
large part by the spread of the gigantic (Heidegger, 1977) through the 
action of managerial discourse, necessitated a refining of 
managerialism. Predicated upon weaknesses identified through 
examination of its diffusion, the "congenitally failing" (Miller and 
O'Leary, 1993) practices of management and their associated discursive 
orderings of representations had to be reworked to enable their future 
instantiation in (viable) organisations. Managerialism sought to 
transform itself in order to ensure its survival. In the next section 
we examine the process and outcome of this transformation. 
A New Commercial Agenda? 
Although consolidation of the New Commercial Agenda (Munro and 
Hatherly, forthcoming; see also Kanter, 1989, on "The New Managerial 
Work ") primarily occurred during the nineteen -eighties (Burrows et al, 
1992; Whittaker, 1992; Reed, 1991; Ezzamel et al, 1992; 1993), signs 
of its emergence were apparent from the early nineteen -sixties (see 
Lash and Urry, 1987). To take yet another largely arbitrary starting 
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point, examination of the work of Burns and Stalker (1961; 1966; see 
also Burns, 1958) provides us with a useful way in to this emergent 
discursive field and its break with past wisdom. 
Study of the practice of a number of firms suggested that there 
were two fundamentally different procedures followed by 
managements. One, 'mechanistic', was appropriate to stable 
conditions; the other, 'organic' to conditions of change. (Burns, 
1958, p. 1) 
The emergence and diffusion of discourse surrounding this latter 
management "procedure" are the main concerns of this chapter. Burns 
and Stalker's work may be seen as a source of both continuity and 
change with regard to the previous managerial discourse it sought to 
reproduce and redirect. It builds upon many of the understandings 
embodied in prior approaches (as well as the emerging discourse of the 
"Tavistock" school, see, for example, Hill and Trist, 1962; Emery, 
1969) but also uses the "inadequacies" of these former approaches as 
grounds for its own production and dispersal, although Burns and 
Stalker are at pains to point out that their descriptions 
(prescriptions) of managerial activity are to be seen as a set of 
responses to a particular view of the organisation's environment. 
We have endeavoured to stress the appropriateness of each system 
to its own specific set of conditions. Equally, we desire to 
avoid the suggestion that either system is superior under all 
circumstances to the other. In particular, nothing in our 
experience justifies the assumption that mechanistic systems 
should be superseded by organic in conditions of stability. 
(Burns and Stalker, 1966, p. 125) [3] 
Despite such caveats, the ouvre required for the production of a 
discursive rendering of "organic" management is primarily the 
"failure" of "mechanistic" management. In certain situations 
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mechanistic management is seen to be part (the main part) of the 
problem. For despite the insistence on the specificity of the two 
forms of management and more importantly, the environmental specifics 
of their applicability, one gets a sense throughout the text that a 
changing environment is set to become ever more likely and ubiquitous. 
Such a shift is seen to necessitate "organic" management and 
technology (rendered as technical change) plays an important driving 
role in this respect. 
When novelty and unfamiliarity in both market situation and 
technical information become the accepted order of things, a 
fundamentally different kind of management system becomes 
appropriate from that which applies to a relatively stable 
commercial and technical environment. (Burns, 1966, p. vii) 
Organic systems are those which are best adapted to conditions of 
change. By common consent, such conditions are at present 
affecting a widening sector of industrial and occupational life. 
(Burns and Stalker, 1966, p. 11) 
The sense of "self fulfilling prophesy" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Weick, 1977; 1979) surrounding Burns and Stalker's text is not 
entirely lost on the authors, although many of those that have 
followed in a similar tradition seem far less reflective. 
Technical progress and organizational development are aspects of 
one and the same trend in human affairs; and the persons who work 
to make these processes actual are also their victims. (ibid., p. 
19) 
Through a heroisation of the market and its supposedly manifest 
superiority as an optimal invisible hand for the purposes of 
(rational) resource allocation, competition and dynamism are taken as 
given (see also, Peters, 1992). An acceleration of "technical" [4] and 
"commercial" change is both a condition and consequence of organic 
management. An intensification and acceleration of Schumpeter's (1939; 
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1951) "creative gales of destruction" is seen to necessitate 
organisational responses that seek to add to the swirling winds that 
brought them into being. Representation of the "chaos" of the market 
and the dynamism of technology inside the organisation is seen to be 
the only realistic response (Peters, 1989; 1992). 
[T]he effective organization of industrial resources, even when 
considered in its rational aspects alone, does not approximate to 
one ideal type of management system, but alters in important 
respects in conformity with change in extrinsic factors. These 
extrinsic factors are all, in our view, identifiable as different 
rates of technical or market change. By change we mean the 
appearance of novelties: i.e., new scientific discoveries or 
technical inventions, and requirements for products of a kind not 
previously available or demanded. (Burns and Stalker, 1966, p. 
96) 
But one organisation's "extrinsic" factors are brought into being by 
the recursive action of its own and other organisations' intrinsic 
factors. Such a situation results in something analogous to a pack of 
dogs chasing their own and each others' tails. Actions seen as 
rational by individual organisations are made so by the similar 
actions of others. Notions derived from "Game Theory" provide us with 
some purchase here. As Axelrod (1984; see also Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981) demonstrates, individual (or organisational) self interest is a 
(collectively) stable evolutionary strategy even if the sum of its 
actions is not ideal for the community as a whole (see also, Barnes, 
1990, on the "free -rider problem "). A competitive strategy is seen to 
be particularly well adapted to changing conditions, a relatively 
stable environment being seen to be necessary for the emergence of co- 
operation between entities. And the environment as rendered in the new 
commercial agenda is anything but stable. 
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Thus we can see that the discourse surrounding "organic" management or 
the new commercial agenda is both a condition and consequence of its 
own dispersal. "Giants" (Kanter, 1990) are made nimble through its 
actions and this nimbleness is required by the widespread adoption of 
nimbleness throughout the economy. Nowhere in this emergent discourse 
is this tendency more pronounced than in its treatment of information 
and communication technologies and information systems. The increasing 
rate of change, both "technological" and "market" based, brought about 
in large part by the prior diffusion of dynamic information and 
communication systems and technologies, is seen to necessitate the 
adoption of similar artefacts by any organisation that hopes to 
"compete" in such an environment. The adoption of (appropriate) 
managerial technologies is seen to be both rational and inevitable. 
Managerial discourse and the rationalities they represent inform the 
translation of sociotechnical term translation 
suggests, they do not determine their specific forms (Rose and Miller, 
1992; Miller and O'Leary, 1993). Rather, the technologies and.. 
"Programmes of government" of the enterprise are.. "translations" 
between the "morals, epistemologies and idioms" of those 
rationalities and the practicalities of management or government 
of a particular problem space. Translations establish "..a 
mutuality between what is desirable and what can be made possible 
through the calculated activities of [managerial] forces" (Rose 
and Miller, 1992). (Lilley, 1993, p. 182) 
In the following section we examine what it is that is distinctive 
about "organic" management before we turn to consider its role in 
translation. What enables and indeed "necessitates" the production and 
perpetuation of nimbleness and dynamism? 
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Organic Management: The Difference of the New Commercial Agenda 
Burns and Stalker's (1966) check -list for the "organic" form admirably 
covers our objective: that is, to demonstrate the "difference" of the 
new commercial agenda. This is largely because it is described in 
terms of its distinctiveness from the "mechanistic" approach. Thus it 
seems appropriate to quote their delineation of the form at length. 
The organic form is appropriate to changing conditions, which 
give rise constantly to fresh problems and unforeseen 
requirements for action which cannot be broken down or 
distributed automatically arising from the functional roles 
defined within a hierarchic structure. It is characterised by: 
(a) the contributive nature of special knowledge and 
experience to the common task of the concern; 
(b) the "realistic" nature of the individual task, which is 
seen as set by the total situation of the concern; 
(c) the adjustment and continual re- definition of individual 
tasks through interaction with others; 
(d) the shedding of "responsibility" as a limited field of 
rights, obligations and methods. (Problems may not be posted 
upwards, downwards, or sideways as being someone's else's 
responsibility); 
(e) the spread of commitment to the concern beyond any 
technical definition; 
(f) a network structure of control, authority, and 
communication. The sanctions which apply to the individual's 
conduct in his working role derive more from presumed community 
of interest with the rest of the working organization in the 
survival and growth of the firm, and less from a contractual 
relationship between himself and a non -personal corporation, 
represented for him by an immediate supervisor; 
(g) omniscience no longer imputed to the head of the concern; 
knowledge about the technical or commercial nature of the here 
and now task may be located anywhere in the network; this 
location becoming the ad hoc centre of control authority and 
communication; 
(h) a lateral rather than a vertical direction of 
communication through the organization, communication between 
people of different rank, also, resembling consultation rather 
than command; 
(i) a content of communication which consists of information 
and advice rather than instructions and decisions; 
(j) commitment to the concern's tasks and to the 
"technological ethos" of material progress and expansion is more 
highly valued than loyalty and obedience; 
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(k) importance and prestige attach to affiliations and 
expertise valid in the industrial and technical and commercial 
milieux external to the firm. (ibid., p. 121 - 122) 
More modern renderings of this approach in the discourse peddled by 
the new breed of management gurus, both practitioners and academics, 
(e.g. Ouchi, 1981; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Kanter, 1984; 1990; 
Crosby, 1984; Goldsmith and Clutterbuck, 1984; Waterman, 1988; 
Oakland, 1989; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Peters, 1988; 1989; 1992; 
Atkinson and Meager, 1986; Atkinson, 1990; Pascale, 1991) explicate 
these differences in terms of "empowerment ", "flexibility ", "quality ", 
"culture ", and "continuous improvement ". These orientations are deemed 
to be necessary in order to compete successfully in markets that are 
increasingly global in scope. The literature emanating from such 
sources celebrates this sea change as it prescribes for its 
augmentation. It is almost invariably evangelical (Kerfoot and 
Knights, 1993), focusing only upon successes, and hence it effectively 
excludes doubt and self reflection upon the plausibility of its 
assumptions and the practical problems encountered in the 
implementation of its recipes. Indeed, the various guru recipes may 
themselves be viewed as so many products in a market for salvation 
(see, Hopfl, 1992, on the "Death of A Snake -Oil Salesman "). Such a 
standpoint serves to partially explain both the proliferation of these 
texts and the lack of reflection by their authors on the "side 
effects" of their prescriptions. 
In its more modern forms, the new commercial agenda uses the exemplar 
of "modern legends" about Japanese and other Pacific Rim practices to 
demonstrate the inapplicability of traditional Western methods to the 
modern commercial world. However, although the terms may be different, 
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and the conditions seen to necessitate their instantiation rendered 
slightly differently, there is a massive degree of convergence between 
the claims advanced in Burns and Stalker's work and those of the new 
commercial agenda of the nineteen -eighties. This convergence is 
perhaps most obvious when one compares Burns and Stalkers' delineation 
of the organic form (above) with Peters and Waterman's' (1982) eight 
attributes of "excellent, innovative companies ". 
The route to organisational success in the rapidly changing 
conditions rendered in this discourse is seen to be the production of 
appropriate systems of meanings that enable organisational 
participants to identify (more directly) with the purposes of their 
employing organisation (see also Robb's, 1993, "Possible Solutions to 
Growing Institutionalisation "). The new commercial agenda seeks to 
provide appropriate bodies for appropriate organisational forms that 
facilitate the generation of shareholder value. A key difference with 
prior practices is that this is to be achieved through identification 
with the products and "health" of the employing organisation (see 
Miller and O'Leary, 1993, on the "Politics of the Product ") rather 
than through a more constraining commitment to what are seen to be 
abstract forms of hierarchical control. Such moves are supported by 
wider cultural shifts that seek to instantiate "neo- liberal" political 
ideals (Rose and Miller, 1992; Miller and O'Leary, 1993; Power, 
forthcoming). 
Entities previously seen as "bads" (Beck, 1992a; 1992b; Power, 
forthcoming), such as "risks" and their reproduction, are reconciled 
with the production of "goods ", i.e. wealth, through the creation of a 
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moral order of representation in which successful managers are urged 
to "thrive on chaos" (Peters, 1990; see also, Peters, 1992) and "use 
conflict" (Pascale, 1991). "Requisite variety" within the organisation 
is required for the "evolution" of new organisational forms and 
practices. Mechanistic management's dream of capturing uncertainty 
through a proliferation of hierarchical relations is (partially) 
rejected in favour of a "network" of self organising technologies, 
bodies and understandings that are bound together through common 
identification with the products and profits of the employing 
organisation (see, also, Keenoy and Anthony, 1992). 
The manager, as person, loses some of its significance as management, 
as shared understanding, takes over the organising role previously 
fulfilled by hierarchically positioned bodies. And, as we hope to 
demonstrate, embodiment of these understandings in appropriately 
defined managerial practices and technologies provides the missing 
glue. 
Organic Management: The Sameness of the New Commercial Agenda 
There are also significant continuities between the new and the old 
commercial agendas, reflecting an archaeology of control (Munro, 
forthcoming). Amongst the most important of these are the continuing 
problematization of individual commitment to the organisation and the 
continued importance of stratification and leadership in this 
problem's "solution ". 
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The new commercial agenda is seen to be a cure for Western commercial 
ills made apparent by the emergence of a challenge to its economic 
hegemony from the Pacific Rim. One response to this challenge, urged 
by many contemporary management gurus, is the building of strong 
corporate cultures in which a kind of Confucian ethic is stimulated. 
However, as Ezzamel et al (1992, following Locke, 1990) note: 
there remains an underlying disjuncture between the collectivist 
ideas disseminated by the gurus of corporate culture and the 
deeply embedded Enlightenment beliefs in "individual freedom" 
and, more specifically, the operation of "free" labour markets 
and individual competitiveness (p. 30). 
The old commercial agenda sought to engineer individual commitment to 
narrow, functional objectives which were supposedly integrated by the 
magic of hierarchy in order to generate a coherent. organisation. 
Western individualism is uncritically accepted as given in both new 
and old agendas. Thus, although the new commercial agenda's solution 
differs, the problem remains the same. Indeed, the embededness of 
individual "freedom" and "competitiveness" in the West is such that 
the new agenda's solution only differs slightly from that offered by 
the previous orthodoxy. The route to collective organisational 
commitment is seen to be through appealing to individualism and 
notions of self appraisal and control. Thus, those whose skills are 
desired by organisations are induced and enabled to act "collectively" 
for the good of the organisation through hope of individual reward. 
Managers unable to adopt the orientations favoured by the new 
orthodoxy are easily jettisoned through invocation of a logic of 
"delayering" and "leanness ", whilst those that remain are "promoted" 
in the remaining hierarchy (Ezzamel et al, 1992). Adoption of 
61 
appropriate attitudes and behaviours is (temporarily) rewarded by 
continued employment and organisational advancement. 
Common ground is found by linking improved job security and 
career advancement with productivity and added value (ibid., p. 
31) 
Thus we see the need for the second continuity outlined above. 
Commitment to the organisation is seen to be deeper in organic forms 
but is also seen to depend on the perpetuation of stratification for 
its fruition. As Burns and Stalker (1966) note: 
while organic systems are not hierarchic in the same sense as are 
mechanistic, they remain stratified.. The lead in joint decisions 
is frequently taken by seniors, but it is an essential 
presumption of the organic system that the lead, i.e. 
"authority ", is taken by whoever shows himself (sic.) most 
informed and capable, i.e., the "best authority ". 
the area of commitment to the 
organic than in mechanistic 
expected to approach that of 
work, and frequently does. (p. 
Given the espoused commitment 
concern., is far more extensive in 
systems. Commitment, in fact, is 
the professional scientist to his 
122) 
of employed individuals to 
organisational ends, accountability is heightened in the new 
commercial agenda (Munro and Hatherly, forthcoming). Whilst this 
emergent accountability is ostensibly lateral, with all those in the 
organisation accountable to each other for its continuing success, 
Conceptions of accountability are typically aligned vertically 
with reporting systems and are subordinate to a "surveillance" 
framing of control. (ibid., p. 1) 
Thus organisational initiatives derived from the new commercial agenda 
frequently buttress stratification through an absorption of lateral 
accountability into extant systems of hierarchical accountability. 
Indeed, given the strength of belief in the "goodness" of 
62 
individualism and competition it is difficult to see how this 
discourse could serve to do otherwise. The new commercial agenda still 
privileges bottom to top accountability, utilising lateral 
accountability to "improve" the efficiency of the surveillance system. 
This leads us neatly into the third source of continuity between new 
and old agendas, the perseverance of the importance of leadership. As 
Burns and Stalker (1966) point out, in hierarchical systems the head 
of the organisation is seen to be omniscient through the marshalling 
and combination of knowledge that the hierarchical system provides. 
Pretensions of omniscience are absent in the new commercial agenda, 
but the role of the leader is no less vital. Leaders must not directly 
control the workforce, a combination of culture and represented 
markets and customers fulfil this need. Instead they must energise 
subordinates, empowering them as they seek to facilitate achievement 
of organisational objectives. Their activities must be culturally 
productive. This heroic role of "transforming" (Burns, 1978) 
leadership has a long history, extending at least as far back as the 
legends of the Vikings. Without an extended hierarchy, leaders take on 
a heightened mythical form of other worldliness. They are what other 
organisational participants must aspire to be. Their presence provides 
an instantiation of what the ideal organisational participant should 
be and hence fulfils an important role in the socialisation of bodies 
that approximate to that ideal (see also, Dugdale and Jones, 1993). 
Leaders must "walk the talk" as they act as exemplars of appropriate 
behaviour in the "new" organisation. To quote Burns and Stalker (1966, 
p. 211) once again: 
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The head of the concern stands for the concern and its relative 
successes - he (sic.) symbolizes or personifies it. The 
management of the concern is also a career system, and the man 
standing on the topmost rung has to serve as a showcase for the 
characteristics which must be attributed to the person who is by 
definition the most successful. 
Or as Peters and Waterman (1982) put it, in terms that could have been 
made for a discursive account of the new commercial agenda: 
The role of the leader., is one of orchestrator and labeller: 
taking what can be gotten in the way of action and shaping it - 
generally after the fact - into lasting commitment to a new 
strategic direction. In short, he makes meanings. (p. 75) 
In the delayered hierarchies of the new commercial agenda, a new form 
of leadership creates meanings to restore the coherence that hierarchy 
sought to instantiate but eventually destabilised. A large cadre of 
functionally defined managers is rendered unnecessary as managerial 
understandings are inculcated throughout the organisation. There is 
little need for management of others when discourse and discursive 
practices and technologies, coupled with the existence of an exemplary 
elite can engineer self management throughout the new organisation. 
For, despite the rhetoric and practices of "delayering ", indeed 
perhaps because of them, more and more organisational roles are 
prescribed as professional /managerial. The "death of the middle 
manager" (Leavitt and Whistler, 1958; Drucker, 1988) signals the birth 
of a more ubiquitous but more invisible managerialism - the 
"responsible autonomy" (Friedman, 1977) of a self organising 
population of self managing individuals. 
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Critique and the New Commercial Agenda 
Before examining how the terms of the new commercial agenda function 
in the translation processes of sociotechnical transformation, we 
briefly consider the role of critique in, and of, that agenda. 
At one level critique is essential for the (re)production of the form 
of managerialism that the new commercial agenda represents. As Miller 
and O'Leary demonstrate (1993; see also, Rose and Miller, 1992; 
Lilley, 1993; Thompson, 1986; 1989), managerial activity, or more 
generally governmental activity, is "congenitally failing ". 
Managerial expertise, and the government of the enterprise more 
generally, is a congenitally "failing" activity to the extent 
that a succession of programmes is the norm rather than the 
exception. (Miller and O'Leary, 1993). 
As we have already noted, the ouvre required for the emergence of the 
new commercial agenda was the representation of failures of older 
forms of managerialism. In this respect, management may be seen as an 
archetypal "problematizing activity" (ibid.; Rose and Miller, 1992). 
The raison d'etre and obligations of management derive from the 
specification of problems to be addressed and very few "problem 
spaces" have retained immunity from previous managerial initiatives. 
Thus, the discourses, practices and technologies of management are 
"bound to the constant identification of the difficulties and failures 
of [ management]" (Rose and Miller, 1992). 
Managers colonise the right to manage through the perpetuation of a 
particular "moral fiction" [5]. That is, they claim to "possess 
systematic effectiveness in controlling certain aspects of social 
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reality" (MacIntyre, 1985) through their access to particular forms of 
esoteric expertise and representational resources. This expertise is 
deployed both to explicate the indispensability of management and to 
provide managers with a vehicle for self instantiation (Foucault, 
1978). 
The apparent absence of a "rational" justification for managerial 
expertise has had little effect on the proliferation, deployment and 
transformation of managerialism. Realisation of the inadequacies of 
practices of management does not seem to lead to critical reflection 
on the philosophical underpinnings of the expertise deployed therein. 
Rather, the ineffectiveness of management serves to produce more 
management purporting to open up those "other" issues that brought 
failure to the prior "solutions" of managerial intervention (see also 
Baudrillard, 1983, on dissimulating simulations such as "Disneyland" 
and "Watergate "). The identification of the failure of one of 
management provides a justification for the implementation of another 
(Lilley, 1993). Additional evidence for this position is to be found 
in the shifting nature of the calls to change produced by prominent 
gurus such as Peters (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Peters, 1989; 1992). 
However, at another, more fundamental level, the need for management 
is seen to "hold" (Latour, 1987). Management does not seem to many to 
be peddling a form of "moral fiction ". Most of the managers (and 
probably most of the managed) seem to believe in the importance of 
some form of management, most of the time [6]. Despite the appearance 
of a number of devastating critiques of aspects of the new commercial 
agenda, both in terms of its theoretical coherence (e.g. Robbins, 
1983; Ray, 1984; Soeters, 1986; Barney, 1986; Fitzgerald, 1988; 
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Dahler- Larsen, 1991; Poliert, 1987; 1991; Willmott, 1991) and in terms 
of the practicalities of its implementation (e.g. Knights and 
Willmott, 1987; Smith, 1990; Wilkinson et al, 1991; Kerfoot and 
Knights, 1993; Kunda, 1992; Van Maanen, 1992; Wilkinson et al, 1992; 
Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992) there seems to be no slow down in the 
diffusion of its themes. Indeed recent evidence (e.g. Ezzamel et al, 
1992; 1993) suggests that an accelerating proliferation of the 
discourse and its associated practices and technologies is underway. 
However, as Foucault insists, it is power, not "facts" about reality, 
that makes things "true ". The power relations and effects associated 
with the discourse of the new commercial agenda are evidently greater 
than those associated with fundamental critiques of that discourse. 
The new commercial agenda is more widely diffused and creative of 
entities with access to far greater resources than are critiques of 
that agenda. The representations it mobilises enable significant 
actions and it derives further support and legitimation from wider 
"neo- liberal" political rationalities (Rose and Miller, 1992; Power, 
forthcoming) As we have noted, the power relations of this agenda 
produce "effects of truth" within a discourse that we may consider to 
be "neither true nor false" (Foucault, 1980, p. 118). It is the 
outcome of the struggle over power that arbitrates the truth. 
[T]ruth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted 
solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in 
liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is 
produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 131) 
Indeed it is the existence of resistant critiques of this discourse 
that serves to alert us to its power effects. However, on another 
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level a number of these critiques, substantial and well argued as they 
are, perhaps miss the point as they indulge a desire to let the 
"truth" shine through. Keenoy and Anthony (1992) draw together many of 
the strands of the new commercial agenda under the rubric of "Human 
Resource Management ". And as they point out the virility of this 
discourse does not reside in its truth or falsity (see also, Clarke, 
1992, on the aspirational power of "ideal types "). Rather,.. 
to understand the HRM phenomenon in Britain it is is necessary to 
treat it as a cultural construction comprised of a series of 
metaphors which constitute a "new reality ". HRM reflects an 
attempt to redefine both the meaning of work and the way 
individual employees relate to their employers. (ibid., p. 234) 
The new commercial agenda produces meaning and produces truth. It is 
not usefully judged in terms of its own truthfulness. It is associated 
with more potent relations and effects than competing critical 
discourses. As Margaret Thatcher so eloquently put it: "There Is No 
Alternative ", at least not a viable one. Thus, as Keenoy and Anthony 
(1992) remind us: 
[T]he "empirical reality" that must be penetrated before we can 
come to a properly informed understanding of the nature of HRM is 
what might be called the internal logic of the histrionics of 
HRM. (ibid., p. 235) 
Such a position sensitises us to the validity and usefulness of 
Foucauldian conceptions of discourse in our attempts to apprehend the 
new commercial agenda. We now go on to consider the role of this 
powerful agenda in the translation processes of sociotechnical 
transformation. 
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Enabling Sociotechnical Change: The Role of the New Commercial Agenda 
Given the overall cultural project of re- engineering individual 
commitment to the organisation's objectives, two themes of the new 
commercial agenda may be said to exemplify the frontiers of the 
representational space constituted by the discourse of that agenda. 
These two themes are "quality" and "flexibility" and they reflect a 
(potentially) contradictory tension at the heart of this discourse 
[7]. There can be little doubt that they are indeed central to the 
agenda: 
Today's and tomorrow's winning hand is becoming increasingly 
clear - quality and flexibility. (Peters, 1988, p. 22) 
Moreover, the terms themselves represent almost universal "goods" 
(Power, personal communication). It is difficult to argue with calls 
for increased flexibility or improved quality as it was, and indeed 
continues to be, difficult to argue with calls for increased 
"efficiency ". Arguments made in their name can only be rebuffed 
through invocation of the inadequacy of means. As ends their 
appropriateness is given and through a re- presentational sleight of 
hand this serves to ensure the "givenness" of organisational 
objectives. Activities must be made more "flexible" or be more 
"quality conscious" to better serve organisational ends, since 
individual success is seen to depend on organisational success and 
organisational success depends on "flexibility" and the "continuous 
improvement of quality ". "Goods" abound, who could argue with that? 
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The space for action delineated by the dual action of these terms is 
admirably broad. Both terms are endowed with considerable 
"interpretive flexibility" [8] (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). And as Munro 
(1991; 1993) drawing upon the insights offered by Cohen (1985; 1987) 
demonstrates: 
it is this very ambiguity of signs which affords their binding 
properties. (Munro, 1993, p. 21) 
Thus the terms "flexibility" and "quality" may be seen to bind 
communities of actors without overly constraining their potential for 
(suitably) diverse action. The terms may suggest, and be used to 
legitimate, a wide range of actions without the resulting cacophony of 
action (necessarily) resulting in unintelligibility (Arthur, 1993). 
These aspects of two of the key representational elements of the new 
commercial agenda are essential for the furtherance of that agenda. 
The terms are "flexible" enough to allow a range of possible actions 
deemed to be appropriate to the achievement of organisational 
objectives. The flexibility of the terms enables the representation of 
a "rag bag" of practices as together constituting a strategic agenda 
(Knights and Morgan, 1991; Munro, 1991). The requisite space necessary 
for translation, the inherent need to deal with the particularities of 
diverse entities enrolled in specific networks, is thus provided 
within a discursive framework that simultaneously provides a 
representation of the overall activities of the organisation as 
"strategic ". 
We conclude this chapter by considering the particular importance of 
each of these two terms in the logics of the new commercial agenda. 
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The Importance of Flexibility and Quality in the New Commercial Agenda 
As Rose and Miller (1992) and Miller and O'Leary (1993) admirably 
demonstrate, the new commercial agenda may be seen to be part and 
parcel of a wider politico -cultural shift towards "neo- liberalism ". In 
the USA at least, this agenda has been translated into a "politics of 
the product" (ibid.) that seeks to ensure that all organisational 
activities contribute to the product and to the satisfaction of the 
customer. The "Governmental Society" described by Peter Miller may be 
seen to be partially synonymous with Power's (forthcoming) "Audit 
Society ". It is to this latter text that we turn to conclude the 
arguments of this chapter. 
"Audit" is granted a wide definition in Power's treatment and 
encompasses the ubiquitous notion of quality. 
audit functions as a norm or "rationality of government" in Rose 
and Miller's (1992) sense... Audit is a particular manner of 
(re)presenting administrative problems and their solutions. 
(ibid., p. 2) 
Audit (along with "quality" initiatives such as BS5750) is seen to be 
the "control of control" (ibid.), hence the similarity with more 
generalised notions of "governmentality" (Foucault, 1991). 
Audits function at a temporal and often spatial distance from the 
organizational processes to which they are applied (ibid.). 
The governmentality inherent in the "audit explosion" reveals the 
importance of flexibility and quality in the new commercial agenda. 
Flexibility is invokes in order to loosen up rules of precedence and 
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hierarchy, whilst quality is invoked in order to tighten up rules and 
reassert (a transformed) control. Through such processes "neo- 
liberalism" is realised. 
On the one hand, centrifugal pressures for.. decentralisation and 
devolution of.. services represent an "enterprization" 
[flexibilisation ?] of.. functions. On the other hand, centripetal 
pressures to retain control over newly autonomised services 
inform a new governmental rationality in which intervention can 
be accomplished by indirect means. Audit [or quality] is a 
decisive political technology (Rose and Miller, 1992) in which 
these mutually constitutive forces are reconciled and ensures 
that the displacement of organizational hierarchies by market 
structures is never complete; audit [or quality] is the shadow of 
hierarchy which serves the appearance of central control. (Power, 
forthcoming, p. 7) 
In this sense audit and associated treatments of quality represent an 
archaeology of control (Munro, forthcoming) derived from the "old" 
commercial agenda and embedded within the new. This enables the 
simultaneous production, reconciliation and dissemination of "loose - 
tight" (Peters and Waterman, 1982) organisational properties. Freedom 
and control are mutually guaranteed and enrolled to act for the good 
of the organisation. 
In the next few chapters we examine in detail, in the terms of 
organisational participants, the intertwinings of entities and the 
emergent new commercial agenda in the processes of translation 
involved in the sociotechnical transformation of BP Oil's refining 
network. 
The first chapter of this section concerns events that preceded the 
introduction of a Refinery Information System (RIS) at Grangemouth 
Refinery. However, the "facts" about these events, as rendered in the 
accounts of organisational participants, were seen by those 
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participants to have played an important formative role in the 
emergence of the notion of integrated refinery information systems and 
the subsequent instantiation of that notion in RIS at Grangemouth. 
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THE EMERGENCE OF BRITISH PETROLEUM'S 
REFINERY BASED INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Introduction 
During the late nineteen eighties BP embarked upon a programme of 
Refinery Information System (RIS) implementations at its major 
refineries throughout the world. This chapter seeks to start to 
provide a context for the consideration of one such implementation 
that occurred at BP's Grangemouth Refinery in Scotland. An in depth 
case study of the Grangemouth implementation was undertaken by the 
researcher during 1990/1991. The material presented here concerns 
events that preceded the implementation of the Grangemouth system. 
This material is derived primarily from interviews with individuals 
involved in the Grangemouth implementation, both at the refinery and 
elsewhere within the BP Group. These organisational participants have 
attempted to identify the origins of the Grangemouth system as well as 
the factors affecting itS final shape. Thus the following is an 
historical account of the development of the RIS concept within the BP 
Group. The researcher has attempted to describe the interaction of the 
pertinent factors identified and thus to provide a history of the 
development process. 
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Organising Oil Refining 
An oil refinery transforms crude oil into products. Crude oil is a 
mixture of many hydrocarbons and refining involves the separation of 
the crude into its constituent fractions. Some of these fractions are 
subjected to processes designed to alter the molecular structure of 
the oil through chemical reactions. This is undertaken to transform 
plentiful low value substances into scarcer and more valuable 
substances. Finally, the various fractions and substances so produced 
are blended together, often with some additives, to produce the 
saleable products. 
For the majority of its short history, the oil industry has been 
organised by a relatively small number of vertically integrated 
multinational companies. Since Rockefeller and his four associates 
established the Standard Oil Company in 1870 [1] the name of the game 
has been "integration ". Rockefeller sought to combat the "'waste' of 
unbridled competition" [1] through economies of scale and scope, by 
combining and collecting the activities required by the oil industry 
under the roof of one company. Any companies attempting to attack 
Standard's monopoly position had to attack on all fronts. Thus the 
small number of major companies that were formed from the enforced 
break up of Standard Oil Trust and the few companies that challenged 
them followed the logic of integration. 
The Anglo- Persian Oil Company, later to become BP was no exception. To 
avoid obliteration at the hands of Standard Oil, it$ successors, and 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































company. It controlled exploration for its own oil, transportation of 
its own oil, refining of its own oil, and marketing and distribution 
of its own products. Oil companies produced their own raw materials, 
crude oil, they sold only finished products, and only to their own 
end -user consumers. The integrated oil company was the King of the 
oil industry until relatively recently but all of that was to change 
with a sudden and massive increase in the price of crude oil. 
The Development of Intermediate Markets for Refinery Products 
If you go back far enough in time you get to the situation where 
oil companies, including in Europe, including BP, were acting as 
vertically integrated. So they brought in their crude, probably 
their own, through to their refineries, through their 
transportation means, through their distribution means, through 
to their customers [2]. 
However, during the early nineteen -eighties intermediate markets 
became more important to the oil refining industry, particularly with 
regard to product trading. "[R]efineries like Rotterdam were pumping 
out surpluses into a market, were generating intermediate markets" 
[2]. This was "...a consequence of overcapacity, [particularly 
European overcapacity] and [it was] the wish of companies to use 
assets in an overcapacity area that actually generated the third 
party market" [2]. 
...there was a vast expansion in crude oil processing capacity in 
the seventies in anticipation of a rapid growth in oil demand. 
Now what then happened...was we had...Yom Kippur...in 197[3], we 
then had the Iranian crisis in 1978/79...[and] because the crude 
price jumped in two very large steps from effectively $3 a barrel 
to $30 a barrel...what you then had was a dramatic slowdown in 
growth of demand. The capacity had already been built and hence 
people found themselves with surplus capacity. What they then had 
to do if they wanted to move the crude through it was get rid of 
the products [3]. 
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...the overriding push was that you have all these fixed costs 
associated with refineries and you need to keep the throughputs 
up in order to spread those fixed costs around. You've got 
marginal economics to play and if you make a dollar a barrel in 
terms of producing an extra amount of refinery product and you 
can sell it then at least you've got that dollar a barrel. The 
fact that your total fixed costs might've been two dollars a 
barrel or more still meant that you were getting a contribution 
to fixed costs, and that always pushed the economics of 
throughput up beyond your markets [2]. 
Overcapacity in the refining sector was not the sole cause of the 
development of intermediate markets. There were also "Independents 
coming in looking to see if they [could] play blending games, moving 
the stock games" [3] The large volume of business and the increasing 
number of players involved were important factors. 
Inevitably when you have a large volume of business...you've got 
a lot of potential for people to come in and do their own bit, 
and the minute you've got a number of players then you have a 
vibrant market. [It's] no different from Covent Garden fruit and 
veg really,...the reason that's a vibrant market is that there's 
a large volume and there's a number of people that are involved 
for various purposes [3]. 
Then the need came as to how BP was going to play in those 
intermediate markets and start to sell to third parties [2]. 
...you...had to control it because for the first time you had a 
third party interface coming into it. If it was internal there 
was no sale, you just moved the oil. Whereas what was happening 
is that we were making sales by barge to third parties. We had to 
invoice them, we had to control them, had to take orders, and all 
of a sudden there was a whole new commercial scene to manage [2]. 
Further Implications of European Overcapacity 
As we noted in the previous section, the refining sector of the oil 
industry was confronted by problems of overcapacity in the early 
nineteen -eighties as a consequence of assumptions concerning the world 









































































































































































































































































































































































The two price jumps basically led to recessions, falling GDP's 
across the world, slowdown in economic growth, [and] slowdown in 
demand for oil [3]. 
These problems were partially responsible for the emergence of 
intermediate markets in the sector but this response was insufficient 
to ameliorate the extent to which supply and demand in the industry 
were out of balance. The overcapacity had to be removed. The 
implications of the spiralling costs of oil for the demand side of the 
equation were becoming apparent relatively early on. Various attempts 
were made to encourage demand and particularly product loyalty on the 
part of consumers. Among such schemes were offers of gifts with petrol 
purchases. The problems facing the refining sector were however too 
deep to be dealt with permanently in such a superficial way. 
Certainly the joke...when the oil price reached ten dollars was 
that what we ought to have been doing was selling people glasses 
and giving them the petrol free [3]. 
Supply completely outstripped demand. If you tie supply back the 
supply and demand balance works itself back onto even keel 
terms [3]. 
The Removal of Surplus Capacity 
Supply had to be tied back by a programme of refinery closures. The 
majority of these closures occurred during the nineteen eighties. 
Other refiners in Europe were also cutting back on their capacity 
during this period since they too had expanded their refining network 
on the basis of similar assumptions concerning the growth 
in world oil 
demand to those that had been employed by BP. 
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...quite a number of refineries [had to be] shut down because 
people saw that if you continued with the capacity that you had 
there was no way that there was any long term payback.. in the 
long term you weren't even going to recover your variable 
costs [3]. 
However, decisions concerning whether or not to shut down refineries 
are far from straightforward. The main parameters which are used to 
guide the decision making are not stable and there is a great deal of 
uncertainty to contend with, particularly with regard to the oil 
price. Getting the desired capacity was a very gradual process. 
Well, you run it for as long as it makes some kind of 
contribution to the fixed costs and even when it doesn't...you 
can shut all the units down but you don't close the whole site 
down. Hopeless PR, but also the margins are volatile themselves 
and...up until 1987 the margins bounced around a zero 
contribution but if you managed it properly you could at least do 
something [3]. 
As the previous quote suggests, supply costs and product revenues were 
not the only important factors when considering the extent and timing 
of these closures. Closures of refineries were seen to be one -way 
decisions. A closure decision was final and the company was unlikely 
to try to reopen a closed site. Public reaction to the consequences 
to the local economies of refinery shutdowns were also important. 
There was a lag in this because when you shut down a major 
employment centre, quite often in distressed areas of the 
country, for example in Llandarcy where it's a halfway decision, 
it's a difficult decision to take and there is often a length of 
time before the timing allows you to do it as cleanly as you 
would like. We're probably five years behind the time that 
commercially we would have liked to have changed from defensive 
to progressive investment [4]. 
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Organisational Changes in the Early Eighties 
The dramatic rise in crude oil prices precipitated by events in the 
middle east during the nineteen seventies did not have a uniformly 
negative effect on the corporation's ability to generate profits. As 
we noted, BP was a highly integrated company and the disintegration 
that occurred during the eighties was only in terms of trading 
relationships. The constituent activities of the organisation 
remained. Thus the BP group still has very considerable interests in 
exploration and production of crude oil and the organisation as a 
whole may have derived a net benefit from the rising price of oil. 
However, the refining and marketing sectors of the business certainly 
suffered as a result of the price changes. 
Changes were made in the organisational structure of the BP group 
during the early eighties. Following a three year study of the group's 
internal organisation these changes, announced in December 1980, 
finally took effect in March 1981 [5]. 
In the central group organisation most activities have been 
devolved into four principal Businesses (oil supply, refining and 
marketing; oil and gas exploration and production; chemicals; 
minerals), four smaller Businesses (gas; coal; nutrition; 
detergents), and BP Ventures [6]. 
The new structure was introduced to take "...account of the increasing 
diversity of the group's world -wide operations, [to allow] for greater 
devolution in decision -making, and [to establish] a basis for further 
evolution in the 1980's" [6]. The four principal Businesses were to be 
known as BP Oil International; BP Exploration; BP Chemicals 
International; and BP Minerals International [5]. 
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Before that we were very much a unified company. We thought that 
concealed in a way where we were good and where we were bad. It 
was much better to be more transparent and much better to be more 
devolved and then businesses could be judged on their own terms, 
with their own competitors, and not have them concealed by the 
overall BP [7]. 
Revealed Performance and Refinery Closures 
In November 1981 a new chairman, Peter Walters who started his BP 
career in 1954, took control of the group, and for the first two years 
of his stewardship the financial performance of the newly formed BP 
Oil International was considered unsatisfactory, with substantial 
losses being made in refining and marketing, particularly in Europe 
[8]. At the time of the formation of BPOI in March 1981, there was 
some 40% surplus in crude oil distillation capacity in Europe [8]. By 
early 1984 33% of the company's refining capacity had been closed [9], 
with the majority of these closures occurring in North West Europe. 
With a small revival in world oil demand and the removal of some 
overcapacity in the refining sector, $125 million in refining and 
marketing losses in 1982 became $297 million in profits in 1983 [9]. 
(although in 1984 BPOI's profits dropped to just over half of the 
previous years total [10]). Further action to reduce overcapacity in 
Europe continued through 1984 and a series of new rationalisation 
measures were announced in January 1985. Much of BP Oil's European 
refining capacity was removed. On completion of these changes BPOI had 
reduced its European crude oil distillation capacity to 65 million 
tonnes per annum, a reduction from the beginning of 1981 of 43 million 
tonnes per annum. In 1988 BPOI had five major refineries in Europe 

































































































































































































































































































The volatile trading environment has vindicated our highly 
flexible policy towards crude oil and products supplies, 
especially in Europe. After trading around one million barrels of 
products a day, we sell more than we refine. However, our 
refining throughput is now more in balance with our core 
marketing demand. We tailor the mix of own- refined and bought -in 
products to take advantage of market fluctuations. We are one of 
the world's leading bulk traders of crude oil and products, an 
activity that contributes directly and indirectly to our 
downstream [refining and marketing] performance [11]. 
One can see the early to mid -eighties as a period in which BP began to 
vertically disintegrate and take on a more commercial focus, 
particularly within the newly created businesses that were once just 
elements of a centralised group. The relative autonomy devolved to BP 
Oil International by the BP Group Corporate Centre, partially replaced 
centralised control with a commercial orientation. The new businesses 
were responsible for their own performance in the market. 
The relationships between Manufacturing and Supply within the newly 
formed BP Oil International were fundamentally altered. The refining 
or manufacturing side of the business no longer simply responded to 
BP's customers needs filtered through the central supply department. 
Refinery products could be traded entrepreneurially and predictability 
of supply in an increasing complex environment was becoming ever more 
critical. It was becoming more and more important for the activities 
of refineries to be made if not perfectly visible, then at least 
predictable to elements of the BP Oil organisation that were remote 
from the refineries. They needed more information on manufacturing in 
order to deal with the increasing complexity arising from huge changes 
in the nature of the distribution and supply side, changes that 
resulted from the increased importance of marketing and product 
exchanges with other oil companies. 
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The Increasing Importance of Product Exchanges 
As we noted previously, until the early eighties oil companies were 
largely vertically integrated. This situation applied to BP but there 
were some important differences between BP and the other majors. 
Some of the American companies, the Texacos, the Essos, were very 
integrated and would rely...a lot on their own system. BP, 
partially as a function of leaving Kuwait, Nigeria, [and] Iran, 
had to get involved in other forms of getting crude oil for its 
refineries. It then also went through a series of refinery 
closures [in North West Europe and] then...found that what it did 
have was...a lot of capacity let's say in the Rotterdam refinery, 
but it was deficit elsewhere as a result of those closures. Now 
all those events mean that you've got to go out looking to 
somebody else to buy the stuff...We had to get hold of crude from 
various other sources [and] the shutting of refiner[ies] then 
means that...you've now got to start trading products, to start 
sourcing them from different places [3]. 
BP moved from a situation where occasional crude and product transfers 
occurred, known as "managing imbalances" [3] to one in which the co- 
ordination of distribution and supply through links with other players 
became core to the business. BP Oil UK's Supply Division has to 
ensure... 
...that we supply our markets profitably within the procedural 
constraints under which we have to operate, and the main function 
through which we achieve that is exchanges [12]. 
Grangemouth is now BP's only crude oil refinery in the United Kingdom. 
Ten years ago BP operated four refineries in the U.K. at Grangemouth, 
Kent, Llandarcy, and a small one in Belfast. This surplus capacity 
meant that little exchange of product with other oil companies was 
required. However, with the partial closure of Llandarcy and complete 
closure at Kent and Belfast, BP found itself with a market based 
almost entirely in the South of England whilst its refining operations 
96 
were concentrated in Scotland. There has been a change in emphasis 
away from a primary concern with refinery co- ordination towards 
consideration of marketing and exchange issues, or "Exchanges and 
Modal Planning" [13]. Exchanges are made with other oil companies to 
ensure adequate supply all over the country. Oil companies, including 
BP, are understandably reticent on the subject of product exchanges. 
The arrangements have a tendency to look like the sort of 
cartelisation reviled by the press since virtually the inception of 
the oil industry. BP Oil even provided its employees with a ready made 
justification of these arrangements in its in house newspaper [14]. 
Contrary to tabloid newspaper wisdom, it's not a cosy 
relationship between big oil companies designed for their benefit 
at the expense of the customer. 
But for the fuels exchange system, the cost of fuels would be 
higher than it is now, says Janet Hogben, manager of the 
Exchanges Section which is located at Hemel. 
"If every one had to supply their own product to all locations 
from their own refineries you would find companies would pull out 
of certain areas which would reduce competition.. There is no 
doubt therefore that exchanges are a force pulling prices down." 
These exchange deals enable BP and other companies to provide 
national coverage economically. BP operates with many oil 
companies in the UK which in turn have deals with one another. 
The Exchanges Section estimates there are 500 or so different 
elements to be renegotiated annually [14]. 
Thus, the nineteen eighties saw not only an unprecedented increase in 
the importance of marketing of refinery products but also, through the 
removal of overcapacity, an equally large increase in the importance 
of product exchanges. For example, BP Oil UK supplies approximately 
half of its customer demand through exchanges. 
...about four million out of the eight million tonnes delivered 
to customers are provided through exchanges [12]. 
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Rotterdam's Position in Relation to the Developing Markets 
The emergence of this "commercial scene" and the need to manage 
refining activities in relation to an intermediate market were 
particularly marked at BP's Rotterdam refinery. The activity of the 
refinery was very closely linked to the activities of buyers and 
sellers on the Rotterdam spot market [15]. The spot market, as we 
noted, developed partially as a consequence of the defensive behaviour 
of oil companies in response to overcapacity in the refining sector 
[2]. The market that so developed is a logical market, not a physical 
one, with trading activities distributed throughout a number of 
centres in Europe [16] Thus, the Rotterdam spot market [17] is an 
independent commodities market with its own traders and sources of 
information. Its activities are made visible through Reuters' 
reporting of market indicators [16]. 
Thus although Rotterdam refinery had a relatively small local market, 
it was well placed to deal with North European trading on the spot 
market [15]. It would seem that Rotterdam refinery's geographical 
location in relation to North European trading routes, coupled with 
the emergence of an intermediate market for refinery products, and 
later supplies [2], placed it in a situation that presented 
significant commercial opportunities. However, the benefits of playing 
in an intermediate market did not come without costs. The main one of 
these costs being the consequent increase in the complexity of the oil 
management problem at refineries. 
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Implications of the Geographical Separation of Manufacturing and 
Supply 
Refining represents only one side of the Manufacturing and Supply 
activities of an oil company. Refining, the production or 
manufacturing side, must be co- ordinated and managed to ensure that 
customer supply demands can be adequately met. The supply side of the 
Manufacturing and Supply Division of BP Oil seeks to ensure "...that 
we supply our markets profitably within the procedural constraints 
under which we have to operate" [12]. The supply function is concerned 
both with making sure that customers are supplied with refined 
products and also ensuring that refineries themselves have adequate 
feedstocks to produce the prescribed product mix to satisfy those 
customer needs. In short, each refinery's field of competence is 
almost entirely limited to the running of plant and the blending of 
components so produced. Decisions concerning the sources of raw 
materials, amounts of raw materials required, destinations of 
products, size of production, and product mix are the concern of the 
supply function. Today, these decisions are becoming more of a matter 
for negotiation between the refinery and the supply function, but 
during the early eighties this was not the case. 
Historically, this supply co- ordination task had been carried out at 
the corporate centre in London. Whilst BP was acting as a "vertically 
integrated company" [2] dealing with it's end -customers directly, 
before the emergence of these intermediate markets, this arrangement 
did not seem to be problematic [18]. Thus, for Rotterdam refinery the 
manufacturing and supply functions were, and had always been, 
geographically separate. The two functions were approximately 200 
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miles apart [15]. The activities of those individuals concerned with 
commercial dealings in refinery products and supplies, who worked from 
the corporate centre in London had a considerable effect on Rotterdam 
refinery's activities. These effects were particularly pronounced at 
Rotterdam, as we noted, due to its proximity to an important trading 
area on the spot market, and thus the activities at the refinery were 
very closely linked to those of buyers and sellers on the spot market 
[15]. 
An Information Systems Solution to the Separation Problem 
BP were reluctant to relinquish centralised control of their supply 
function, and thus a computerised system was developed in the early 
eighties to bridge the gap between Rotterdam's manufacturing and 
London's supply functions [4]. The refinery's proximity to, and 
dependence on, the market had created an acute management problem 
[15]. BP traders working within the supply function in London needed 
information on the refinery's stocks in order to allow them to play 
the market. 
...theoretically you could sort out the Rotterdam control problem 
by transposing the commercial control across to the refinery. 
Now, in fact, what we chose to do as a company was not to do that 
but actually bridge the gap using technology [4]. 
Thus, the desire to maintain centralised commercial control led to the 
introduction of a distribution monitoring system, known as SIS, 
(Supply Information System [19]) to BP Oil's corporate centre at 
Britannic House in London in 1982/83 [20]. This was, in essence, a 
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supply control information system at the London supply centre, 
"upstream" of refinery production. 
...the refinery had a direct link into [the system], so it was 
actually run completely at the London end of things [20]. 
The supply division in London produced production requirements and 
"...then it was downloaded to the refinery, then production would 
handle it" [20]. Thus the SIS system provided a partial solution to 
the problem of controlling production in relation to the demands of an 
intermediate market. However, this increased ability to play the 
market that the system provided to the London supply division had some 
unpleasant side effects on the complexity of the refinery production 
management task. Tensions developed during the early eighties as the 
SIS system facilitated the traders ability to trade. The problems grew 
as immediate electronic trading became more important [15]. Rotterdam 
refinery's proximity to the spot market's main distribution route, 
coupled with the traders increased ability to trade resulted in the 
refinery using up to fifty different crude supplies a year. Each cargo 
of crude was throughput in approximately two to three days. Thus every 
two to three days the refinery had to respond to changes in its supply 
side, whilst at the other end output was extremely variable as it was 
market driven [15]. This resulted in BP Oil being unable to honour 
agreed deals from its own refinery manufacturing. Instead they were 
forced to buy stocks on the market to meet customer needs to which 
they were committed. The organisation was being forced to act as a 
"distressed" purchaser, leaving itself in a vulnerable position [15]. 
According to a refinery programming manager at BP Oil UK's Head Office 
in Hemel Hempstead,... 
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...the whole aim of this [the supply division co- ordination task] 
is to get advance information to avoid being in a distressed 
position (my emphasis) [12]. 
Traders trading on the spot market can commit the refinery to supply a 
customer up to approximately one month ahead of delivery. Thus the 
traders were dealing in terms of the future production capabilities, 
but they were basing their deals on current rather than future 
oriented information. 
The Traders Use of Information 
The notion of traders' increased ability to trade on the basis of the 
SIS information is a slightly simplified view of the situation. The 
traders are making "seat of the pants" decisions, and the last thing 
they want to be doing is ploughing through reams of screens. Moreover, 
much of the information available pertains to aspects of manufacturing 
and supply that lie outside their field of expertise. 
They don't have the background to understand what the information 
means. People who understand it best have already seen it. And 
they don't have the time [3]. 
A lot of those traders are not engineers, they do not necessarily 
understand the refinery and they are not the people who are 
dictating how the refinery runs [3]. 
As the previous quote suggests, the traders are working within quite 
severe constraints set by the supply function. 
The supply people have to judge...what they think the correct 
levels of stock holding [are] and the most optimal manner of 
getting the right stocks into the right place [3]. 
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Supply people are essentially considering 
ensuring there is enough stock to go round 
traders are...trying to balance that when 
buy in or sell out [and optimise the price 
With advanced information systems... 
movement of stock and 
all the terminals. The 
there is a demand to 
paid or received] [3]. 
...you do have a great deal more information [but] what it 
hopefully does is it allows the people who send the requests and 
are [talking to] the traders...to have greater confidence in 
what's going on so that the level of instruction they can give to 
the trader is more secure, is more accurate, and hence allows 
more opportunities [3]. 
[SIS information] enhanced [the traders] understanding of what 
stocks were available but [they] never saw that information 
[directly]. It went to the [supply] operational function within 
the Head Office and they then presented the options to the 
traders [3]. 
The Head Office then, and it's still the case,..dictated the plan 
for the refinery, decided what stock levels should be. They 
didn't decide what tank should be blended with what tank to make 
what, but they did decide what the demand levels were and what 
should be manufactured [3]. 
The task of deciding "what tank should be blended with what tank" was, 
and is, undertaken at the refinery by production schedulers. Since the 
early eighties BP Oil has been... 
...creating little teams [grouped around particular products] of 
effectively a supply operations person, a trader,..a [refinery] 
scheduler, and somebody...in supply...who evaluates the value of 
[components and products to us]...because...they've all got part 
of the picture [3]. 
Decisions concerning the precise activities of BP Oil's manufacturing 
and supply operations emerge out of communications between these 
individuals. These decisions are not really systematised. The 
relationships are... 
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...loose because the decision is so complex no one person can 
hold it together...For each element of that decision making 
somebody's responsible so you've focused in there but what you 
say is that the whole needs the collaboration of a number of 
individuals [3]. 
These decisions are still made in the same way today, although the 
influence of the various stakeholders has changed over time. This may 
be seen as at least partially a result of changes in the information 
available to the different stakeholders involved. 
The Importance of Refinery Based Information Systems 
The supply function is not the only information filter for the 
traders, the refinery schedulers also fulfil such a function, 
considering the information available to them and utilising their 
expertise to inform the traders of it salient points "...and make 
part of their decision for them" [3]. 
...what [the refinery schedulers] have to do is dress the 
information in a manner which is most useful to [the traders]. 
[T]he scheduler is sitting there between the refinery and the 
trader and the supply operations people and thinking...with what 
I'm doing with this refinery what is the best way of making 
availabilities [3]. 
[Availabilities here refers to both excess products that may be 
tradeable and opportunities for the absorption into the refinery 
system of feedstocks that may then be purchased by the traders at 
a "nice price "] 
The "distressed purchasing" was seen as symptomatic of the poor 
quality and lack of (timely) availability of information, particularly 
to the refinery production planners and schedulers [15]. It is the 
schedulers and planners who carry out much of the on site oil 
management activities. Thus, a need was perceived for a system that 
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would allow "managers at Rotterdam to manage their plant more 
effectively" [15]. In effect, the SIS system had enabled the London 
supply function to provide the traders with more opportunities. The 
refinery schedulers had derived some benefit from the system because 
"...it gave them greater awareness of exactly what they had in various 
tanks" [3]. But on balance the major benefits were derived by the 
London supply function. As we noted, the traders were not directly 
affected by the system, their improved information was provided by 
their contacts in the supply /scheduler /trader nexus. An asymmetry had 
developed leading to a bottleneck in BP's manufacturing and supply 
system. This bottleneck was at the refinery and it made the 
schedulers' production management task considerably more difficult. 
Rotterdam Refinery 
One of the European refinery analysts from BP Oil Europe's 
Manufacturing development group described Rotterdam's situation: 
Well it's an odd kind of refinery, coupled with the fact that it 
barge trades, so you know, you then have very small boardings 
which means there's a considerable scheduling problem. And 
because it's entrepreneurial it had to respond very quickly to 
the market whereas other refineries like RVI [in Bavaria, 
Southern Germany] for example, is land -locked and supplies a 
local market, Grangemouth is much the same, it's much more 
stable [20]. 
As we noted, during the early to mid -eighties these tensions were an 
increasing cause for concern. A refinery based RIS system was seen as 
providing the potential for a technological solution to the problem. 
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I think we were losing quite a lot of profits then. I wouldn't 
call it a crisis, that's sort of steeped in erm..., it was 
obviously the most prominent refinery that needed such a 
solution [20]. 
One member of the BDU team who was deeply involved in the Rotterdam 
RIS strategy study described his "personal view" of the situation as a 
"resonance" problem. 
You've got variability at both ends with the plant in the middle 
and switching the plant activities was a slow process. If you did 
attempt to change inputs and requirements quickly a great deal of 
turbulence developed within the plant processes. Thus the plant 
was very difficult to manage [15]. 
...management were being run by the plant rather than running the 
plant [15]. 
Another manager noted the inadequacy of the SIS system in terms of its 
inability to look forward. Traders on the spot market can be 
committing to deals up to a month ahead of delivery [3]: 
It wasn't enough just to have what stocks are currently tested in 
tanks [at the refinery] because what was actually important in 
terms of committing the business of the next day and the day 
afterwards, which is what the...traders were doing and had to do, 
is they had to have confidence in what was going to be produced 
(my emphasis). In other words they had to have confidence in a 
production plan. They didn't need so much to know the position 
now because they dealt in the future. They needed to know what 
the position was going to be tomorrow and the next day. Only then 
can you actually take control of the whole physical flow [4]. 
...when you make a sale you commit yourself to supply a customer 
in the future [21]. 
...working stock levels for refineries are very limited, 
therefore you cannot work on a replacement stock basis because 
the variability, or "noise" in requirements is greater than the 
stock balance. Hence the need to control the future [16]. 
You could not handle the amount of barge volume that was taking 
place out of Rotterdam by hand. It was just, the co- ordination 
required, the speed of response, was not possible [2]. 
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Thus, the production planning systems at Rotterdam were perceived to 
be a "bottleneck" that needed unblocking. The degree of variability in 
Rotterdam's production and supply profile was such that "...the 
monthly plan [produced by the London supply division] was largely 
redundant immediately, and thus the refinery required an enormous 
amount of on site [oil] management" [15]. 
The Emergence of the Rotterdam RIS System: Rotterdam in Crisis 
A small project team was set up at Rotterdam by the corporate centre 
Manufacturing and Supply Business Development Unit (BDU) to try to 
address these issues. The aim was to examine the systems in place and 
attempt to develop them to allow the site management to regain control 
[15]. The team started off by asking the managers at Rotterdam what 
their principle objectives were within the refinery. The rather 
worrying answers they received, in the light of the new commercial 
opportunities emerging from the developing intermediate markets, were 
that their objectives were: 
1. Jump for London 
2. Minimise stocks 
3. Minimise costs [15] 
It would seem that the refinery management were faced with such an 
acute management problem that they simply did not have time to engage 
in consideration of the commercial implications of the emerging 
markets. The implications as far as they were concerned did not seem 
to move beyond an endlessly defensive battle with an expanding 
logistical nightmare. 
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The Rotterdam study team tried to supplant these objectives of a loss 
reduction based operation with the idea of profitable operation. They 
sought to expand the management focus from its current concern with 
reducing costs, that is raw materials and refining costs, to encompass 
consideration of the price obtainable for manufactured products. The 
refinery management were told by the project team that their principle 
objective should be profit maximisation [15]. BDU's had considerable 
influence within the organisation during the mid -eighties. 
The idea was that they would direct the strategy of those 
businesses [for which they were responsible] within BP Oil, but 
only the strategy. But over time, they grew to be sort of 
monsters, employed an awful lot of people and interfered frankly 
far too much in operational areas [7]. 
However, as far as the refinery management were concerned the 
complexity of their present task precluded much consideration of the 
profit and loss implications of their activities. Before the managers 
could direct the refinery's operations in a profit seeking manner, 
they had to regain control. And the study team sought to give them 
back that control through the creation of an "integrated oil 
management system" [21]. 
The inadequacies of the SIS supply to manufacturing link as a total 
solution to the problems of the emerging commercial scene demonstrated 
that the co- ordination problem could not be solved by merely making 
stock information on the refinery available to the remote supply 
division... 
...and therefore at Rotterdam they evolved from accessing 
operational data which was then shared across the English channel 
through to jointly planning. Then this whole RIS thing of single 
planning and control of refinery activity and the scheduling 
timetable arose [4]. 
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The operations of the plant were set on one set of assumptions 
which would be changed more rapidly than you could re -plan the 
effects of those changes. And it's actually speeding the whole 
process up to that degree of coherence which attempts to put you 
in control [4]. 
Another manager who was involved in "implementing the commercial 
heart" of RIS and who was also involved in "the feasibility study for 
the Rotterdam system ", had this to say: 
You can actually visualise a series of building blocks: process 
control; advance control; on -line optimisation [through the use 
of Linear Programming modelling techniques]; and RIS basically is 
dependent on those, and RIS sits above the whole framework of 
data capture basically. You need the infrastructure otherwise you 
can't support it. You've got to collect data, that's the key 
principle, and the second idea is that having got the data you 
just want to present that to management, or people who actually 
need the data to work with, that's one thing you can do with it. 
But what [the RIS] at Rotterdam tried to do, and subsequent RIS 
systems are trying to do, is actually how do you use the data to 
your advantage to generate a commercial edge over your 
competitors? And the idea is basically that you have the data, 
you have computers that can handle that data and manipulate the 
data for you, and that basically allows you to shift data from 
one application, modelling system, whatever, into another. So 
it's allowing you to integrate the modelling systems (my 
emphasis) [20]. 
The systems at Rotterdam seem to represent a two stage attempt to 
regain effective control of the manufacturing and supply function in 
the face of the new demands and opportunities presented by the 
emergence of intermediate markets. SIS was the first stage providing a 
link between Rotterdam and Britannic House. RIS was the second stage 
response to the realisation that current stock data alone was not 
enough to solve the manufacturing and supply co- ordination problem. It 





















































































































































































































































































The Consequences of Overcapacity for Investment in Refineries 
The implementation of RIS systems that began at Rotterdam during the 
latter half of the nineteen -eighties represents a sizeable investment 
for BPOI. The first RIS system cost approximately $24 million [20]. 
The first half of the decade was, as we noted earlier, a time of 
significant losses in European refining and the timing of investments 
must be seen within such a context. The investment in the Rotterdam 
RIS occurred only after the European refining sector's overcapacity 
had been largely removed, and the potential for profitable operations 
in that sector had been restored. 
[T]here was overcapacity in European refining until really quite 
recently and how on earth did you justify investment in an over- 
capacity, negative margin type sector of the industry until [that 
overcapacity was removed]? If you took a blanket shot -gun 
approach investing in all your surplus refineries, you're going 
to throw good money away. That's not what you'd expect a company 
like BP to do.. In global BP terms I think the first question was 
how many refineries you had or needed, and secondly how good they 
were. And we've sort of rationalised the numbers down to what 
we're comfortable with and seem to be effective [and] the 
refinery margins have come up accordingly. Now it's time to see 
how good they are [4]. 
Increasing Sophistication in the European Markets 
The timing of the move to progressive investment to improve refinery 
performance through the provision of information on refinery stocks 
and later short term production plans may also have reflected the 
developing sophistication of the markets that had been partially 
generated by overcapacity. 
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In the development of most markets you go through steps of 
development.. In the case of a.. flexible spot market [the first 
step is] becoming aware of the numbers of players and all their 
interests and finding which people are the best ones to put it 
to. Now after a couple of years you've sort of done all that and 
you've got that bit of it well sussed. Now I think as far as BP 
was concerned ..that was fairly well sussed by.. about 1986, 87. 
What you then go on to is the next degree of finesse [and] in the 
spot markets people started looking a bit more closely at 
qualities, it's actually what qualities have we got. Let's not 
just sell to the spec., if we've got some quality giveaway let's 
see what we can do there. Now I think that's when some of the RIS 
information starts becoming more critical because you're not just 
selling a tank of gasoline, you're selling that tank of gasoline 
and it may be that that tank of gas oil's worth more than any 
other tank of gas oil but until you get the information you don't 
know. It's also starting to be a bit more cute on the stock 
levels, exactly what are the stock levels? So you're not just 
looking at the volume of the the market, you've now moved on to 
another level (emphasis in original) [3]. 
Once the organisation had got down to the number of refineries it 
"wanted" to run the issue of how they were run became far more 
important. The investment in RIS systems was difficult to justify in a 
situation in which supply completely outstripped demand. In such 
circumstances the marginal benefits to be derived from a RIS system 
were relatively insignificant. Organisational particpants did not 
underestimate the complexity of the "technology" involved in a RIS 
system and an effective design for such a system may have been 
virtually impossible to achieve in the early eighties. However, the 
absence of interest in the benefits derivable from RIS type systems 
and the defensive investment environment in the early eighties in the 
European refining sector, brought about by high crude prices and 
overcapacity, made a move to such systems unattractive, at least 
temporarily. 
[I]t comes back to that principle of ratcheting up your level of 
detail and RIS is taking you on to a [new] level of detail. Now 
really for some time in the late seventies and early eighties I 
don't think people were at that sort of level. I mean it was all 
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about how much capacity you had before you could then sort that 
out and.. move on to the next step which is what's the best way 
to run it [3]. 
It is difficult to go for a sort of niche marketing strategy to sell a 
particular high spec. tank of product when the market is awash with a 
surplus of products. "You can [do it], but people's minds are 
elsewhere" [3]. The marginal economic benefits that RIS potentially 
provided were only practically achievable once the overcapacity in the 
European refining sector had been removed. In terms of the profitable 
operation of a refinery in a market where supply and demand are in 
some sense balanced.. 
..[k]ey parameters are actually plant availability and RIS 
operates at a level optimisation which is one level below that. 
In other words, the first thing that determines whether the 
refinery is effective or not is whether it can run the plant that 
it's supposed to be running. The next thing is what use can you 
make of the running plant and RIS is all about making the best 
use of that running plant in the ..short term [4]. 
The move from defensive to progressive investment in the refining 
sector did not occur overnight. While some refineries were being shut 
down, others were receiving capital investment to improve their 
effectiveness. 
..you don't turn these taps on and off in quite a full sense. In 
the defensive period there were still investments taking place 
but they.. had to meet higher hurdles if you like, and now the 
taps aren't full on. One has to be cautious in terms of putting 
money in the right place [4]. 
However, RIS represents a particularly difficult investment to justify 
in an area of surplus capacity because of the nature of the benefits 
it seeks to provide. 
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[T]hese things cost millions of dollars [and] if.. the refineries 
wish to spend that sort of money then they have to be sure that 
they're going to get the benefits. For example, you could equally 
well spend that money on de bottlenecking a piece of plant where 
you would have, virtually anyway, guaranteed benefits.. The 
alternative is that you have faith in computer systems and spend 
the money, the idea being to get the last drop of cents per 
barrel of crude you process [20]. 
Even now refining margins, particularly in Europe, are quite small, 
but the major change that has occurred as a result of the shutdown of 
surplus capacity is that in the long term those margins are at least 
positive. With a glut of refinery products in Europe the activity of 
refining struggled to add value but with the renewed potential for 
profitable refinery operation RIS started to come into its own. 
If you're going to be competitive you can't afford to throw money 
away.. and most of the value opportunities there are oil based, 
as you might expect. I mean, what's the turnover here, it's about 
a billion dollars per annum. It doesn't take much of a swing in 
the value added activity to generate real bottom line 
improvements [4]. 
The magnitude of the potential benefits to be derived from a RIS 
system are dependent on refinery size, and Rotterdam is a huge 
refinery. Rotterdam refinery, partially as a result of its size, had 
major symbolic importance within BP. Rotterdam was a flagship refinery 
and its status as such may also have contributed to the decision to 
base the first RIS system there [3]. Thus, one can see that a variety 
of diverse factors combined to make Rotterdam an attractive site for 
the first RIS system implementation. We now go on to consider the 
second RIS implementation which occurred at BP's Bulwer Island 
Refinery in Australia. 
114 
The Second RIS Implementation: Bulwer Island's Oil Management System 
A Common System For All BP Oil's Refineries 
RIS systems are being implemented at all of BP Oil's strategic 
refineries worldwide [20]. Although there are important differences 
between the various implementations, each of the systems seeks to 
fulfil a similar function: 
The objectives of the system are to take operational information 
and hold it centrally and then to analyse that information in 
terms of commercial rather than operational criteria [22]. 
The $24 million spent on the Rotterdam RIS was seen to be a worthwhile 
investment by BP Oil and the organisation was able to satisfy itself 
that the benefits derived from the system outweighed its costs [20,4]. 
The payback on a system like this is very difficult to calculate 
but Rotterdam suggested they saw a benefit of 17 cents per barrel 
[22]. 
A benefit of this magnitude is certainly significant when one 
considers that a refinery like Rotterdam processes billions of barrels 
each year [3]. Thus the organisation was keen to implement RIS systems 
in its other major refineries. Although the circumstances surrounding 
the Rotterdam implementation were unique the benefits derived were not 
seen to be solely dependent on those circumstances. 
In fact, the motivation in the Rotterdam case was arguably a 
little suspect but had a huge spin off and the huge spin off was 
a commercial improvement and that commercial improvement looked 
to be transportable across refineries [4]. 
The suspect motivation referred to above was the desire to solve the 
control problem brought about by the geographical separation of the 
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manufacturing and supply functions. It seemed as if the system so 
produced could give managers who used it better commercial control of 
refinery operations wherever they were situated. 
You in fact ended up with a general tool for improvement which 
wasn't actually organisationally quite so dependent [4]. 
It looked on the surface of it as if the software and the 
approach would have large areas of portability across refineries, 
so you wouldn't have to write the same software again [4]. 
BP Oil's refinery at Bulwer Island in Australia was chosen as the site 
for the second RIS implementation. The Bulwer system was known 
explicitly as an Oil Management System (OMS). Bulwer Island is a very 
small refinery, compared to Rotterdam [20] and it operates in a very 
different environment. The benefits expected from Bulwer's OMS system 
were not necessarily the same as those derived from the RIS 
implementation at Rotterdam. 
[Rotterdam] was obviously the most prominent refinery that needed 
such a solution. That's not to say that you can't get benefits 
from such systems in different ways at other refineries and so I 
suppose the first two implementations were poles apart. We had 
Rotterdam which is very volatile, things are changing incredibly 
rapidly there, great instability, variation of crude, you name 
it,..[with]..essentially a large scheduling problem that 
dominates your production and control problem. And then the 
second implementation in Bulwer which is...a refinery which 
serves a local market. Vessels are seen coming a month away,...so 
you don't have any volatility. However they have a different sort 
of problem which is in terms of competing plant in terms of 
essentially a mass balance problem and optimising the process 
operations was more critical there than at Rotterdam. So you've 
got the emphasis one end on process modelling and at the other 
end [on] scheduling and other refineries then will sit along that 
scale somewhere [20]. 
A desire to regain control of the scheduling of crude intake and 
product offtake was a primary driver behind the Rotterdam system but 
the concept of analysis of centrally held operational data was seen to 
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have the potential to contribute to the solution of other refinery 
management issues. At Bulwer, where scheduling was less of a problem, 
the approach held out the promise of dealing with problems concerning 
how the various sub -elements of the physical refinery system were to 
be run, related, and co- ordinated. That is, those issues associated 
with planning the operations of the site. All of BP's RIS systems 
involve the use of Linear Programming techniques to assist in the 
optimisation of both the operation of process units and of the overall 
refinery system. It was upon this aspect of the RIS approach that 
Bulwer's OMS focused. 
Competing Design Criteria: Site Specific Considerations vs. The Desire 
to Produce a Centrally Supportable System 
When we set out on the RIS project the idea was to make it as 
portable as possible and in fact 50% of the Rotterdam system was 
portable. The rest of it has to be tailored to the site and 
that's inevitable, but...the concept was that if you kept the 
core of the system portable then any enhancements at future 
implementations could be brought back into your other 
refineries [20] . 
The portability issue described above was difficult to square with the 
differing emphases on elements of the RIS concept that were applied at 
different implementations. Systems staff at Bulwer were well aware of 
the possible conflict of interests. The introduction to Bulwer's OMS 
Concept of Operation Document states that... 
It was a primary requirement of the OMS project to maximise the 
use of [Rotterdam RIS] technology in the implementation of the 
Bulwer Island OMS system, a key aspect of this technology 
transfer has been the initial adoption of the [Rotterdam RIS] 
data model as the basis for the development of the OMS systems. 
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Without strict adherence to the [Rotterdam RIS] data model the 
relocation [of] any of the significant [Rotterdam RIS] software 
models would prove costly, if not impossible [23]. 
The Bulwer Island OMS interface requirements precluded strict 
conformity to the [Rotterdam RIS] model. However, strident 
attempts were made to minimise the impact of these differing 
requirements and maintain the ability to utilise [Rotterdam RIS] 
software [23]. 
The same fundamental entities were used to make up the business model 
of the refinery at both Rotterdam and Bulwer Island and this level of 
similarity was maintained in the data models of the two systems [23]. 
The seven key entities of the business model are: 
CONSTRAINT, GRADE, MOVEMENT, NODE, QUALITY, PLAN, SCHEDULE 
It is through these entities, their sub -types and associations 
that a description of the physical refinery, the plans for its 
use and the history of its use are represented [23]. 
The nature of the primary management issue at Bulwer Island was 
markedly different from that at Rotterdam, as we have seen. The focus 
upon process modelling at Bulwer lead to a decision to abandon the 
planning and scheduling systems that had been developed at Rotterdam 
in the first RIS implementation. This had implications for the data 
model to be used in the Bulwer system. 
A major departure from the [Rotterdam RIS] model became 
unavoidable when the decision was taken to drop the use of both 
GRTMPS and BPRSS [the linear programmes used in the Rotterdam 
planning and scheduling systems, respectively] from the OMS 
Planning system in favour of the MIMI suite of products [23]. 
MIMI, which stands for Manager for Interactive Modelling 
Interfaces, is a flexible interactive front end for modelling 
applications marketed by Chesapeake Decision Sciences. It 
provides an integrated framework for bridging applications 
programs, databases and distributed computers with a common 
interface [24]. 
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MIMI comes with a module that "...provides the capability to generate, 
solve and report solutions to LP problems" [24]. 
In fact, there were... 
...a number of major departures fry m the [Rotterdam RIS] data 
model in its implementation at Bulwer Island in order to 
accommodate the very different interface requirements of the 
Bulwer Island OMS system [23]. 
Given the inevitability of these departures...and the consequent 
impossibility of 100% [Rotterdam RIS] compatibility, it was seen 
as pragmatic, and desirable, to improve upon the [Rotterdam RIS] 
model [23]. 
As we noted above, the OMS and Rotterdam RIS data models were still 
made up out of the same key entities but the way in which those 
entities were represented and ordered had changed. The OMS model 
standardised certain elements of the Rotterdam RIS model, extended the 
use of database wide unique identification tokens, extended the use of 
network tables, and minimised data duplication by removing special 
interface tables and standardising the storage of a variety of 
production targets [23]. 
Other design criteria also contributed to the shifting of the OMS 
model away from its Rotterdam RIS model starting point. 
The objective of the OMS system is to provide the tools with 
which the refinery staff may maximise the refinery added value. 
The major plank of the design of these tools has been to ensure 
that they are data driven. This design requirement has had, not 
unexpectedly, a significant impact on the design of the OMS 
database and the direction of departures from [Rotterdam 
RIS] [23]. 
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Changes to the OMS LP and Process Modelling Systems 
The implications of Bulwer Island's attempts to improve upon the 
Rotterdam RIS system were far reaching. Substantial changes were made 
to the system. These included changes to the database structure, 
architecture, and reporting. Radical changes were also made with 
regard to the way in which the process optimiser models were 
integrated into the site wide linear programming model [15]. These 
changes were made during 1988 and at that time it looked as if the 
Bulwer OMS system would become an improved "Mark II" version of the 
initial Rotterdam RIS. The Bulwer model was expected to become the BP 
standard. However it soon transpired that the proposed changes could 
not deliver the benefits they promised without significant costs and 
the Bulwer team were forced to backtrack [15]. 
One of the systems managers at Grangemouth had this to say: 
With any RIS system you have initially the data capture systems, 
historical data capture, of which you've got process data, tank 
data and lab data at the core. Analysis of that data to identify 
where problems were is one part of the system where you can get 
some benefits...The ambition with RIS was always to do a lot more 
than that and to actually build systems which looked forward in 
time, predicted what we were going to do, and did that in 
sufficient detail to provide advice, to the operators at least, 
about how they should operate the plant. So the idea was also to 
shorten the time frame on that look ahead period so that you 
almost had real time optimisation of the refinery. That was the 
ambition [25]. 
The aim was to provide a fully coherent, and implementable, short term 
production plan for the whole refinery. 
...so you would have an LP [Linear Program]..[and] that LP would 
drive in some way the optimisers which were responsible for 
providing the advice for the process control. Rotterdam did a 
little bit of that but still the systems were quite separate. 
Bulwer Island tried to really integrate them and...they devised a 
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system where [the process optimisers, for example the catalytic 
cracker optimiser] did multiple runs, hundreds of runs and 
produced lots of sets of data for different types or by varying 
operating parameters. So then when the LP ran and decided at any 
stage of its solution what operating parameters it was going to 
use at that stage, it could go off to this database of the data 
from the optimiser and say that's the best fit at the moment, 
bring that back as the yield structure we're going to get if we 
run on those operating parameters. Now as the LP went through its 
iterations it would continually go out and access this database 
and get a better and better fit [25]. 
Thus the optimisers were run for a large number of iterations and then 
the LP was run for fewer iterations and it picked out the best of the 
optimisers' iterations each time. After the initial population stage, 
the data set of optimiser performance was built up from the past 
actual performance of each process unit within the overall system. 
That is, the optimiser performance data set was a record of the best 
actual past performance of the unit in question. It was a record of 
how the unit had been seen to perform in the past, not a theoretical 
calculation of how it should perform. 
Bulwer Island's approach was...to extract the running sets rather 
like still frames in a movie film. They were going to trap all 
these and basically record it as a history of options and have 
some logic which allowed the planning function to be based around 
what had actually happened in the past. And they ran into 
problems with software which could trap that amount and sort out 
the logic of picking one...in some sort of optimised fashion. It 
meant that they had to choose a different type of LP optimising 
package or write different sorts of interfaces. Instead of taking 
a cat cracker and saying, well, I have sixteen options - I can go 
maximum throughput, minimum throughput, maximum crack spirit, 
minimum crack spirit, and so on and so forth, all the sort of 
traditional parameters - what they did is they were looking for 
something like a hundred options out of their last two months, 
two years, whatever, operating practice. It meant they didn't 
have to worry about models, they just referred to fact...and you 
could pick the best actually achieved operating practice out of 
the past and set that as a target for the future. I found it in a 
theoretical sense rather attractive. But they seemed to run into 
a lot of problems in terms of integrating that with their LP 
systems and so on. They bit off more than they could chew and I 
don't know what's happened to that project [4]. 
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They tried to be technological innovators I think it's fair to 
say at Bulwer Island and at one stage it looked as though they 
were going to overtake the BP world....They may have done so but 
I think they had to change their whole system mid -stream. They 
ran into technical problems which were quite substantial [4]. 
The technical problem really was in driving the optimisers to 
generate a database which you could actually understand and was 
suitable for solving the bigger problem and they never really 
cracked that problem. If you can imagine that those optimisers 
were filling a sort of three dimensional space with lots of data 
points and the LP was going in and finding the best point based 
on the sort of feed used, appropriate points on a blend, and 
interpolating between them. The theory of what they trying to do 
was very complex and so was putting it into practice, just 
because of machine time restrictions and so on. That planning 
part of it didn't work and because the target setting bit [which 
was dependent on the planning part] was integrated with some of 
the other systems, like reconciliation, two or three other 
systems sort of fell apart because they wouldn't work. So they 
had to fall back to the initial data capture system [used] in one 
or two of the more straightforward systems [25]. 
The not altogether successful alterations that Bulwer made to the 
Rotterdam RIS, and particularly those changes made to the core 
Rotterdam data model, had wide ranging implications for the programme 
of RIS implementations that BP Oil had embarked upon. Grangemouth in 
particular was faced with a difficult choice over which model to 
adopt. We will return to the specifics of the Grangemouth 
implementation in the next section. One of BP Oil's refinery analysts 
had this to say about the long term effects of Bulwer's divergence 
from the core Rotterdam RIS system: 
What actually happened was that Bulwer were allowed to destroy 
the core of the system and...we've ended up with two RIS systems 
essentially within the RIS group, within the BP group. And it 
means that any future implementation has to choose a starting 
point between one of these bits of software, you either go 
Rotterdam software or you go Bulwer software...I still believe we 
should've harmonised worldwide but that's water under the bridge 
really and we just sort of have to face the problems we have. 
What it has done of course is to create a tremendous support 
problem because we're not now able to set up any kind of central 
support. You can argue that you need a lot of on site support 
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anyway because it's the site specific bits that require the most 
attention but having said that we've completely precluded any 
kind of central support and I think that the cost of supporting 
that software has probably increased because of that...There have 
been mumblings about actually getting a software house to 
productise it so we can sell the RIS system elsewhere and in that 
way we would share with other oil companies, not just within BP 
but worldwide other oil companies, would share the sort of 
maintenance and enhancement costs...[W]e're too far down the line 
with our current RIS implementations to actually consider it at 
this point but for the next generation of RIS systems I think 
that's the likely starting point. So you basically build yourself 
a tool kit and you can sell the tool kit without selling [the] 
business concepts which generate the cash, in theory. I just have 
one hang up about that and that's the fact that having sold the 
models of this system and defined the interfaces, the data in the 
interfaces will basically give away the business secrets. But 
again, I mean that's my view and other people disagree with that 
[20]. 
Although the failure of Bulwer's "technological leap into the future" 
[4] prevented it from coming the Mark II of RIS and a standardised 
starting point for future RIS implementations, its partial success 
somewhat scuppered BP Oil's hopes for central support for the core 
elements of a number of partially customised RIS systems in their 
refineries throughout the world. However, if the OMS experiment had 
been more successful at Bulwer and the approach had been adopted at 
BP's other refineries the organisation could've found themselves 
facing even greater problems at future implementations. 
The...thing about Bulwer which you shouldn't forget is that it's 
a very, very small refinery and therefore you can build into the 
LP representation all the detail, and you can do your scheduling 
within the planning program in the LP. If you try scaling that up 
to a larger refinery everything increases in size exponentially 
and becomes completely unmanageable with [the computer] hardware 
[currently available]. This is the danger of these systems... 
Let's say [that] Bulwer had worked, I still think it would have 
been a difficult thing to superimpose as such on Grangemouth for 
example and almost impossible to put into Rotterdam...Just to 
give an idea,...Grangemouth might make one MOGAS [motor spirit] 
blend a day [whilst] Rotterdam would make five a day on average 
[and Grangemouth is a substantially larger refinery than Bulwer 
Island]. The scale up problem is much, much greater. RIS is 
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actually a tool kit. I mean you basically take the concepts and 
the software that you have available and then you jiggle it 
about to represent local circumstances [20]. 
RIS: a "Configurational" Technology? [26] 
The Rotterdam Refinery Information System and the Bulwer Island Oil 
Management System may be considered as examples of what Fleck [26] has 
termed "configurational technologies" [27]. 
Configurations..essentially comprise more or less unique 
assemblies of components, some standardly available, others 
specially developed, built up to meet the particular requirements 
of a user organization [26]. 
Fleck contrasts configurations with "generic systems" [26]. Generic 
systems possess: identity across instances; a certain systematicity 
governing the integration and relation of components; and an inherent 
logic which structures development [26]. Configurations, lacking these 
attributes, are consequently more dependent upon the contingencies and 
particularities of application, including varying user demands. 
Configurations differ from generic systems, in that there is a 
greater looseness or "ad hoc- ness ", and a lack of systematicity, 
about configurations. The overall "shape" of the configuration 
stems from the particular requirements and exigencies of the 
application addressed [26]. 
The uncertainty inherent in the development of configurational 
technology systems creates opportunities for, and indeed necessitates, 
radical large scale innovation at the application site. The oil 
management systems developed at Rotterdam and Bulwer Island and 
described above certainly seem amenable to this characterisation. 
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With generic systems, requirements are pre- defined through the 
activities of market mechanisms which serve to embody prior 
application experience in the "bog- standard" system. Generic systems 
are most applicable to well defined, tightly specified tasks, where 
contextual stability is achieved through a dynamic balance of 
contingent elements and alliances. These conditions do not tend to 
pertain where configurational technologies are employed. The creation 
of a configuration seeks to establish stability at the application 
site, but this stability will not necessarily be transportable with 
the technological elements of the system. As similar systems are built 
at different sites a process, termed "innofusion" by Fleck [28], is 
established where diffusion and innovation are "collapsed together" 
[26] with a number of differences and similarities being established 
between versions of the system. The areas of similarity and difference 
are not necessarily stable between different versions and are wont to 
change. Similar contingencies at different sites may stimulate the 
solidification of system similarities, but these can easily be 
disrupted by differing circumstances. 
But in all cases, through the process of building a configuration 
equal to coping with local exigencies, certain local 
contingencies may literally be reified - i.e., translated into 
artefactual form, and crystallized as a distinct technological 
component from out of a fluid mixture of social, organizational 
and other technological and non -technological contingencies [26]. 
This is not to suggest that designers and implementers are dupes in 
such a process. As Fleck [26] notes "new characteristics may be 
explicitly developed in response to requirements or environmental 
exigencies, by recombining existing components, and then directly 
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transmitted to succeeding generations of technology." New components 
may also be added, and old ones dropped, as we saw at Bulwer. 
Thus although the espoused intention of BP Oil's corporate centre (at 
least following Rotterdam RIS) was the development of a generic system 
to facilitate oil management at a number of different refineries, the 
distinctiveness of the first two application sites resulted in the 
creation of two distinct systems, or configurations. 
Fleck has suggested that stable generic systems may emerge from 
configurational technologies... 
..once knowledge about the ranges of possibility open to the 
configuration has been developed, and subsets of those 
possibilities which exhibit a degree of internal consistency have 
been identified, and for which a market demand is evident [26]. 
As we will see later, a market demand for RIS, even within BP, was far 
from evident. There may indeed have been a demand for a management 
system at each site, but for systems with very different 
characteristics at each of the different sites. 
Stable generic systems do not necessarily emerge from repeated 
configurational applications and the likelihood of such stabilisation 
decreases with increasing complexity and variety of applications. 
In many situations (and currently many large -scale IT systems 
seem to approximate these), local contingencies continue to 
resist stabilisation or crystallization, and development involves 
a sequence of highly individual configurations - a sequence, 
moreover, which is not necessarily progressive [26]. 
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The corporate ambition within BP Oil was for a system that could be 
treated, at least partially, as a black box [29]. This had certainly 
not been achieved by the end of the second RIS implementation and such 
a stabilisation may well not be achievable, even after a number of 
implementations. A succession rather than a progression of system 
versions would seem to be a more likely outcome. Not only were staff 
at Grangemouth presented with two competing configurations, they were 
also to face a great deal of site specific uncertainty and contingency 
of their own in their search for an implementable system. In the next 
chapter we consider in detail the emergence of RIS at Grangemouth. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE GRANGEMOUTH REFINERY INFORMATION SYSTEM (RIS) 
Introduction 
Grangemouth refinery is situated on the Firth of Forth in Scotland. 
Within the BP organisation the refinery is currently owned and 
operated by BP Oil UK whose headquarters are in Hemel Hempstead. BP 
Oil UK is represented at the headquarters of BP Oil International 
(BPOI) in London by BP Oil Europe which also represents BP Oil's 
European corporate operations. As we noted in the previous section, 
Grangemouth is now BP's only crude oil refinery in the United 
Kingdom [1]. 
In the early 1920's the Anglo- Persian Oil Company, later to become 
known as BP, became interested in the establishment of a small 
refinery in north -east England to meet the local needs of Tyneside, 
Scotland and the Scandinavian market. In 1919 the Anglo- Persian Oil 
Company had acquired a company, Scottish Oils Limited, that had 
recently been formed out of the six scottish oil companies that had 
survived the changes that the oil industry had undergone during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This recently acquired 
subsidiary persuaded the Anglo- Persian Oil Company that it should look 
instead at the flat ground to the east of the growing town of 
Grangemouth as a possible site for a new refinery to serve these 
markets. Grangemouth not only offered a suitable site and a port for 
crude carrying tankers but also a proximal nucleus of labour skilled 
in shale oil technology. The refinery was therefore built at 






















































































































































































































































































































Today, crude oil enters Grangemouth refinery from two sources: a 
harbour and bulk storage depot at Finnart, via a cross -country 
pipeline; and a Forties Field pipeline from the North Sea. Crude from 
Finnart may have been bought direct from any of the many oil exporting 
countries, or from the Rotterdam spot market. Crude entering from the 
Forties pipeline may have come from any one of the several oil and gas 
fields connected to the Forties system. Oil is sent along pipelines in 
consecutive "slugs" which do not mix with each other to any 
significant extent. Thus crudes of different qualities enter the 
refinery for blending and processing into a range of highly 
standardised products. Even feedstocks from any one field will vary 
over time and, although the product specifications change only 
infrequently, the volume demanded can and does change rapidly. Oil 
management at Grangemouth is therefore a very complex task. The 
refinery's products are distributed by road, rail, pipeline, and sea 
[1]. 
The Refinery Information System (RIS) project at Grangemouth was not 
the first attempt to introduce computer technology to support the 
operations of the refinery. It followed a number of years of 
significant investment in the development of computer systems and 
hardware at the site. However, virtually all of the major systems in 
place were developed and implemented as individual projects without 
any serious consideration of the overall structure of the refinery 
wide system that was so created [2]. Some of these systems did 
communicate with each other but the links were cumbersome, incomplete, 
and expensive to maintain and, consequently, the overall system lacked 
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coherency. As a result of this piece meal approach there was perceived 
to be a large amount of useful information potentially available that 
was not being used to best effect [2]. 
Initiating RIS at Grangemouth 
In 1987 a Strategy Study concerning oil management systems at 
Grangemouth was undertaken by the Systems Group of the Business 
Development Unit (BDU) for Manufacturing and Supply (M &S) [3]. As we 
noted in the previous chapter, BDU's are part of the BP Oil 
International (BPOI) organisation at the corporate centre in London 
and are charged with directing the strategy of those elements of BP 
Oil's business for which they hold responsibility. BPOI has separate 
BDU's for Manufacturing and Supply, Retail, and its Commercial 
business areas [4]. 
The Systems Group Strategy Study came hot on the heels of the first BP 
refinery based RIS system which was under development at BP Oil's 
refinery in Rotterdam. According to one member of the M &S BDU who had 
been involved in the design and implementation of the Rotterdam 
system, the concept of a refinery based RIS system first surfaced at 
Rotterdam in 1985 [5]. A European refinery analyst, a member of BP Oil 
Europe's Manufacturing Development Group said that... 
...the vision some years back, and I suppose this still exists, 
[was] that over a period of something like ten years, from the 
mid -eighties,...we would get the RIS type system into all of our 
refineries worldwide [6]. 
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The Grangemouth Strategy Study "...focused on Oil Management Systems 
as we believe that the major benefits are to be derived from systems 
in this area" [3]. The proposals that emerged from this study were 
"...modelled closely on Rotterdam Refinery's [RIS] system 
philosophy "...which has.. "..been fully accepted by BP Oil 
International (BPOI) as the standard for all the Group's strategic 
refineries" [3]. Grangemouth is one such refinery. 
Grangemouth had not been as dramatically affected by the changes that 
occurred in the European oil market in the early eighties as had 
Rotterdam where the development of the spot market was accompanied by 
a demand for a large number of comparatively small shipments of a 
variety of products carried by barge. One of the Grangemouth managers 
with some responsibility for systems development at the refinery had 
this to say about the differences between the two sites: 
[Grangemouth] is not a site...where the intermediate market 
developed so early, nor was it voluminous,...[and] it's not barge 
orientated. You could handle the amount of..ship[ment]s that were 
sold to third parties from here, if you like, by hand. You could 
not handle the amount of barge volume taking place out of 
Rotterdam by hand. It was just, the co- ordination required, the 
speed of response, was not possible [7]. 
The manager quoted above saw that many systems at Grangemouth were 
being implemented in response to Head Office pressures rather than to 
the particularities of the refinery's operating conditions. Because 
projects were not being conceived to meet needs expressed locally 
management often had to struggle for local support [8]. He saw a 
problem with the "partial solutions" that resulted from such an 
approach. Tools were not being implemented with regard to wider issues 
and they were therefore not achieving inroads into coping with the 
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refinery's "critical success factors" [8]. This manager was not aware 
of any local demand for the RIS system that was articulated before it 
was already pretty clear that the site was going to receive such a 
system [8]. 
If a solution has been successful elsewhere it becomes a 
potential solution depending on a degree of local support which 
obviously may be open to political manipulation. Often the tool 
may not in reality be the solution [8]. 
[The Grangemouth RIS] did not come from the refinery. I think 
I've mentioned before that RIS came out of Rotterdam where it 
seems to have come out of attempts to meet the information 
accessing needs of a group of remote decision makers... Then this 
whole RIS thing of single planning and control of the refinery 
activity and scheduling timetable arose [9]. 
Remote decision makers at the BP Oil UK (BPOUK) Head Office at Hemel 
Hempstead did have a role to play in the running of the Grangemouth 
refinery but the extent and impact of their influence was far smaller 
than was the case at Rotterdam. The need at Rotterdam was for 
something that would make information available... 
...to the decision makers who in that organisation were remote, 
and in many refineries are actually remote or distributed. As far 
as Grangemouth is concerned there is a degree of remoteness about 
the Hemel supply operation but because the distribution of 
products from here is essentially ship followed..by pipeline... 
followed by rail and road, the parcels are bigger and that tends 
to mean that the planning ahead is slightly longer than the 
Rotterdam barge type traffic. Nonetheless, the principle was seen 
as very effective and...they did that first project audit on 
Rotterdam and despite I think spending $25 million on the whole 
damn development they were able to satisfy themselves that they 
got value for money out of that and therefore thought they'd hit 
upon a competitive edge. And BP is pursuing that around it's 
major refineries and [Grangemouth] is certainly a major refinery 
[9]. 
Despite the cynicism displayed in the earlier quotes, this manager did 
see a RIS at Grangemouth as being potentially useful. He went on to 
say that... 
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The concept of taking control of the production of the site is 
valid. The tools that were in place before the RIS concept came 
along knocking at the door... two or three years ago... were 
primitive, slow [and] fragmented. The operations of the plant 
were set on one set of assumptions which would be changed more 
rapidly than you could re -plan the effects of those changes. And 
it's actually speeding the whole process up to that degree of 
coherence which attempts to put you in control [9]. 
I'd put it in terms of how long does it take you to produce a 
plan, and how good is the plan. And I would summarise the RIS 
objectives as saying that it must produce an implementable short 
term plan for the refinery within four hours, or close to it. And 
if it can do that then it will succeed in terms of being able to 
change the direction of the whole refinery, not bits of it, but 
the whole refinery consistently, and therefore avoid nasty 
surprises from changing bits, meeting those bits only to find 
that other bits of your scheduling operations all unwind [9]. 
We now go on to consider in more detail the development and 
implementation process of the Grangemouth RIS. 
The Grangemouth Oil Management System Strategy Study, December 1987 
The vision within BP of getting "the RIS type systems into all of our 
refineries worldwide" [6] had its first significant impact on the 
Grangemouth refinery in 1987 with the commissioning of the Strategy 
Study mentioned in the previous section. According to the report 
produced by this group "all the major oil companies are actively 
engaged in the development of computer information systems in 
refineries" [3]. As we have already noted the information systems 
proposals put forward in this report were "modelled closely on the 
[Rotterdam RIS] philosophy" [3]. Through the Rotterdam RIS project BP 
was seen to have taken "oil management system concepts a good deal 
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further than most of its competitors" [3] and the intention was to 
build upon the perceived advantages derived from this lead by rapidly 
deploying RIS -type oil management systems into all of the group's 
refineries. 
The Strategy Study's focus on oil management systems was justified in 
terms of the benefits to be derived from improvements in this area 
relative to those derivable from further information systems support 
for other aspects of Grangemouth Refinery's operations. This focus of 
approach was partially predicated on the existence of a number of 
other systems at Grangemouth. These systems were thought to have 
already led to significant improvements in other areas potentially 
served by an integrated refinery based system, such as loss 
calculation and custody transfer management [3]. These areas were not 
seen to fall within the remit of the RIS Strategy Study. "[RIS] 
studies are concerned with the optimisation of operations within the 
refinery" [3]. Areas such as the two mentioned above and oil 
accounting were explicitly excluded [3]. The authors of the Strategy 
Study were keen to utilise existing systems at Grangemouth in any 
subsequent development of RIS at the site. 
As the refinery already has a considerable investment in many of 
the components of a [RIS] -type integrated oil management system 
the proposals we make build on these developments in order to 
exploit their full potential [3]. 
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Predicted Benefits of the Strategy Study Team Proposals 
The main benefits were seen to be in the planning and scheduling areas 
of refinery production. Specifically, benefits were to be derived 
from "the integration of refinery models" [3]. That is, from the 
integration of the various Linear Programs, developed in London and 
Hemel Hempstead, which modelled (i) the behaviour of various elements 
of the refinery, (ii) the refinery as a whole, and (iii) the 
activities of groups of refineries within BP Oil. Within Grangemouth, 
slightly different models were used for planning and scheduling 
operations and another set of models was used to provide optimal modes 
of operation with regard to the added value to be derived from 
activities. These optimised models were also used to provide 
predictions of performance in order to facilitate the monitoring of 
actual performance. 
The Strategy Study Team acknowledged difficulties in calculating the 
precise extent of these improvements in performance but they did feel 
able to point to the main sources of the benefits thought to accrue 
from an integration of refinery modelling: 
i) Consistency of [Linear Programming) (LP) models between the 
refinery and head office. 
ii) The global optimum [or overall Grangemouth value added 
performance] will be improved by the feedback of key data from 
the on -line plant models into the refinery LP model. 
iii) 'Better commercial decision making as a result of improved 
representation of the refinery in the head office LP model. 
iv) Schedules which are, as far as possible, consistent with the 
LP plan and which fully recognise the constraints of the site. 
Benefits expected from: 
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More accurate scheduling. 
More accurate prediction of rundown quantities and 
qualities for blending. 
- More optimal use of components. 
Reduction in quality giveaway [i.e avoiding selling 
high quality, high value products for the price of 
low quality , low value products by improving the 
information available on product qualities]. 
v) The use of predictive versions of the on -line plant models 
[models for optimisation] and the simplified models [planning 
models] for planning purposes. These models are currently being 
developed for the [Rotterdam RIS] system [3]. 
The remit of the Strategy Study Team was obviously not confined to 
consideration of the potential impact of RIS on the internal 
operations of the refinery. The relationship between refinery 
operations and the remote Supply Division was also considered. 
As well as talks with a number of key staff in Grangemouth 
Refinery we have also discussed the commercial links between the 
refinery and head office with the manufacturing and supply 
functions in London [3]. 
The Planning and Scheduling of Production at Grangemouth Before RIS 
At the time of the Strategy Study the planning of refinery production 
was carried out "jointly" by head office and the refinery. A number of 
different computer systems were used to facilitate this process. 
Planning for periods of between one and three months ahead was 
undertaken by head office staff using a Linear Programming (LP) 
modelling system run on IBM computers at Hemel Hempstead [3]. 
This model..covers the whole of BP Oil's operation and differs 
from the short term refinery model used on site. The model is 
used for selection of crudes, including the economics of 
purchasing Forties mix. Once the monthly plan is established, it 
is agreed with the refinery at a monthly meeting. This estimate 
forms the basis for [overall refinery] performance monitoring 
comparisons, though this activity does not extend to re- running 
the model using actual crude runs [3]. 
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The one to three month plan established by the refinery and head 
office was broken down at the refinery into operating blocks of 
between three and thirty days, the average being about five days. The 
actual block length was determined by the periods of time for which 
the operation of the process units remained "stable ", given the inputs 
provided and the production required [3]. Changes to either the 
relative or absolute amounts of the products required, or to the 
amount or compostition of the feedstocks available had, and continue 
to have, significant implications for the stability of operations. 
As many as four estimates of production were carried out each month, 
with the precise number depending on the "stability" of the programmes 
suggested. 
Planning Production at Grangemouth Prior to RIS 
Production Planning at the refinery was carried out using a system 
unique to Grangemouth which was run in house on the refineries VAX 
computers. The system consisted of a suite of Fortran programs, 
developed in the early 1970's which were subsequently linked to an 
overall refinery LP planning system designed by Scicon [3]. BP bought 
Scicon in 1966 and by 1984 it was the biggest computer services 
company in the UK [10]. Scicon was sold by the group in 1990 [11]. 
Key component stock data are manually input to the [Sciconic 
refinery] LP model, for each block, to simulate offtake patterns 
appropriate to the feedstocks in each period. The definitive 
offtake programme is not confirmed until just prior to the week 
in question [3]. 
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Three main programs from the Fortran suite were in use at the time of 
the Strategy Study. Two programs were used to predict the operation of 
the various refinery process units for different modes of operation 
and feedstock mixes. The third extracted data from the first two in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Sciconic overall refinery 
LP model. That is, it picked out data on the mode of operation for 
each unit that was deemed most appropriate by the overall Sciconic LP. 
From this data the third program also generated "an operating 
programme which can be given directly to operations staff. This 
programme [was] automatically downloaded to the [process control 
system], to provide planning targets" [3]. 
It is important to note here that the output of the Fortran programs 
was not used to directly control the operation of the process units. 
The third program provided targets which were displayed on the process 
control system to the operators of that system. These individuals used 
the process control system to control the operation of the process 
units. They carried out this control on the basis of the targets 
provided, but the actual control of the units was mediated by their 
judgements. The computer system carried out the calculation of the 
optimal programs but operations were actually controlled by the 
process unit operators in the light of contingent conditions which 
were often not taken into account in the computer's calculations. As 
we will see later, this separation of optimisation from control was 
maintained throughout the development of the Grangemouth RIS. 
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Scheduling Refinery Production at Grangemouth Prior to RIS 
At the time of the Strategy Study, the actual scheduling of refinery 
production was considered to be "essentially a manual task" although 
the process could be assisted by the use of BP's Refinery Scheduling 
System (BPRSS) "for feedstock and blending areas when appropriate" 
[3]. Feedstock scheduling tended to be relatively straightforward when 
the refinery was using the comparatively homogeneous Forties mix by 
itself but it could become very much more complicated if feeds from 
other sources were used. BPRSS was used in these circumstances, with 
its use for this purpose being required, on average, twice a month 
[3]. 
For most of the time, the stability of operations allowed the use of a 
"stripped- down" version of the Sciconic LP planning model for 
component blending optimisation. The stripped down version of the LP 
covered blending operations only and this tool was preferred to BPRSS 
as the full blown model required the collection and input of more 
detailed data than the former. Final calculations of individual blends 
were carried out using a spreadsheet in order "to take account of 
actual process rundown qualities, predicted component tank qualities 
and product tank bottoms" [3]. A copy of this spreadsheet was 
transferred electronically to Hemel Hempstead [12]. 
The proposals for developing production planning and scheduling at the 
refinery that were put forward by the Strategy Study Team were 
explicitly in line with the overall development process ratified by 
BPOI and exemplified at Rotterdam. 
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The fulfilment of the concepts now being further developed by 
BPOI calls for the complete integration of planning (monthly and 
block estimates), scheduling (feedstocks, process and blending 
areas) and process models (on -line and off -line models)... The 
ultimate objective of the system is to produce realistic targets 
which, if achieved, will maximise the value added to the 
feedstocks [3]. 
The recommendations of the Strategy Study Team were "based on these 
concepts" and were intended to "enable the refinery to move closer to 
these objectives" [3]. Their proposals also had implications for the 
Grangemouth -Head Office relationship. In particular, it was suggested 
that the refinery and Head Office should use the same basic LP 
representation. The Strategy Study Team recommended the use of the 
Head Office LP at Grangemouth in place of the Sciconic refinery LP 
that had been used in the past. As the Head Office LP embraced the 
whole of BP Oil's operations, it was suggested that Grangemouth staff 
should maintain only that portion of the model that pertained to the 
Grangemouth refinery. Thus the proposals were seen to "require very 
close co-operation between the refinery and head office LP users" [3]. 
With regard to scheduling, the Strategy Study Team focused on the 
under utilisation of the BPRSS. It was suggested that the availability 
of better data capture facilities would go some way to rectifying this 
situation. These facilities were to be provided by another project 
ongoing at Grangemouth, the Process Instrumentation Project (PIP) 
which is described in detail later in this section. The "integrated 
oil management information system" proposed in the Strategy Study 
Team's report incorporated "quantity, quality and movements tracking 
[information]..as well as information from the laboratory and head 
office supply functions" [3]. The automatic data capture required to 
support these aims was seen to be essential for increasing the use of 
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BPRSS in the refinery for feedstock and blending scheduling. 
Extensions to the BPRSS were also proposed. 
Automatic data capture will enable the refinery to take full 
advantage of the existing BPRSS feedstock and blending area 
models. The use of an BPRSS process area model, linked to 
simplified process models.., would allow a more accurate 
representation of unit rundown streams [3]. 
The Integration of Refinery Modelling 
The framework for the integration of refinery models for Grangemouth 
was explicitly adapted from a framework that was still under 
development at Rotterdam in 1987. The system to be developed was 
intended to integrate the whole production control function from the 
development of the long term plan by head office, through the short 
term refinery planning and scheduling stages, right down to the on- 
line models used to optimise the operations of the various elements of 
plant in use at the refinery [3]. 
In essence, the components of the system [were]: 
- A 1 -2 month strategic LP model, run by the head office. 
BPRSS for feedstock scheduling to predict the crude 
cocktails which are to be processed. 
[An LP model of the operation of the crude distillation 
units] to generate activities for the short -term 
planning model (3 -10 days) for each cocktail and each 
operating mode. 
The short -term planning model, run on a rolling basis 
every few days, to provide global optimisation of the 
refinery. 
BPRSS, in conjunction with simplified [on and off line] 
process [plant] models [of the crude distillation 
units, the alkylation unit, the catalytic cracker, and 
the catalytic reformer], to schedule the process areas. 
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INTEGRATED REFINERY MODELLING SYSTEM 














































- The [process] plant models, run off -line, to generate 
planning targets and an operating programme. 
The [process] plant models, run on -line, to provide 
revised targets which take into account deviations in 
feedstock quality and atmospheric conditions. 
BPRSS to schedule and optimise blending for the 
forthcoming 3 -4 days [3]. 
The use of models was to be extended in an attempt to improve the 
quality of predictions through more accurate representation of actual 
plant capability under the given conditions of operation. 
The on -line process plant models were seen to "provide the most 
accurate representation of the current operation and capabilities of 
the process units, it [therefore] seemed logical to use them for both 
monitoring and planning purposes to provide modelling consistency" 
[3]. There was however a minor break made with the strictures of 
complete integration with regard to the scheduling of production. It 
was suggested that off -line simplified versions of the plant models 
with rapid response times should be created (by the BP Group's 
Engineering and Technical Centre at Sudbury) for use with the BPRSS. 
Since if the complex models were to be called interactively by BPRSS 
"the computer processing time required by the on -line models would be 
excessive" [3]. The simplified models were intended to "predict 
yields, qualities and throughputs with sufficient accuracy for 
planning purposes" [3]. 
Monitoring of the operation of the off -line simplified plant models 
was to be carried out by a combination of the system itself and the 
expert knowledge of refinery staff. "Coefficients" were to be 
generated by the system to relate the models to the physical 
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conditions of the plant. The more complex versions of the simplified 
optimising models used by BPRSS were to be run on -line using the 
actual operating conditions of the run as inputs. The predictions of 
this run were to be compared with the predictions from it's previous 
off -line run, and a coefficient was to be calculated relating actual 
possible optimum performance with predicted possible optimum 
performance. These coefficients were then to be ratified by technical 
staff within the refinery before being incorporated into the 
simplified models used by BPRSS. Human intervention was seen as of 
vital importance here since the performance data that was stored in 
the central database was also captured from the on -line models, via 
the monitoring system, and this information became the primary 
resource used when attempts were made to improve the accuracy of the 
models used. "This step is essential to prevent the system from 
becoming self -fulfilling" [3]. 
The feedback of data from the process models into the three to ten day 
overall refinery plan was seen to provide benefits in terms of the 
overall performance of the refinery. These benefits were thought to 
accrue through the improved representation of units in the overall 
refinery model and through the greater accuracy of the overall 
refinery model so created. Feedback also had an important role in the 
maintenance of consistency between the different levels of 
representation used in the various models employed in the refinery. 
The revisable overall refinery model was to be used to define the 
"constraints within which the individual off -line and on -line plant 
models are able to optimise, and so ensures consistency between local 
and global optimisation" [3]. 
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Proposals for Providing the Data Necessary for the Grangemouth RIS 
As was mentioned earlier, prior to the instigation of the Grangemouth 
Strategy Study work was underway to improve the quality of the data 
capture systems in use at the refinery. A "Process Instrumentation 
Project" (PIP) was nearing completion. This project had involved re- 
instrumenting much of the refinery plant through the implementation of 
a Honeywell "Total Distributed Control" System. This system allowed 
the monitoring and management of much of the plant from a central 
control room. The data captured by this system was of "paramount 
importance" for the RIS project [3]. The existence of the PIP system 
was a necessary prerequisite for the implementation of RIS at the 
refinery. The main problem for the Strategy Study Team was to decide 
how to manage this data and its transfer to RIS. Ideally the Strategy 
Study Team wanted all plant data to be transferred to a central 
database to service other applications such as the process models. 
Such an approach would also "provide users with an enquiry and 
reporting capability ..and.. assist trouble- shooting investigations" 
[3]. 
In principle, we envisage a system which would allow staff at all 
levels to gain access to summary data appropriate to their work, 
but in addition to retrieve the underlying detailed data if they 
wish to do so. As a consequence of the PIP system, Grangemouth is 
now equipped to provide much of this information [3]. 
A Strategy for Computer Support for Oil Management at Grangemouth 
The proposals for the integration of planning and scheduling within BP 
Oil, the systems already available at Grangemouth, and the enthusiasm 
within the M &S BDU for the ongoing Rotterdam RIS project meant that 
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for the Strategy Study Team the only sensible course to be followed to 
improve oil management at the refinery was the implementation of a RIS 
type system built around a central database. 
The new concepts developed by BPOI for oil management systems 
demand the highest levels of system integration which can only be 
realised by having a unified common structure for the data, which 
is stored in a central database. In this way, all systems and 
users have free access to the data via a common pathway [3]. 
The central database in such a system was seen to provide two 
complementary benefits. Firstly it acts as data communications link 
providing an efficient and "tidy" means of conveying information 
between various sub -systems and secondly it provides users with a 
window for viewing the operations of the refinery and a single source 
of information to support the ad -hoc and pre- defined enquiries 
required for oil management [3,5]. 
Prior to the implementation of RIS, base level computer knowledge at 
the refinery was considered to be "low" in relation to other elements 
of the BP organisation, such as BP Exploration [2]. This potential 
deficiency was taken into consideration by the Strategy Study Team who 
noted that.. 
To be of real use to staff who are unfamiliar with computers the 
database system must be flexible and friendly and the data 
structures must be understandable [3]. 
To this end the ORACLE "fourth generation language (4GL) [is] 
preferred by BPOI..and this software product is being used in 
Rotterdam's [RIS] development" [3]. This product, at least in the 
configuration in which it was implemented at Rotterdam, allows users 
to be provided with pre- defined screen -based forms that can be 
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parameterised, by relatively inexperienced users, and used to download 
information for perusal or further analysis on simple packages [13]. 
We will consider in more detail later how access to information was 
actually defined in practice. 
Only relevant, oil related, data was to be passed to the central 
database of the Grangemouth RIS system [3,5]. Within such a framework 
individual subsystems were to retain their own working databases and 
either a subset or all of the information contained therein would be 
periodically transferred to the central RIS database. For example, 
Process data would continue to be corrected by the Honeywell 
[data capture] machines, transferred to the VAX system [the DEC 
computers on which RIS was to run] at frequent intervals, 
reconciled and condensed into hourly figures. These could include 
spot, average, high and low values. Data could be stored on -line 
for perhaps as long as a year to permit historical analysis, and 
thereafter archived [3]. 
Thus it is important to note that RIS was only to provide a certain 
sort of view of the operations of the refinery, a view predicated on 
the concerns of oil management. For example, as we noted above, RIS 
was seen as a system that could help process controllers but it was to 
be distinctly separate from the process control system. The same could 
be said of oil accounting. Accordingly, the focus on oil management 
systems outlined earlier was steadfastly maintained. 
Although some data transfer between the oil management system and 
the administrative and plant management systems may be necessary, 
our view is that the volume of data to be transferred is 
insufficient to justify the creation of an integrated overall 
refinery database [3]. 
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As we noted above, the Strategy Study Team did engage in discussions 
with head office personnel about the commercial links between the head 
office and the refinery. However recommendations in this area were 
limited due to the progression of another project that sought to 
specifically deal with this issue. The brevity of this section of the 
Strategy Study allows its quotation in full and draws attention to an 
important difference in the development of refinery systems between 
Grangemouth and Rotterdam. 
There is today no equivalent of the Rotterdam [SIS] system, which 
would provide the supply function in head office with current 
stocks, production estimates, and actual movements, and the 
refinery with nominations and current prices for modelling, 
blending, and value added calculations. 
BP Oil is now actively considering the requirements for a 
commercial information system (OSCA) [Oil Stock Control and 
Accounting System] with an interface to the refinery internal 
systems. There is no doubt that benefits to the 
supply /manufacturing function, such as better trading decisions 
and their impact on the refinery operation, will arise from the 
implementation of such a system [3]. 
The development of OSCA was approved by BPO and underway by the time 
the Grangemouth RIS Project had moved on to the feasibility study 
stage. 
Finally, the Strategy Study Team briefly addressed the perceived 
inadequacy in computer knowledge at the refinery. Although the ORACLE 
based system was to be designed to be relatively easy to use the study 
recognised that for the effective utilisation of even such user - 
friendly systems an improvement in the level of computer support 
available at the refinery would be required. 
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The systems proposed represent a significant increase in scope 
and complexity compared with the present data processing 
environment at Grangemouth Refinery, and there can be no doubt 
that enhanced skills would be required in the data processing 
support group [3]. 
With these proposals in mind the Strategy Study Team briefly 
considered a development path for Grangemouth. They noted that 
delivery of the proposed systems was likely to take several years and 
although some of the individual sub -systems suggested could have 
benefits on their own... 
It is important to appreciate that...the full potential can only 
be realised by the integration of all the elements [3]. 
Whilst proffering some ideas on the sequencing of the developments 
that they proposed the Strategy Study Team were keen to point out 
that... 
A more detailed study is clearly necessary to undertake an 
outline system design with a carefully considered development 
path [3]. 
The team concluded that their proposals for an integrated system would 
cost approximately $4.795 million and achieve benefits of 
approximately $4.15 million per annum [3]. The costs were obviously 
minimised by the availability of Rotterdam RIS software "free of 
cost ". Curiously, for a project which could be expected to extend over 
a number of years and whose returns would be largely dependent on 
future oil prices, predicted benefits, given in terms of cents per 
barrel or dollars per tonne, seemed to be based upon only one oil 
price value. One might have expected a number of possible price 
scenarios to be explored in the cost /benefits section of the document. 
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The Strategy Study Team recommended the.. 
...formation of a system design study team (4 people, 4 -6 months) 
to provide a more detailed definition of requirements and the 
development path, and a more complete assessment of the costs and 
benefits [3]. 
On the basis of the figures provided by the Strategy Study Team the 
system looked likely to provide significant benefits and consequently 
a System Design Team was indeed set up. They submitted the first stage 
of their feasibility study for the RIS Project in September 1988. We 
now go on to consider how their recommendations led to the RIS system 
that was actually developed at the refinery. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE GRANGEMOUTH RIS PROJECT FEASIBILITY STUDY 
Introduction 
The Grangemouth RIS Feasibility Study was undertaken by a System 
Design Team comprised of three BP employees and one member of Scicon's 
Energy Division. At the time of the completion of the Stage 1 Report 
in September 1988, Scicon was still a subsidiary of the BP 
organisation. Two of the BP members of the team were Grangemouth 
refinery staff: one from the Production Department, the other from the 
refinery's Technical Department. The third BP member of the team came 
from BP International's Information Systems Services group [1]. 
The team agreed "..a schedule for a five stage approach to the Study" 
with the Steering Committee (more about them later) responsible for 
overseeing the project's progress [1]. The Feasibility Study sought to 
utilise the Scicon approach to "Defining an Information Systems 
Strategy" [2] as an "adaptable" [1] starting point for their 
deliberations on the potential for RIS at Grangemouth. The Scicon 
approach "..recommends the splitting of an IS Strategy Study into the 
following three phases: 
Phase 1 - Business Requirements Study 
Phase 2 - Systems Study 
Phase 3 - Strategic Plan Development [2]. 
The approach was seen, by the System Design Team to "..be more 
suitable for completely new computer projects than for a project such 
as Grangemouth RIS which will link and build upon existing systems" 
[1]. They also pointed to weaknesses in terms of the approach's 
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facilities for the evaluation of candidate solutions and in terms of 
its lack of provision of milestones against which progress could be 
measured, monitored, and corrected [1]. The team felt, however, that 
with the inclusion of two additional stages in the study it would be 
possible "..to overcome these deficiencies" [1]. Thus, the study was 
to consist "..of the following five stages: 
Stage 1 - Plant Familiarisation and Documentation of 
Existing Systems 
Stage 2 - Business Requirements Study 
Stage 3 - Evaluate Candidate Solutions 
Stage 4 - Develop Target Architecture 
Stage 5 - Strategic Plan Development [1]. 
The five stage approach was seen to "..provide opportunities for the 
identification of early implementation possibilities" [1]. Although 
the System Design Team were nominally in the business of providing a 
"Feasibility" Study for RIS at Grangemouth, as we noted in the 
previous section, BP Oil were keen to emulate the perceived 
"competitive edge" [3] derived from the first RIS system at Rotterdam 
in its other major refineries worldwide. This strategic aim, coupled 
with the positive response to the idea of RIS at Grangemouth provided 
by the 1987 Strategy Study [4] meant that the provision of some form 
of RIS type system at Grangemouth was virtually a foregone conclusion. 
It was really only the specifics of the Grangemouth instantiation of 
RIS that were still up for grabs in September 1988. 
Each stage of the "Feasibility Study" was to "...culminate in a formal 
report (i.e. four interim reports and one final) which [could] be 
reviewed by the the end users and the steering group" [1]. 
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Justifying and Ratifying RIS at Grangemouth 
The Role of the Steering Committee 
The types of "weaknesses" and "deficiencies" pointed to by the System 
Design Team in the Scicon approach are suggestive of the key role that 
firm management was seen to play in the realisation of a successful 
and cost effective RIS at Grangemouth. It is notoriously difficult to 
maintain and meet original specifications and costings in the 
development of large scale information systems. Active project 
management, at a number of levels, was perceived to be the solution 
needed to alleviate these problems, although there was recognition, on 
the part of the Steering Committee that this is easier said than done. 
As one member of the Grangemouth Committee pointed out: 
...it is very very difficult to cost information systems, it's 
largely a question of faith, and it's even harder to measure 
benefits. But you can benefit the thing overall, you can probably 
bench mark the site overall, but to actually split it down into 
components, which is what you're trying to do when you're 
justifying a system is very difficult... I have a rough idea what 
the function costs [and] what the benefits ought to be, and it's 
a question of using judgement as to whether you believe that or 
not [5]. 
Ratification of Grangemouth RIS was to be dependent on a number of 
justificatory procedures within a number of fora within the BP Oil 
Group. 
Within the Europe organisation, essentially you build it into 
your business plan. Assuming it's in your business plan, then 
that sort of money can be handled within the European 
organisation. But it has to be endorsed by what we call the 
Business Development Unit in London and that's corporate within 
BP Oil. So if it's included in the business plan then the 
sanction is within Europe, but endorsement is required from the 
BDU. For a project of that size it would be second in command, or 
something like that, in Europe who would take the decision [5]. 
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Even after ratification at that level, strict control was to be 
maintained by the Steering Committee. At Grangemouth, they met... 
...every few months. I mean these meetings can be stretched if 
there's not a lot going on, then obviously the date can be moved 
out a bit. If there's a lot going on that needs some sort of 
endorsement from the [Steering] Committee they'll be much more 
frequent. What the project does is report on it's progress 
against the technical targets and the financial targets, and the 
project's usually split into phases, so you can measure your 
expenditure against your phase allocation. So.. they've been 
allocated a fund [and].. the refinery manager will control the 
release of those funds to ensure that they're being spent in the 
right way. I think there is a danger with systems projects, as 
we've discovered from failures in the past, not in this kind of 
area but just systems projects generally, because they're not 
that well defined when you set off. The danger is that you can go 
off at tangents and you can overspend dramatically [5]. 
The successful implementation of the first RIS at Rotterdam was seen 
to derive primarily from strict application of sound project 
management practices and BP were keen to emulate this facet of the 
Rotterdam RIS at subsequent sites. Issues concerning commonality of 
core software, described in the first part of the RIS story, were also 
seen to be key here. 
..I think the RIS project at Rotterdam, which was $24 million 
worth, was one of the first IS projects to come in on time and 
within budget and actually do what it was meant to do. That's not 
to say that there weren't things that needed sorting out, but to 
all intents and purposes the project was a success. Now if you 
look at the Grangemouth situation, even though [they may pick] up 
a lot of software from elsewhere, there are things which [will 
be] relevant to Grangemouth that [wouldn't be] relevant to other 
refineries and there [will be] bits of the system they don't 
particularly like and they wish to redesign. So the danger is 
that whilst, you know, we can support these kinds of 
developments, what we don't want them doing is going completely 
berserk. What these project boards serve to do is to ensure that 
they are making progress on developing bits, but without losing 
sight of some sort of finishing date and the amount of funds 
they've got. The other possibility is of course if you find 
yourself in a hole then you could possibly delegate that to a 
research centre or some other.. centrally funded part of the 
organisation. Particularly if it's a big problem and /or likely to 
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be a common problem. Another possibility.., of course, is that 
because it's often advantageous to implement these things within 
a project like this (you stand a much better chance than doing it 
remotely) then you might [get] central funding so you have 
additional funds coming in from the centre, for the benefit of 
everybody [5]. 
Subsequent events at Rotterdam and Bulwer meant that for development 
staff at Grangemouth these strictures were particularly acute and they 
became more acute as the project went on. We have already alluded to 
the problems that began to emerge at Bulwer as the second RIS 
implementation progressed. However, before completion of the 
Grangemouth system, problems started to emerge at Rotterdam. These 
problems were admittedly more to do with issues external to the 
development of RIS, but they did come to impinge on the justificatory 
potential of subsequent RIS implementations. The perceived initial 
success of the Rotterdam RIS led one member of the Grangemouth 
Steering Committee to remark that... 
I must admit sympathy [with the System Design Team] in the sense 
that I realise how difficult it is to pinpoint down from some of 
these things and my personal opinion is that we should've, having 
audited the first system at Rotterdam, which provided better 
benefits than we'd envisaged, ..then accepted the principle, 
accepted the fact, that they did generate benefits and not worry 
about costing and benefiting. Well, of course you'll cost and 
benefit, but not being so obsessed with the benefits of future 
systems [5]. 
One would perhaps have expected ratification of subsequent RIS 
projects to become easier following the extremely favourable results 
of the initial Rotterdam audit. However, instead they soon became... 
...more difficult. But that's rather an unfortunate circumstance 
really that we find ourselves in. Shortly after the RIS system 
went into Rotterdam they formed a joint venture in Rotterdam and 
the system wasn't designed for a joint venture and therefore 
basically wasn't used. The second RIS implementation in Bulwer 
Island Refinery down in Australia.. overstretched themselves.. in 
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terms of the production system design and because of that they 
basically failed to meet their goals and are still trying to 
implement the system... So because of those failures, if you 
like, or the perception of failure, management are very reluctant 
to spend money on RIS projects and we had to fight quite hard to 
get the Grangemouth project through and each time one of these 
things comes up we're in exactly the same situation where you 
have to reconvince people [5]. 
These problems were not apparent, or at least they were not formally 
discussed in 1988, at the time of the Feasibility Study. Rotterdam had 
still not completed its RIS implementation and the Bulwer system was 
still in the early development stages. There was no mention of the 
Rotterdam joint venture in any of the five volumes of the Grangemouth 
Feasibility Study. The Bulwer Island system is first mentioned in the 
Stage 3 report, although no performance problems are suggested. The 
System Design Team did, however, express a desire to liaise closely 
with Bulwer development staff to ensure the early identification of 
any problems that did emerge. These issues were to become more 
important as the Grangemouth development proceeded. As the preceding 
quote suggests, the inevitability of RIS at Grangemouth that was so 
pronounced in the Stage 1 Feasibility Study Report, was rather rapidly 
diluted, and action was required on the part of the System Design Team 
to convince the Steering Committee that the promised benefits would 
indeed be delivered. 
One of the key problems that emerged at Rotterdam, notwithstanding the 
implications of the joint venture, was the organisational realisation 
of the benefits expected to accrue from the technical wizzardîj that 
was RIS. 
...I think the key thing is having solved the technical problems 
and putting the systems in [there] you then have a secondary 
problem in that if you don't use the RIS system and people, the 
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users, aren't committed to it, you don't get the benefits. And 
that is one of the key problems that we're facing really.., 
bringing the users along with the implementation of the system 
and ensuring that they use it after the event... Having seen the 
lack of enthusiasm, if you like, certainly in the Rotterdam 
refinery, I think it is important that we try and boost this 
now [5] . 
We will go on to consider, in detail, how the realisation of benefits 
was managed at Grangemouth shortly. Before doing so however, it is 
important to note that the "question of faith" was still important for 
all concerned on both sides of the development process. Those 
monitoring and ratifying the decisions of the System Design Team had 
to have faith in realisability of the somewhat ephemeral benefits 
envisaged by the Team. However, the faith of the System Design Team 
itself, and the active exhibition of that faith were also of paramount 
importance. In the absence of strong, precise, "objective ", numerical 
justifications the Steering Committee had to look to other clues in 
order to allow them to assess the likelihood of the realisation of the 
System Design Team's plans. 
...if you don't believe in it then you can't sell it to your 
management when you present the case [5]. 
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From Feasibility Study to Final Specification 
Changes Envisaged in the Feasibility Study 
By the time the Final Report [6] of the Grangemouth Feasibility Study 
was completed in February 1989, a number of significant changes to the 
4 
recommendations of the 1987 Strategy Study had been suggested and 
agreed. Indeed, by the time the Stage 1 Report was published, doubts 
were being expressed by the System Design Team over the applicability 
of the Head Office LP model for the Grangemouth Production Department 
[1]. The Strategy Study had recommended the replacement of the 
refinery's Sciconic LP with the Head Office model, but the authors of 
the Stage 1 Feasibility Study felt "..that this should be considered 
further before implementing the change, and it will be reviewed as 
part of the study" [1]. 
The System design team were not, however, keen to retain the Sciconic 
LP at the refinery. Whilst it did provide "..a quick means to define 
the optimum mode of operation for the Refinery in line with processing 
capability, market prices, and requirements" [1] it had other 
disadvantages that extended beyond its lack of consistency with the 
Head Office LP model. The Sciconic LP was seen to be "poorly 
documented ", time consuming to use and update, and lacking a recursive 
facility that would allow simpler representations of process units 
and, perhaps more importantly, the provision of definitive solutions. 
It was "not particularly user friendly ", it required expert production 
and computing knowledge to interpret solutions and to update the 
database, and it could "suggest benefits which are not in practice 
attainable" [1]. Some similar concerns were expressed about the 
suitability of BPRSS for RIS, particularly with regard to the need for 
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both practical refining and computer programming experience. These 
inadequacies were described with reference to their commercial 
consequences. Timely, accurate information on production potential as 
well as production commitments were seen to be required. 
The benefits of operating with lower stocks depends to a large 
extent on accurate forecasting not only of production but also of 
offtake...Without accurate information in this area there is a 
risk of stock -out if stock levels are allowed to operate at a 
very low level. Maintaining sufficient buffer stocks to prevent 
this both ties up capital and reduces operating flexibility and 
can possibly result in lost sales opportunities [1]. 
Against this backdrop of commercial problems with the proposals for 
RIS LP modelling provided by the Strategy Study, the authors of the 
Stage 1 Feasibility Report offered no implementation proposals of 
their own. The remit of this part of the study, that is, "Plant 
Familiarisation and Documentation of Existing Systems ", allowed them 
to defer their decision. They may have been aware of other candidate 
solutions emerging in the BP world, that were not sufficiently 
respectable to warrant consideration in September 1988. The team 
seemed happier to take a "wait and see" approach to the problem. 
Although changes were beginning to be made to the proposed RIS 
development path, they were made against the background of progress on 
the Oil Stock Control and Accounting (OSCA) and PIP projects. The 
provision of stock information to Head Office and the instrumentation 
of process units were seen as essential pre- requisites for RIS by both 
the authors of the Strategy Study and the System Design Team. 
"Implementation of the main part of OSCA [was] due to be completed by 
the end of 1989" [1] and "The Process Implementation Project [was] 
nearing completion at the time of writing" [1]. 
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During the "Business Requirements Study" [7] some 40 Grangemouth and 
BP Oil employees were interviewed by the System Design Team. They 
found that "Historically, computer systems have been imposed on the 
Grangemouth Refinery, often from outside, without adequate user 
involvement at the analysis stage" [7] and that "Training in awareness 
of modern information technology is urgently required" [7]. These 
findings are consistent with the concerns raised by the Strategy Study 
and were seen by the System Design Team as further evidence of the 
lack of "management control over the development of new systems; there 
is no strategy" [7]. These issues were seen to be fundamental and led 
the System Design Team "to recommend that a separate study should be 
implemented to look at the overall refinery computer systems' 
requirements, identify the weaknesses in current systems, and develop 
a plan for improving them" [7] Thus, again we see a conception within 
BP of effective management as the cornerstone of successful 
utilisation of IT. Action was also required to bring "up the level of 
IT awareness of Grangemouth personnel in order that the maximum 
benefits of any RIS implementation may be obtained" [7]. A key problem 
here was the narrow view taken by prospective users of the benefits of 
IT. Grangemouth employees saw "computer facilities.. only as tools to 
help them perform their own jobs better" [7]. The commercial 
orientation of RIS demanded the provision of "hard financial benefits 
of their having better Refinery information" [7] and this sort of 
appreciation was to be a key aim of the improved IT awareness training 
proposed by the System Design Team. 
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Following a somewhat similar vein, the Team also recommended the 
introduction of "an effective electronic mail system" [emphasis in 
original] [7]. RIS was seen as'a leap forward into the information age 
and an information based organisation was needed to support it. The 
desire for electronic mail may be seen as another facet of this 
trajectory. 
In the Stage 2 Report possible directions for the development of RIS 
were presented against the backdrop of BP Oil's business strategy for 
the Grangemouth refinery. In essence, BP Oil was "to remain a national 
marketer supported by refining operations at Grangemouth" [7]. It is 
important to note here that BP's UK market was not, and was not 
expected to be, supplied by Grangemouth production alone. Exchanges 
and purchased products were to continue to play a major role. 
The company's market demand is met primarily from 7 mta [million 
tons per annum] product refined at Grangemouth together with a 
processing deal at Texaco's Pembroke refinery, which yields 1.7 
mta. 
Allowing for about 0.5 mt refinery output as LDF sold to BPCL [BP 
Chemical Ltd], the combined refined product from Grangemouth and 
Pembroke is expected to fall about 2 mt short of BPO's market 
demand in 1993 [7]. 
IT and systems policy was intended to consistent with, and supportive 
of, this overall business strategy. For BP Oil's manufacturing and 
supply operations key critical success factors were defined as: 
understanding demand, by location and by refinery - linked to a 
knowledge of stocks and offtakes. 
knowing the technical performance of the refinery 
planning the short term optimisation of trading / refinery 
operation / modal movement / exchanges [7]. 
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The perceived importance of adequate information for the achievement 
of these objectives is self evident. The System Design Team invoked BP 
Oil's business strategy on Information Technology and Systems to 
justify their deliberations on RIS at Grangemouth. This suggested that 
IT investment should be directed towards.. 
achieving a balanced portfolio of applications between ongoing 
operation of a low cost base set of systems linked with a 
controlled use of low cost, quickly developed blue skies expert 
systems which will provide a competitive edge. 
We note that not all expert systems are quickly developed. We 
interpret the statement to mean that there is a corporate will to 
try systems which use leading -edge technology. The development of 
these systems must be carefully monitored [emphasis in original] 
[7]. 
We can see here more evidence of the tension within BP between playing 
it safe with technology and taking risks that may lead to a 
competitive advantage. Moreover, we can also see again the importance 
attributed to effective project management in the resolution of this 
conflict. The System Design Team attempted to clarify the position by 
raising questions about the organisation's broad "technology 
positioning" policy. However, the way in which the question was posed 
does much to reveal the preferences of the team. 
does [the organisation] wish to remain with the ageing 
technology it has lived with for years, accepting ever -increasing 
software maintenance costs as the price to pay for its investment 
in established software? 
would it prefer to make a step change to the technology that is 
available today, paying no attention to what is around the 
corner? 
as a matter of principle, is it policy to adopt "blue skies" 
technology wherever possible, accepting the higher risks of this 
policy against the potential gains of increasing its leading edge 
over the competition [7]. 
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Clearly the technological specialists who made up the System Design 
Team favoured the "blue skies" approach, with the essential proviso of 
strong project management. In fact, it is interesting to note that the 
third option appeared in the Stage 2 report without a question mark, 
as it is reproduced above. Whilst this may have been merely an error 
on the part of a typist, it may also reflect a "Freudian Slip" on the 
authors' behalf. 
In the next section we examine the influence of this approach on the 
choice of Linear Programming System for the Grangemouth RIS. 
Changes to the Proposed Linear Programming System 
In the Stage 2 Report we find the first mention of the MIMI /LP package 
that was used for production planning and scheduling at the Bulwer 
Island refinery. However, no mention is made of the Bulwer System. 
Although MIMI is new to BP it is licensed by several major 
companies, including Amoco, Shell, Sun, Du Pont and Chrysler [7]. 
As we noted in the section considering Bulwer's implementation, MIMI 
stands for "Manager for Interactive Modelling Interfaces ". It is 
described in the Stage 2 Report as an "LP Option" along with the 
refinery's Sciconic LP and the Head Office modelling system. The team 
maintained their earlier reservations about the latter two whilst the 
MIMI system is described as "a flexible interactive front -end for 
modelling applications.. It provides an integrated framework for 
bridging applications programs, databases and distributed computers 
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with a common interface ", whilst "the /LP module provides the 
capability to generate, solve and report solutions to LP problems" 
[7]. No disadvantages are identified and a number of advantages are 
described. These include the system's flexibility and "its ability to 
interface with a data base and with other application programs, as 
well as its potentially powerful set -up and reporting facilities" [7]. 
The benefits of additional complementary modules are also described, 
despite the fact that these were still under development by the 
manufacturer at the time of writing. Additional modules were to 
"include: MIMI /G, an interactive graphics module; MIMI /E, an expert 
systems shell; and MIMI /S, a planning and scheduling module" [7]. The 
compatibility of the MIMI /LP with the long term aims of BP Oil in 
general, and the System Design Team in particular, seemed to make it a 
natural choice. The presentation of alternatives in the Stage 2 Report 
made the adoption of any another solution extremely unlikely. 
Great enthusiasm for the development of expert systems at Grangemouth 
is apparent in the Stage 2 Report and the expected development of an 
expert systems shell for MIMI must have served to make it all the more 
attractive. The Team went so far as to suggest "at least three areas 
where Expert Systems technology could be applied fruitfully.. in the 
Grangemouth application" [7]. "Blue skies" solutions seemed to be the 
order of the day. 
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Similarities with the Strategy Study Recommendations 
Although changes in the proposed LP system seemed likely, the 
commitment to an ORACLE based system, made in the 1987 Strategy Study 
was maintained. "ORACLE is in use in other BP refineries, and is a BP 
strategic project" [7]. 
Significant attention was also devoted to activities designed to 
improve the amount and accuracy of the information collected on the 
refinery's operations and conditions. Reiterating the Strategy Study 
the System Design Team claimed that significant commercial benefits 
were derivable from improvements in this area. Removal of uncertainty 
in plant and operations data was not only a pre- requisite for the 
establishment of systems designed to build a commercial advantage out 
of manipulation of that data. It also provided benefits directly 
through the minimisation of unaccountable losses, removal of double 
guessing, and through reductions of margins of error and hence 
requirements for "buffering ". Those negotiating with customs officials 
over appropriate duty payments were also provided with better 
resources by these improvements. The improved quality of information 
was expected to provide greater accuracy in the calculation of duty 
requirements and hence lower tax bills [7]. PIP and other similar 
smaller scale projects to re- instrument areas of the refinery were 
thus seen to be of vital importance. 
As we noted above, OSCA was also progressing at full speed. Although 
outwith the RIS project, the system was important for the sort of 
commercial focus the company was seeking through, amongst other 
things, its IT policy. No significant changes to the proposed 
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development of OSCA were suggested in the Stage 2 Report beyond noting 
problems with dependence upon the program that was to serve as an 
interface between OSCA and refinery based systems such as RIS. The 
Team did not suggest an alternative interface, presumably since OSCA 
lay outside their terms of reference. 
New Benefits, Old Costs 
The System Design Team estimated that the total annual benefit of the 
RIS they describe in the Stage 2 Report would be $3 005 000, assuming 
an exchange rate of £1 = $1.7 [7]. "This compares with the figure of 
$3 227 000 (excluding benefits derived from better process models) 
claimed by [the 1987 Strategy Study]" [7]. The problem of 
quantification of benefits was ever apparent, for example, although 
"it was universally acknowledged that better information exchange 
between" the refinery and Head Office "would significantly improve the 
company's ability to grasp evanescent commercial opportunities. This 
was admitted..to be almost impossible to quantify" [7]. 
The calculation of benefits was not very detailed, but it did 
demonstrate the potential for significant commercial improvements. 
The exact figure is unimportant, the project still looked commercially 
viable. Indeed the exact figures were so unimportant that "the costs 
of achieving the forgoing benefits have not yet been estimated: this 
is a task for later RIS study stages" [7]. 
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The Stage 3 Report [8] opens with an announcement of the Steering 
Committee's acceptance of the development of "an integrated RIS system 
with a relational database at its core.. there was no feasible or 
desirable alternative" [8]. The remaining Feasibility Study Reports 
thus sought to recommend a develop and implementation path that was 
consistent with these objectives. 
Specifying a Development Path for RIS at Grangemouth 
The ratification of the System Design Team's preferred framework for 
RIS at Grangemouth was seen to be dependent on a number of factors: 
the analysis of Business Requirements in the Stage 2 Report pointed to 
"a highly integrated planning system "; technical considerations 
suggested "that a properly designed relational database [was] the only 
feasible solution to link all the necessary modules in a manageable 
and maintainable way; the approach represented "good, modern practice 
in the computer industry at large "; support for RIS from the BP centre 
was still strong - "it is seen as the only way forward "; and staff at 
Rotterdam were "convinced that real benefits" were already being 
derived from their original RIS which was, at the time, "not yet fully 
commissioned" [8]. 
The System Design Team were keen to emulate Rotterdam's success at 
Grangemouth. There was a high degree of commonality perceived between 
Rotterdam's and Grangemouth's business requirements, and thus, the 
team felt that there was "a large amount of software that can be taken 
from Rotterdam to form the foundation of a Grangemouth system" [8]. 
However, given the technical complexity of the task before them, the 
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Team suggested that the expertise of people with experience of the 
Rotterdam implementation could prove invaluable. In order to exploit 
this potential boost, the team re- scheduled some of their activities. 
The Stage 3 Report included: 
a recommended approach for implementation of RIS 
a development plan for start of the implementation early 1989 
preliminary cost estimates for the 1989 development work [8]. 
These activities were originally to be covered by the Stage 4 and 5 
Reports. The benefits envisaged from proceeding with the 
implementation in 1989 included "the opportunity to transfer key 
personnel from the successful Rotterdam project to Grangemouth; this 
window of opportunity" was expected to close in early 1989 [8]. 
Moreover, early implementation was seen to enable BP to "maintain 
their competitive edge in RIS systems" [8]. The detailed Systems 
Analysis required at this stage was also seen to provide benefits. 
These were to arise from the provision of "early, valuable information 
to allow sound decisions to be made to improve the flow of information 
throughout the refinery - not just within RIS" [8]. 
The development approach recommended involved the setting up of.. 
a small team working on systems analysis, prototyping and 
development of detailed specifications in parallel with 
installation of the database and some of the Rotterdam software 
Such an approach was seen to be consistent with a total project 
implementation timescale of approximately two years. Thus, the full 
system would be installed by early 1991. 
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The general approach taken in the design of the various 
subsystems is to retain existing software which is good and meets 
our requirements, or where there is no better economic 
alternative. Purchase of new software has been recommended where 
the existing systems are inadequate, where the software is a 
crucial part of the integrated system, and where the potential 
benefits are high [8]. 
As we noted earlier, in -house Rotterdam software was obtainable "cost 
free" although costs of modifications to this software to meet the 
exigencies of the Grangemouth situation were to be borne by the 
project. However, a number of recommendations were made for the 
purchase of proprietary packages and systems. 
The new software recommended is the VG Laboratory System (used in 
Rotterdam RIS), the MIMI system which has integrated LP, expert 
system, and scheduling modules (being implemented at Bulwer 
Island RIS), and MTTS Movement Tank Tracking System for 
identification, logging and graphical display movements (being 
implemented at Vohburg and probably at Gothenburg and Bulwer 
Island) [8]. 
[VG is the name of the supplier of the Laboratory System] 
Given the agreement between the System Design Team and the Steering 
Committee over an approach to the development of RIS, the former felt 
able to provide a framework describing the context in which the system 
was expected to function at Grangemouth in their Stage 3 Report. This 
framework is reproduced overleaf. The system to be developed sought to 
meet a series of agreed business requirements, ratified by the 
Steering Committee. The various subsystems to be developed and their 
integration were to be driven by these requirements. The business 
requirements and the systems requirements thought to be their 
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BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
To have the ability to identify 







Information about trading flexibility available to the refinery 
so it can identify opportunities 
Tank quantity and quality information available to Heed Office 
Planning tools which allow fast response to changes and "What if" 
analyses 
Facilities which permit confidence in the outcome of blends 
without need for time- consuming corrections 
To have an effective Quality 1 Despatch of product should not be possible unless authorised by 
Control system the Laboratory and Production Dept 
2 Ability to trace a batch of product back to its source and 
examine its composition and tested quality 
3 Certificates of Quality should not require manual corrections 
To understand the Process Unit 1 Accurate process flow data, accessible to all those who require 
technical capabilities and have it 
the ability to utilise them 2 Accurate process models 
effectively 3 Accurate LP representation 
To maximise value added by 1 Accurate representation of feedstock quality 
effective target setting and 2 Accurate overall refinery LP 
mònitoring 3 Process optimisation models 
4 Accurate flow measurement in process, blending and despatch areas 
5 All relevant information available in a usable form to support 
effective monitoring 
6 Confidence in quantity and quality information, to allow 
efficient operation at minimum stock levels 
To have the necessary information 1 Monitor stock movements 
systems for effective loss 2 Accurate process flow measurement 
management 3 Information to support BP's position in cases of disagreement 
with HMCBE over duty liability 
To create a broad based 1 Ability to distribute information to those who require it to 
understanding of refinery 
operations and strategic, 
requirements 
carry out their job to the highest standard 
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Recommendations for Implementation of the Grangemouth RIS 
In this section we consider in more detail the approach to development 
and implementation of the Grangemouth RIS set out in the Stage 3 
Feasibility Study Report. 
Production Planning and Scheduling 
The initial recommendations on the choice of LP systems for RIS at 
Grangemouth, set out in the 1987 Strategy Study [4], were formally 
rejected in the Stage 3 Report. The System Design Team favoured the 
adoption of the MIMI /LP system that was being implemented at Bulwer 
Island. They, in line with the 1987 Strategy Study, saw no future for 
the Sciconic LP, but they did feel able to recommend the use of the 
Head Office LP model at Grangemouth "as an interim solution and as a 
way of getting a model that both the refinery and Head Office have 
confidence in" [8]. This temporary respite for the idea of using Head 
Office model at Grangemouth was seen as worthwhile "only..if the model 
formulation is improved at the same time" [8]. MIMI was now 
undoubtedly seen as the solution in waiting: 
MIMI looks like a much better solution both in the short term, 
and more important, as a longer term strategic tool for refinery 
planning. Provided Bulwer Island do not give unexpected 
unfavourable feed -back this is the route recommended for the 
Grangemouth RIS system [8]. 
The adoption of MIMI elsewhere in the BP group had important 
implications for its acceptability. Improvements to the Sciconic 
system would have resulted in Grangemouth having another "individually 
tailored solution with all the maintenance and development problems 
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that entails. Better to follow the route chosen by one of the other 
RIS implementations, so that knowledge and software can be shared" 
[8]. As we noted earlier, the expert systems potential of the MIMI 
solution made it all the more attractive to the Design Team. This 
module, when available, "could be used to make the LP set -up and 
solution interpretation easier and more user friendly" [8]. However, 
the benefits of MIMI did not come cost free, either economically or 
organisationally: 
The MIMI system is by its very nature flexible, and the problems 
are more likely to be associated with controlling the flexibility 
to get the best out of it. The experience of Bulwer Island 
refinery will be valuable here [8]. 
Hence, the team suggested the immediate upgrading of the Head Office 
LP for use at the refinery and the gleaning of information from 
Bulwer, before MIMI's suppliers were asked to create an application 
for Grangemouth, "with as much commonality with Bulwer Island as is 
possible or desirable" [8]. 
With regard to scheduling, the team recommended improvements to the 
accuracy of BPRSS, although they noted that the system "would not be a 
particularly useful operational tool until the data input is 
automated" [8]. Thus, their plan was broadly in line with that 
suggested in 1987 [4]. However, there were hints about extending MIMI 
to cover scheduling of refinery processes. Although it was felt that 
BPRSS would give better information than the LP, it was suggested that 
"this option should be reviewed later" [8]. The team also suggested 
that the off -line plant models, which although in existence were not 
widely used, should be transferred to the VAX platform on which RIS 
was to run "as soon as live process data is captured in the RIS data- 
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base" [8]. The importance of improvements to the Head Office LP as a 
paving step for the future implementation of MIMI were also emphasised 
in the scheduling context. 
Improvements to the Information on which RIS was to Depend 
As well as applauding the success of the PIP, albeit with reservations 
about its future hardware platform, the Stage 3 Report detailed plans 
for the introduction of a Flow Measurement Uncertainty Reduction 
(FMUR) subsystem as part of RIS. 
The availability of uncertainty- reduced flow measurements to 
users and to other computer systems will enable a clearer picture 
of actual flow conditions to be obtained and will help the 
achievement of production goals [8]. 
The FMUR system was to take plant measurements transmitted via the PIP 
system and produce reconciled flow measurements. A measurement's 
uncertainty was to be determined using a hierarchy of procedures 
descending from recent physical recalibrations of meters, through 
numerical calculations, down to rule of thumb estimates with the 
"best" measure of uncertainty being used in each case. Once all 
individual uncertainties had been defined, a mass balance 
reconciliation was to be performed that sought to apportion 
discrepancies in mass balance in the physical refinery system 
"reasonably across the meters" [8]. That is, the larger the flow 
uncertainty of a meter, the greater the proportion of mass balance 
discrepancy attributed to it. 
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The team also made recommendations for changes to the physical 
refinery system, not just its representation within RIS, where these 
changes were seen to be important for realisation of RIS's potential 
commercial benefits. In particular, updates were proposed for the 
machinery used in the blending of, and the introduction of additives 
to, refinery products. Achievement of the refinery's business 
requirements was seen to depend not only on accurate information but 
also on the possibility of predictable results of interventions and 
normal operations. It was no use having information on how to bring a 
product up to spec., if the tools to physically bring about the change 
were too imprecise to implement the desired change successfully or 
with requisite certainty. The commercial benefits of RIS did not 
depend solely on the software used and the hardware platform 
supporting it. The physical refinery had to be physically controllable 
at a similar level of resolution to that provided by RIS. 
Satisfying the Information Needs of the Head Office Users 
The Stage 3 Report provided a more detailed assessment of the 
information needs of Head Office users along with some ideas on how 
these needs were to be met. 
The main requirements for Head Office are for information about 
current and planned refinery operations, which will involve 
transmission of data via OSCA, transmission of fixed reports, and 
flexible query facilities to access data from the data base [8]. 
These requirements were derived from the business objectives of those 
elements of the corporate organisation responsible for the refinery - 
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Head Office interface. These objectives included an "ability to 
identify and respond to Trading or Production opportunities" coupled 
with an understanding of "the technical capabilities of the process 
units" [8]. Such an understanding was seen to be required for BP Oil's 
effective utilisation of the Grangemouth plant. RIS could not alone 
provide the entire solution. 
The first of these objectives implies a two way flow of 
information between Head Office and the refinery. A RIS system 
will certainly satisfy the requirements for information flow from 
the refinery to Head Office, but it is probably not the most 
effective tool for distributing the necessary information about 
trading flexibility in the other direction. An electronic mail or 
informal bulletin system is probably a better solution [8]. 
The proposed electronic mail system connecting Head Office and 
refinery personnel may be seen as an extension of the desire for such 
a system within the refinery, expressed by the System Design Team in 
the Stage 1 Report. Indeed, considering the good progress being made 
on the implementation of OSCA and the refinery based nature of RIS... 
No unique facilities [were] envisaged for Head Office users. 
Their requirements should be satisfied by a subset of the 
facilities provided for refinery users [8]. 
Positioning the System Designers and Programmers: 
Outlining the General Approach 
As the System Design Team were keen to emphasise... 
The subsystems described previously.. form part of an integrated 
Refinery Information System. Sight of this crucial fact must not 
be lost during the design and development of RIS. The information 
supplied by each subsystem must be available to any of the users 
of RIS (if their password privileges allow) through a seamless 
man -machine interface [8]. 
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In order to ensure that the programmers and designers did not "lose 
sight" of their overriding aim the System Design Team provided outline 
specifications of general facilities common to all of the components 
of RIS. These "outline specifications" varied in prescriptive strength 
although they all sought to ensure the consistency seen to be 
essential for "an integrated Refinery Information System ". 
Requirements for facilities such as terminals and workstations were 
already largely determined by previous choices and could thus be 
specified concretely. For example, with regard to VDU terminals, the 
Team suggested that "Where non -DEC devices are used, there must be no 
operational difference (screen colour set, keyboard layout, etc.) 
between them and the equivalent DEC device [8]. Other specifications, 
whilst not definitive, still pointed to the need for consistency. Some 
choices over exactly what this consistent form should be were left for 
later. For example, when considering the coherence of information 
presentation the team suggested that.. 
All RIS subsystems must present their information in a unified 
and coherent manner. Specifically, this shall include: common 
conventions for using colour; common error /warning message 
layout; common screen layout structure (head banner for 
orientation, body for RIS information, foot banner for errors and 
warnings); uniform display of decimal digits; context -dependent 
help facilities; field value selection lists; uniform date and 
time presentation, and the use of highlighting /flashing [8]. 
Other recommendations in a similar vein included: 
Use of Graphics 
The use of graphical means of presenting complex information is 
to be encouraged. To help in this, an integrated on -line graphics 
facility shall be provided as part of RIS. 
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Consistent Menu Structure 
It is mandatory that a consistent menu structure and navigation 
feature be designed into RIS. Design guidelines for this must 
embrace: a system -wide menu tree; inter -screen navigation steps; 
a navigation help feature; inhibition of redundant function keys, 
and operational modes for inexperienced and for expert users. 
Ad Hoc Query Facility 
A facility shall exist to enable users to request the reporting 
of any (reasonable) selection of data in the RIS database, 
summarised and presented as he (sic.) wishes. For reasons of 
machine resource loading, this facility will only be available 
via a suitably trained and knowledgeable support group. 
Backup, Recovery and Archive Facilities 
Routine data backup and recovery shall be possible in a manner 
which has little or no effect on the continuous operation of RIS. 
Any data may be archived - once agreed with the support group - 
and replayed into the system for analysis. 
System Security 
System security features shall be provided which protect RIS at 
the following levels: 
disaster recovery (the ability to restore the system and 
recover its information from backup media held off -site) 
unauthorised access from outside the BP Group (accidental or 
malicious) 
unauthorised user access to the different RIS subsystems and 
data areas 
unauthorised data modification [8]. 
Thus although the man - machine interface was to be "seamless ", a number 
of seams were to be built into, or not removed, from the machine. 
Considerations of machine resource loading and security provided a 
rationale for some restrictions on the unmediated flexibility 
potentially offered by an Oracle relational database system. As the 
previous quote about MIMI suggests, having chosen potentially flexible 
building blocks, the main problems for the Design Team were "likely to 
be associated with controlling the flexibility to get the best out of 
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it" [8]. There is an interesting tension here between the Design 
Team's insistence on consistency, presumably intended to facilitate 
(managed) "flexible" usage, and their recommendations for passwords, 
"reasonableness ", and support groups, presumably intended to restrict, 
control and monitor such usage. The lack of IT knowledge at the 
refinery and worries about security and system performance together 
provided a significant countervailing force against unmitigated 
flexibility. This tension existed not only between an idealised 
theoretical RIS and its practical realisation at Grangemouth but also 
between the implications of that ideal and other ideals such as 
managerial control that were also struggling for the Design Team's 
attentions. 
Choosing a Systems Development Approach to Match the Requirements 
There is only one realistic development approach for the 
Grangemouth RIS system. This is the approach variously known as 
"end -user computing ", "user -led computing ", or - our preferred 
term - "Joint Application Development" (JAD) [8]. 
The System Design Team provided two justification for the foregoing 
statement: 
The first is that the "classical" systems development methodology 
(the generation of massive and incomprehensible requirements 
specifications, followed by woolly systems specifications) simply 
does not work. If it produces anything at all, it produces 
systems which are late, over -budget and which only vaguely meet 
the business requirements [emphasis in original]. 
The second justification is that once the JAD approach was 
adopted on the Rotterdam RIS implementation, the project 
proceeded with startling success and is now on target for a 
timely and within budget delivery [8]. 
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As we have already noted, "the RIS project at Rotterdam.. was one of 
the first IS projects to come in on time and actually do what it was 
meant to do" [5]. The System Design Team were keen that the RIS 
project at Grangemouth should do the same. Moreover, the JAD approach 
was seen to be consistent with the RIS philosophy of collecting and 
analysing data and information according to its commercial potential. 
"Knowledgeable members of the user group" were the best source of this 
information [8] even though, at Grangemouth, users did not seem to be 
particularly adept at providing "hard financial benefits of their 
having better Refinery information" [7]. Rather they saw "computer 
facilities.. only as tools to help them perform their own jobs better" 
[7]. Various techniques were to be used to facilitate this orientation 
throughout the development. These included "Business Area Analysis ", 
"Data Modelling" and "Prototyping" [8]. 
Business Area Analysis "should identify all essential and beneficial 
information flows throughout the refinery - and also any which are 
redundant" [8]. This objective was to be achieved through "liaison 
between the systems analyst and knowledgeable members of the user 
group" [8]. Such an analysis should "indicate where interim 
improvements could be made while the target system is being 
constructed, in order to provide rapid benefits to the organisation" 
[8]. Obviously the provision of such "rapid benefits" would do no harm 
to the standing of the analysts, designers and programmers working on 
RIS at Grangemouth. Demonstrable early successes would undoubtedly 
facilitate co- operation with users in the achievement of future 
objectives. 
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Data Modelling demanded the arrangement of the data required by the 
refinery "so that they reflect business needs and not computer 
technology" [8]. Such a process would not only serve to emphasise the 
commercial orientation of RIS, it was seen as essential for other 
reasons: 
This process is a prerequisite of any integrated database 
environment because without the model a database management 
system would degenerate to a mere (expensive) filing system. 
[T]he technology of relational database to be used in RIS 
requires the data model as input. If data are not properly 
modelled, performance and integrity will suffer. 
[Thirdly].. data modelling results in a database structure which 
changes only slowly - as the business evolves. Migration of the 
database to different computer hardware - to take advantage of 
improvements in the technology - can be performed whenever 
appropriate while preserving the business's investment in data 
[8]. 
Prototyping of the system, the construction of "working" computerised 
simulations of aspects of the putative system, was to be undertaken in 
order "to test the principles, ensure that the system works, and 
obtain design feedback which enables the design to be adjusted before 
major commitments are made" [8]. Prototypes could be developed 
"cheaply and quickly" thanks to "the availability of modern tools and 
techniques - such as relational database and the so- called Fourth 
Generation Languages (4GLs)" [8]. 
Together these three techniques were seen to permit the joint 
development of applications by computer analysts and end -users. The 
System Design Team provide us with an idealistic view of the process 
in action: 
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In a JAD project, a systems analyst working with an end user can 
create and demonstrate dialogues for database queries, report 
generation and manipulation of screen information. The analyst 
discusses an end user's needs with him (sic.) and then creates a 
specimen dialogue on a terminal.. Initially, questions of 
transaction volumes, data validation and response times are 
ignored. 
The end user is shown the dialogue and trained quickly to use it. 
He may then make suggestions for changes, which the analyst 
quickly makes. The user may add extra dialogue information, or 
new calculations. The analyst can encourage and stimulate him by 
suggesting new layouts, different ways of presenting data - such 
as colour coding and graphics. The user remembers forgotten items 
- most importantly exceptional cases, which are notoriously 
expensive to cater for in a live system - and the analyst 
implements them. 
Finally, agreement is reached and the prototype is frozen - or, 
realistically becomes subject to formal change control.. In most 
cases.. design work is still needed to achieve machine 
efficiency, security, data validation and auditability.. [T]he 
prototype becomes, in effect, the requirements document for the 
final system [8]. 
For this ideal to be realisable in practice the System Design Team 
suggested that the "communication gap" between the users and analysts 
be reduced as far as possible. In the view of the Team, 
This can only be accomplished by: 
appointing to the team analysts whose personal skills are as 
good as their technical skills 
ensuring that there is no conflict of culture between the 
analysts and the users 
making sure the users understand the techniques, 
and tools of the analyst 
similarly, ensuring the analyst understands the 
problems and way of working of the user [8]. 
terminology 
objectives, 
The first two requirements were seen to be "management issues ", 
asserting once again the key role to be played by effective project 
management in the realisation of RIS. The last two requirements were 
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to be met through "effective cross -training before the project 
commences" [8]. The recommendations for IT awareness training made in 
the Stage 2 Report were seen as satisfying the third criteria, whilst 
training for analysts in user concerns were "yet to be defined, since 
it would depend on the depth of previous refinery experience possessed 
by the analysts" [8]. Although such an approach was seen to put a.. 
fairly heavy demand on user resources.. Investment in close user 
involvement in the development of RIS should be seen as an 
investment in building a system which is truly useful to its 
users and hence to the business. 
If a classical approach to RIS development were adopted.. user 
resources of this level would be consumed anyway.. in fruitless 
modification activities after the system had been built [8]. 
Curtailing JAD - Developing from the Rotterdam Base 
Whilst recognising that JAD would normally demand "the development of 
full data models and prototypes from scratch ", the System Design Team 
perceived sufficient functional congruity between Rotterdam's RIS and 
the system to be developed at Grangemouth to suggest "using the 
Rotterdam- developed database structure and associated software as a 
template around which to build [Grangemouth] RIS" [8]. The team laid 
out the steps involved in building upon the Rotterdam base: 
obtain VAX machine resources in Grangemouth 
obtain necessary software licences 
train users 
install the (empty) Rotterdam database at Grangemouth 
populate the empty database with suitable Grangemouth data 
transfer the Rotterdam system design to Grangemouth 
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build Grangemouth system prototypes 
use the prototypes to develop user requirements specifications 
modify the Rotterdam design to suit the Grangemouth 
requirements [8]. 
Much of the "joint development" process seen as essential for the 
final implementation of a usable system was considered circumventable 
since similar work had already been done at Rotterdam. In the light of 
the professed importance of JAD, the adoption of such a position by 
the System Design Team seems remarkable. Differences between the two 
refineries were perceived to be small enough to present few problems 
in the modification process which seems to come very late in the above 
development path. The availability of Rotterdam software, experience 
and expertise "cost free" was obviously a powerful incentive. The 
costs of reinventing the wheel at each RIS implementation were to be 
avoided by adopting the techniques and products of best practice RIS 
design exemplified at Rotterdam. The costs of future updates and 
system support would also be minimised by the maintenance, wherever 
possible, of common core software. Thus again we see a tension between 
the idealised requirements of the team's favoured approach and the 
exigencies of the developmental context of the Grangemouth RIS. 
Compromise and negotiation between a variety of physical and 
theoretical considerations can be seen to characterise the RIS 
development throughout its tranformation from rhetoric to reality. 
At the time of the Feasibility Study Bulwer Island did not seem to be 
seen as a radical RIS Mark II. Rather it was seen as somewhat flexible 
replication of Rotterdam's successful approach that sought to deliver 
a similar product. Where improvements to the Rotterdam system had been 
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made they would be adopted, but Rotterdam was still seen as the 
exemplary starting point from which future implementations would have 
to build. Bulwer was, at the time, just another example of this 
process in action, albeit an example which potentially provided a 
justification for minor deviations from strict adherence to the 
Rotterdam system. The key negotiation, or translation, was to be 
between Rotterdam's ready made solution and the emerging requirements 
of the Grangemouth situation. 
Building a Team Able to Meet the Requirements 
The key importance of sound project management emphasised throughout 
the Feasibility Study led the System Design Team to make 
recommendations about the organisation of the Project Team that would 
actually design and implement the proposed system. 
To ensure success we believe that the best modern techniques in 
project management should be used. These include the managed 
control of joint applications development coupled with a 
"surgical team" approach to design and programming (i.e. a team 
led by one or two systems experts, supported by a number of 
skilled specialist assistants) [my emphasis]. 
Separation of technical leadership skills from the different, but 
equally important skills of traditional project management is 
important in this kind of project. We address this issue by 
separating the roles of Project Manager and Project Consultant 
[8]. 
Although seemingly favouring the blue skies technological solutions of 
the technocrat the team seemed keen to broker a happy marriage between 
such an orientation and the need for a commercially oriented, 
deliverable system. The Project Manager would presumably serve to 
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represent the concerns of the Steering Committee to the technical 
specialists, via the Project Consultant, and vice versa. The desire to 
adopt innovative untried solutions to the problems of the Grangemouth 
refinery was to be mediated by the desire to maintain a common core to 
RIS throughout the BP world and by the strictures of allocated funds 
and agreed finishing dates. 
Whilst.. we can support these kinds of developments [Grangemouth 
specific new solutions] what we don't want them doing is going 
completely berserk [5]. 
The demands on the Project Team were seen to vary over the lifetime of 
the project. 
The project naturally splits into two major parts. The first is 
the development, using JAD techniques, of a set of User 
Requirements Specifications and prototypes. The second part would 
take the specifications thus developed and transform them into a 
production RIS system, complete with documentation and full user 
training [8]. 
Thus, the System Design Team suggested a different team structure for 
each of the major parts of the project. These two structures are shown 
below. 

















































The Stage 3 Report concluded with the following recommendations for a 
Grangemouth RIS that would meet the business requirements agreed with 
the Steering Committee. The system would consist of: 
a planning subsystem to allow the Production Department to 
respond quickly and accurately to changes 
a scheduling subsystem to enable Production to derive, from Head 
Office's strategic plan, targets for the process units and 
schedules for the blending areas 
performance monitoring facilities to permit process monitoring to 
be carried out in a more active and responsive way than at 
present 
a flow measurement uncertainty reduction feature, including mass 
balance reconciliation, to reduce the measurement uncertainty 
surrounding the process flow meters and so help to achieve 
production goals 
a process data capture system to enable the other RIS components 
to operate on up -to -date process and offsites information 
an offsites operations subsystem to facilitate the exchange of 
information between RIS and the offsites operators 
a movements monitoring feature to identify all movements taking 
place in the offsites area, to provide detailed routing 
information to the operators and to provide warnings if 
unexpected events occur 
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a tank tracking feature to provide a continually- updated picture 
of the quality and composition of the material in the refinery 
tanks 
a laboratory system to provide accurate analysis information 
throughout the refinery and to Head Office, to help provide a 
fast and efficient laboratory service, to permit better control 
of material dispatched to customers, to provide flexible 
information storage facilities, and to provide accurate 
Certificates of Quality 
Head office information features to provide information about 
current and planned refinery operations 
a set of system -wide general facilities to provide a coherent and 
uniform framework around which to build the rest of RIS [8]. 
The team also proposed pursuance of their recommendations for 
improvements to those physical elements of the refinery concerned with 
the blending and introduction of additives to products. 
Costs and Benefits 
Expected benefits to be provided from improvements to the blending and 
additive introduction processes were given in the appendix of the 
Stage 3 Report. These areas merited a special cost -benefit 
consideration as they lay outside the original RIS development remit. 
The figures provided by the team suggested that implementation of the 
proposed changes in this area would be economically attractive, to say 
the least. 
Detailed costings were also provided for the first part of the 
development approach recommended in the report. Two different 
estimates were given, one for the parallel specification of two RIS 
subsystems in this part of the project, the other for the parallel 
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specification of six subsystems. The Steering Group were left to 
decide how many subsystems should be developed in parallel at the end 
of the Business Systems Analysis phase of the project in August 1989. 
According to the team.. 
This number (say from two to six) affects project cash flow and 
end -date, but has little other on the project as any reasonable 
number of subsystems could be developed in parallel [8]. 
The total cost for the production of two prototype subsystems in part 
one was given as £585 970, whilst for the six prototypes this figure 
was £835 450 [8]. 
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Agreeing the Framework and Establishing the Specifics 
The Stage 4 Report was produced by three of the four authors who were 
jointly responsible for the first three stages [9]. One of the team 
members from Scicon was no longer involved in the writing of the 
study. The Stage 3 Report was reviewed by the Steering Committee on 
15th December 1988. 
It was agreed at that meeting that the team should design a 
system including the MIMI system (containing LP, expert system 
and scheduling modules) and MTTS (integrated Movement Tank 
Tracking System). The remainder of the system is based mainly on 
Rotterdam [RIS] software, where it is appropriate, and follows 
the [RIS] philosophy of an integrated system built around a 
central database, which uses feedback of real -time information to 
improve planning and optimise refinery operations [9]. 
Thus the Steering Committee supported the team's contention that 
Rotterdam software should form the core of the Grangemouth system with 
advances from other implementations, particularly Bulwer Island, being 
adopted where "appropriate ". The report emphasised the similarities 
between Rotterdam and Grangemouth in order to justify this approach 
whilst differences were noted but their impact was minimised. For 
example: 
Grangemouth Refinery is comparable in size to Rotterdam Refinery, 
but has a greater number of tags [or data collection points] in 
the process computers (some measured, some calculated). The 
actual number of tag values transferred and stored in the VAX 
[the computers on which RIS was to run] should be scrutinised 
carefully at the design stage, since this has an important effect 
on performance. Based on Rotterdam experience, we believe that 
Grangemouth should not need to transfer more data than Rotterdam 
is doing at present. The size of computer facilities required for 
a RIS system is therefore expected to be similar to Rotterdam 
[9]. 
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Differences in the systems upon which RIS depended at Rotterdam and 
those upon which it was to depend at Grangemouth were emasculated 
through invocation of the spectre of performance worries. Thus 
circumstances at Rotterdam and Grangemouth were more closely aligned 
and "no- cost" Rotterdam software emerged as applicable to the 
Grangemouth situation. 
Concerns of consistency between RIS projects within the BP world and 
the importance of (limited) centralised control of such developments 
were also deployed throughout the Stage 4 Report. Rotterdam was still 
the key exemplar, but other RIS developments within the group were to 
play an important wider contextual role. 
The use of VAX hardware supplied by Digital Equipment Corporation 
(DEC) for [Grangemouth RIS] will follow BPOI's strategy for 
implementation of RIS systems world -wide. It also fits in very 
well with the existing use of VAX systems at Grangemouth. 
Rotterdam RIS is being implemented on VAX computers, with Bulwer 
Island and Gothenburg refineries following in a similar manner 
[9]. 
The use of Oracle was justified in a similar way. Although the team 
recognised that experience of use of the system was limited in BP Oil, 
itS use within BP Chemicals for the development of a number of 
systems enabled it too to take on the mantle of a group ratified 
solution. The fact that BP had negotiated very favourable discounts 
with both Oracle and DEC for the large scale supply of their products 
must also have played a key role in the selection of the hardware and 
software platforms for RIS at Grangemouth. 
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Specifying the Computer Architecture for Grangemouth RIS 
With a broad framework in place, the specifics of the hardware 
platform for RIS at Grangemouth were established by the team. The RIS 
database was seen to require a large amount of processing power and 
the team sought to meet this requirement through the use of a cluster 
of two VAX 8810 computers [9]. The cluster was also to "provide 
processing power for central features of RIS (e.g. Planning, Mass 
Balance Reconciliation, Process Models" [9]. However, smaller 
distributed MicroVax computers were to be employed "where possible ". 
Such an approach was seen to be more cost effective. It also serves to 
emphasise the partial nature of the view of refinery operations 
provided by RIS. A number of factors, including existing systems and 
RIS performance worries, combined to ensure that the central database 
would represent only a certain subset of refinery operations. The 
choice taken over the number of tags to be passed to RIS (see above) 
can also be understood in such a light. 
The decision to make use of MicroVax computers required the use of a 
high speed network to link the computers and to this end the team 
suggested that an Ethernet network should be installed as part of RIS. 
It is not surprising to learn that this configuration of computers and 
linkages was a close emulation of that employed at Rotterdam. 
Given the initial desire to limit the facilities required at 
Grangemouth to a similar size to that employed at Rotterdam, much of 
the Stage 4 Report was concerned with a comparative analysis of data 
traffic and sizing between the two refineries. Increases in the amount 
of data processed at the MicroVax level at Grangemouth were deemed not 
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to have as significant an effect on performance as increases in the 
amount of data to be dealt with by the Oracle database. The team 
decided to suggest that attention be paid to this issue but put off 
the provision of a definitive solution until later in the development. 
The number of tags required to be stored in ORACLE will need to 
be carefully scrutinised, or a larger VAX system may be required 
to process the data. This number will only be available when 
functional specifications have been made [9]. 
Allowing For Growth 
Since RIS was to be a project with a relatively long "useful" life in 
front of it, the team were keen to allow for subsequent growth in the 
processing capabilities of the system. 
All subsystems in [Grangemouth RIS] will be designed with room 
for expansion, and in a manner which can be further expanded 
should the need arise. Large parts of the software will be copied 
from Rotterdam and Bulwer Island, which have themselves been 
designed and built to be portable. 
The hardware that will support [Grangemouth RIS] will be VAX and 
MicroVAX computers supplied by DEC. Computers will be carefully 
selected to allow for future upgrade paths with the minimum of 
disruption. No top of the range computers have been selected. 
Where possible, new ranges of hardware have been selected in 
preference to older ranges, to lengthen the time before 
obsolescence occurs. The three main areas of growth are likely to 
be demands on processing power, disk space, and terminals & 
printers. Increasing load on communications is not expected to be 
a problem in the future [9]. 
We can see here another example of the team's ambivalent approach to 
the project. They sought to minimise the risks through "sound" 
planning and management of developments against the backdrop of 
turbulent technological change and a desire to be at the forefront of 
the information age. Throughout we can see a subtext, sometimes 
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explicit, where the needs of Grangemouth are aligned with those that 
existed at Rotterdam serving to reinforce Rotterdam RIS's position as 
the basis for a solution at Grangemouth. Indeed an attempt was made to 
provide a metric for comparing the available software at Rotterdam to 
the needs of Grangemouth. The assumptions upon which this approach was 
predicated obviously served to partially ensure a good fit. 
..similar computing power is assumed for [Grangemouth RIS] as is 
currently used for the Rotterdam RIS implementation. This is 
valid since Grangemouth is a similar refinery to Rotterdam, in 
terms of size and complexity, and [Grangemouth RIS] will include 
most of the functionality of [the Rotterdam] RIS [9]. 
Such an assertion stands in stark contrast to a number of the 
comparisons between Rotterdam and Grangemouth provided by other 
organisational participants earlier in our account. We now go on to 
examine how the team sought to establish measures of fitness of the 
Rotterdam software for the Grangemouth situation. 
Demonstrating Congruity Between Rotterdam and Grangemouth 
The team developed outline specifications for each Grangemouth RIS 
subsystem listing the functions to be performed by the subsystem and 
estimates of the number of inputs and outputs and the amount of 
processing required to meet the desired functionality. 
We then extracted similar information from the [Rotterdam] RIS 
documentation and made an estimate of the fit of the [Rotterdam] 
RIS functional points to the [Grangemouth] RIS in order to 
determine the re- usability of that Rotterdam subsystem.. This is 
expressed as the "GR -RIS FIT" factor.. From this we are able to 
calculate the amount of effort required to rework each component 
of the Rotterdam RIS. 
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A suitable team structure for each subsytem was assumed. From 
this, and from quoted day rates from Scicon, an average day rate 
and hence total labour cost per subsystem was calculated [9]. 
These measures of "fit ", excluding those subsystems such as MIMI and 
MTTS that were to be adopted from elsewhere in the group, ranged from 
a low point of 78 %, for the process data capture system, to a high 
point of 100 %, for the tank tracking system, the planning system, the 
customs documentation system, and the trend monitoring system, with 
the spread of estimates skewed towards the latter figure. The 
specifications developed for Grangemouth by the team, were seen, by 
the team, to be largely consistent with the descriptions of the 
Rotterdam system, culled by the team, from the Rotterdam system 
documentation. There is certainly room for the self -fulfilment of 
prophesy within such an evaluation procedure. 
Some other minor changes to the Rotterdam blueprint were also 
suggested. For example, an upgraded version of the hierarchical 
storage controller used for the connection of disks to the cluster was 
preferred, "owing to its superior performance. At Rotterdam, the 
performance of the disks is currently seen as a bottleneck to RIS, 
[and] the slower.. controller, which also has a lower capacity has not 
been selected for this reason" [9]. Still, in the main Rotterdam was 
to be starting point for development at Grangemouth, and for a number 
of applications it seemed as if it would be the finishing point as 
well. 
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Precedent, Performance and Flexibility 
Certain performance characteristics of the final system were seen to 
depend upon choices made early in the development and these choices 
were seen to effect the "seamlessness" and availability of the final 
system. 
Applications have to be built within certain constraints before 
they can be run cluster -wide, on either or both VAX 8810's. At 
this stage it is expected that the ORACLE Database with 
associated menu system and screens will be available cluster 
wide, but that lesser used applications will be restricted to a 
nominated 8810, e.g. MIMI, process models [9]. 
Performance concerns, when congruent with the available Rotterdam 
solution, seemed to be gaining pre -eminence in the Stage 4 Report over 
the desire for a seamless integrated system. The relatively low (no) 
cost of Rotterdam based solutions obviously had a role to play here. 
This area of concern was particularly pronounced in the Stage 4 Report 
as it included more detailed estimates of development costs than those 
provided previously. We will go on to consider this costing shortly. 
Before doing so, it is interesting to note an example of the power of 
the Rotterdam precedent in determining the requirements of RIS at 
Grangemouth. As we have noted the Sciconic LP system was dealt a 
number of life threatening blows in the early stages of the 
consideration of Grangemouth RIS. The MIMI system evaluation underway 
at Bulwer Island was "going very well" [9]. However, the wide ranging 
use of the Sciconic LP at Rotterdam enabled its partial resurrection 
at Grangemouth, even though the Design Team had seemingly broken with 
Rotterdam's LP solution. 
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Sciconic LP forms part of the.. package that is currently used at 
Grangemouth for scheduling and short term production planning. 
Sciconic LP.. is used at Rotterdam for the LP parts of the Mass 
Balance Reconciliation System (MBRS). It is quite possible that 
MIMI packages could be used for [Grangemouth] RIS to implement 
MBRS, although it is not possible to confirm this at this stage. 
Sciconic LP.. [has] been added to the [cost] estimate for this 
reason [9]. 
Costing the Proposed System 
Costs for the changes in the blending area recommended in the Stage 3 
Report were not included in the Stage 4 Report. Tentative costs had 
been included in Stage 3 but more importantly, these costs were seen 
as "independent of RIS" [9]. Provisional costings were however 
included for the hardware required to improve the acquisition of data 
for RIS, particularly data on the status of valves within the refinery 
system. The benefits from the more sophisticated information 
engineering involved in RIS were entirely dependent upon an adequate 
supply of appropriate information on the refinery, and thus these 
costs could not be considered independent. RIS was primarily about 
allowing people to see what they should be doing with the refinery, it 
was not to be a direct control system for the refinery. Thus, 
information supply was seen as integral to the RIS development, 
whereas the ability to act on that information was not. The importance 
of the ability to act upon the information supplied required its 
mention in the report, but not its inclusion in the project remit. 
Measures of the effort required at Grangemouth to convert the 
Rotterdam starting point to Grangemouth solution were converted into 
costs, as we noted above. These costs, by subsystem, are reproduced 
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below. The costs for software development included an estimate of the 
amount of user involvement required for a successful implementation. 
These costs were based upon "six users with a high level (75 %) of 
involvement in the project, and six with a lower level of involvement 
(10%)" [9]. 
SUBSYSTEM COST (E) 
1. PLANNING AND SCHEDULING 129 600 
2. OFFSITES 105 600 
3. INFRASTRUCTURE 108 600 
4. REPORTS 127 947 
5. PROCESS MODELS 28 800 
6. TANK TRACKING 0 
7. PROCESS DATA CAPTURE 81 600 
8. FLOW MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY RECONCILIATION 9 600 
9. REFERENCE DATA 38 400 
10. CUSTOMS DOCUMENTATION SYSTEM 0 
11. TREND MONITORING 0 
12. EXTRAS FOR GRANGEMOUTH 204 000 
13. PROJECT OVERHEADS 323 883 
TOTAL 1 157 430 
These costs were provisional and were to be improved in the Stage 5 
Report. Hardware costs were considered to be more accurate. The 
overall costs for the RIS development at Grangemouth suggested in the 
Stage 4 Report are reproduced below. Some of these costs, i.e. those 
for the Feasibility Study, had already been incurred, whilst some were 
so uncertain that they were not provided, for example, the staff costs 




Computer Hardware 1 698 444 
Communications and Cabling 193 593 
Computer Building 374 535 
Instrumentation 305 000 
Feasibility Study 180 000 









Contingency ( @10 %) 
Revenue Expenditure 
Contingency ( @30 %) 
284 574 
642 980 
1 157 430 
109 113 
2 194 097 
2 751 572 
275 157 
2 194 097 
658 229 
Grand Total 5 879 055 
' ANNUAL MAINTENANCE COSTS 
VAX Cluster 76 380 
MicroVax Computers 24 072 
VAXstations 13 140 
Terminals and Printers 18 384 
PC Hardware 1 692 
Software Packages 9 984 
Oracle Packages 6 816 
Ethernet Equipment 7 476 
Staff Costs 
Software Developed 
Total 157 944 (After First Year) 
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Thus the creation of RIS at Grangemouth was expected to cost almost £6 
million. The development of RIS at Rotterdam had cost some $25 million 
[3]. RIS could be introduced at Grangemouth for approximately half the 
cost of RIS at Rotterdam, provided the Rotterdam system was taken as a 
starting point. The economics of system development provide perhaps 
the clearest illustration of why every effort was made to ensure 
consistency with the Rotterdam solution. The worries expressed by one 
of the systems managers at Grangemouth about the applicability of an 
external solution to the refinery's oil management problems [3] were 
more than counterbalanced by the economic advantages of such an 
approach. Not only would its introduction be cheaper but subsequent 
maintenance and upgrade costs could be spread around the group, 
potentially allowing significant economies of scale [5]. RIS at 
Grangemouth seemed destined to be a very close variant of RIS at 
Rotterdam. 
The Final Report(s) 
Two versions of the System Design Team's final report were produced: a 
draft Stage 5 Report in January 1989 [10]; and a Final Report in 
February 1989 [11]. These reports had only two authors, one from 
Grangemouth Refinery's Technical Department and one from Scicon's 
Energy Division. Thus, by completion of the study, the study team had 
been cut in half. There was a great deal of similarity between the two 
reports, but there were also some important differences. Both studies 
were... 
206 
...designed to stand on [their] own, ..and to summarise the key 
factors from the entire study for the Steering Group and other 
management [10,11]. 
Indeed, the Final Report was largely identical to the Draft Report, 
but it "also include[d] relevant findings from the RIS software 
portability study (..carried out in Rotterdam in the first half of 
February) in the final software estimates for [Grangemouth RIS]" [10] 
along with comments on the first draft. The development of RIS at 
Grangemouth looked certain to proceed. 
The costs and benefits of the project have been evaluated in 
detail and, as anticipated, the economics of a RIS implementation 
at Grangemouth are shown to be very attractive indeed. The 
findings are very much in line with those of the M &S BDU Strategy 
Study carried out at the end of 1987 [10,11]. 
The most obvious difference between the two reports was in terms of 
the costs and benefits attributed to RIS at Grangemouth. According to 
the Draft Report.. 
The overall cost of the project, including £180 000 already 
spent, is estimated at £5.48 million, of which £0.91 million is 
contingency. 
The project has been phased over 3 years with expenditure of £0.8 
million in 1989, and £2.25 million in each of 1990 and 1991. 
Benefits (net of increased revenue expenditure) are estimated at 
£2.51 million ($4.27 million) per annum. Assuming a ten year life 
for the RIS system, this equates to a NPV [Net Present Value] at 
8% of £8.15 million ($13.85 million) and gives an IRR [Internal 
Rate of Return] of 37.5% [10] . 
Whereas in the Final Report... 
The overall cost of the project, including the £180 000 already 
spent, is estimated at £6.8 million, of which £1.1 million is 
contingency. 
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The project has been phased over 4 years with expenditure of £0.8 
million in 1989, £2.25 million in each of 1990 and 1991 and £1.32 
million in 1992. 
Benefits (net of increased revenue expenditure) are estimated at 
£2.65 million ($4.51 million) per annum. Assuming a ten year life 
for the RIS system, this equates to a NPV at 8% of £7.86 million 
($13.36 million) and gives an IRR of 36% [11]. 
In the absence of evidence of galloping inflation in the second month 
of 1989 one can assume that changes were made to the project through 
consultation with "the Steering Group and other management ". Not only 
the costs and benefits, but also the timing of the project was 
altered. In the Draft Report, the team suggest that the Grangemouth 
RIS could be developed in about two years, without the involvement of 
an "unmanageably vast project team" [10]. However, the team thought 
that scheduled overhaul work at Grangemouth and a "likely shortage of 
funds in 1989 and 1990" made a three year development more prudent 
[10]. By the time of the Final report the project was scheduled over 
four years. 
Other differences include the mysterious addition of an extra VAX 8810 
computer to the VAX cluster. Although the Stage 4 Report suggested 
that the amount of computing power required by RIS was not 
definitively known, it did suggest that two VAX 8810's would provide 
sufficient power. This belief was maintained in the Draft Report, but 
the requirement had increased to three by the Final Report, with no 
explanation being provided for the upgrade. Costs for computer 
hardware, estimated at £1 698 444 in the Draft Report, had increased 
to £2 080 661 in the Final Report. 
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Costs to allow automatic valve status transmission for the proposed 
Movements and Tank Tracking System, included in the Stage 4 Report 
were "dropped" in the Draft Report [10]. However, in the Final Report 
a cost of £550 000 appears for "Offsites Instrumentation ", again with 
no explanation [11]. Presumably automatic valve status transmission 
was picked up again. 
Costs attributed to software development also increased between the 
Draft and Final Reports. This may be partially explained by the detail 
provided by the RIS portability study. Costs for software development 
were estimated at £1 063 705 in the Draft Report, and at £1 162 779 in 
the Final Report. "Associated Costs" also increased, from £109 113 in 
the Draft, to £238 558 in the Final Report. 
Luckily however, the benefits to be derived from RIS had also 
increased. Summary annual benefits provided in the two reports are 
reproduced below to allow comparison. 
Summary of Benefits Draft Final 
(thousands of dollars) 
Laboratory 192 189 
Offsites 964 1 270 
Trading, Supply and Production 1 633 1 702 
Planning 
Flow Measurement Uncertainty 1 881 1 881 
Reduction 
Loss Control and Performance 179 80 
Monitoring 
Total 4 847 5 122 
Improvements seem most pronounced in the Offsites area, presumably as 
a result of the picking up of the dropped Offsites instrumentation in 
the Final Report. Benefits were also improved in the Final Report 
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through the assumption of different product prices for estimates to 
those used in the Draft Report. Product prices were between 1.7 and 
11.5% higher in the Final Report [10,11]. In the Draft Report these 
prices were derived from "realistic differentials based on 1988 
averages" [10] whilst in the Final Report they were derived from 
"realistic differentials based on Corporate Planning's 1993 market -led 
price set" [11]. In both reports however, the team were keen to 
emphasise that.. 
The project is relatively insensitive to crude price.. and the 
economics are robust except in the most extreme circumstances, 
when refining itself would be uneconomic [10,11]. 
The team also claimed that the project would remain economically 
attractive even if extreme changes in the other assumptions on which 
the estimates were based were found to be necessary. For example, 
software costs of 100% higher than predicted would still result in an 
NPV of over £7 million and an IRR of over 30 %. Similar figures were 
provided to cover the effects of sterling devaluation and of a delay 
in the achievement of benefits. RIS was seen as economically 
attractive unless refining itself became uneconomic [10,11]. 
Similarities Between the Two Reports 
The majority of the Final Report(s) was taken up with a summary of the 
decisions taken on the basis of the Stage 3 and 4 Reports. The need 
for RIS at Grangemouth, defined in terms of competitive advantage, 
both within and outside the group, was re- emphasised and although the 
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stability of Grangemouth's operations, relative to Rotterdam's was 
mentioned, similarities were again emphasised. The low financial costs 
and the reduction of risk thought to be associated with a Rotterdam 
based solution were of paramount importance here. 
Despite the physical differences between Grangemouth and 
Rotterdam there is a broad area of common ground in the way the 
various refinery functions fit together. These functions are 
closely integrated with a high degree of communication and data 
transfer between them. The [RIS] system developed at Rotterdam is 
specifically designed to meet the needs of such an integrated 
business, and because of its structure it is sufficiently 
flexible that it can be tailored to meet individual refineries' 
needs while taking advantage of the vast amount of common 
software which has already been developed. Therefore, an 
integrated RIS system could be installed at Grangemouth based on 
the same philosophy as Rotterdam [RIS], but tailored to address 
the particular needs for Grangemouth Refinery within BP Oil 
Manufacturing and Supply - at a fraction of the costs of 
developing such a system from scratch [10,11] 
These concerns also impinged on the proposed timing of the project. 
Work was scheduled to commence in the second quarter of 1989.. 
...in order to take advantage of the experienced personnel who 
will become available at the end of the Rotterdam [RIS] project. 
Grangemouth will benefit greatly from their detailed knowledge of 
the RIS software. They can help to minimise the risks of the 
project, and also reduce the overall costs since it would be much 
more expensive to transfer the Rotterdam software without this 
type of experience in the project team [10,11]. 
Virtually all detailed knowledge of the software which embodies 
the concepts of RIS resides in the heads of the prime contractor 
(Scicon [- which was soon to be sold by BP]) for Rotterdam [RIS]. 
This experience and knowledge could easily be transferred to 
Grangemouth RIS development if it were to proceed with minimum 
delay. Otherwise, the experience if not the knowledge is likely 
to be transferred to competing refineries [10,11]. 
One can see that Grangemouth's increasingly commercial orientation was 
also important here. 
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As well as refining products for the UK market, a significant 
volume of Grangemouth's production is sold on the spot market. 
There is therefore a need for the refinery to be flexible and for 
the Trading and Supply staff, who are physically remote from the 
refinery, to have a good understanding of the refinery's 
potential at all times [10,11]. 
Risks were also seen to be minimised through compliance with broader 
corporate objectives that impinged on systems development. That is 
through the use of... 
...hardware, software and communications components which are 
consistent with BDU- supported strategic directions for these 
areas of information technology [11]. 
The team demonstrated awareness of the economies of scope potentially 
provided by such an approach. They pointedly noted some overlap 
between work required for RIS at Grangemouth and work planned for 
Gothenburg Refinery. They suggested that "corporate benefits would be 
derived from common development between the two refineries" [10,11]. 
The team pointed out that improvements to the refinery's physical 
infrastructure had an important role to play in the successful 
implementation of RIS and the realisation of the potential benefits of 
flexibility. The two processes were seen to be mutually beneficial. 
A large investment programme is planned for Grangemouth refinery 
to improve its process flexibility. BP Oil will derive maximum 
benefits from this investment only if modern information systems 
- such as RIS - are put in place to support these enhanced 
facilities [10,11]. 
But although flexibility was seen as the key to success, and the data 
in the RIS database and RIS's flexible reporting facilities provided 
"the ideal foundation to support this type of activity" [10,11], an 
application support group was seen as necessary to "provide a rapid 
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turn -round service for ad hoc queries of the database" [10,11]. Lack 
of IT knowledge and performance concerns maintained their role in 
putting a break on unmediated user access to RIS. 
Assuring Future System Use and Support 
As we noted earlier, concerns were raised by the Steering Group [5] 
about the achievement of the potential benefits offered by RIS after 
its implementation. However the team felt that the development 
approach that they had outlined would go a long way to ensuring 
success. These usage worries were particularly pronounced at 
Grangemouth, presumably as a result of previous externally "imposed" 
solutions and the emergence of as yet unmentionable problems at other 
RIS implementation sites [3]. 
There is a risk that, while [Grangemouth RIS] will be built on 
time and to requirements, it will not be fully utilised by 
Refinery personnel - as has happened before with computer systems 
installed at Grangemouth. This risk must be eliminated by using 
JAD [Joint Application Development] techniques (to engender a 
sense of ownership of [Grangemouth RIS] in its users) and by 
backing up RIS development with suitable training, as we 
recommended earlier in the study [10,11]. 
Other techniques were used to engender a sense of accountable 
ownership on the part of the users as we will see later. Although keen 
to emulate the Rotterdam development's successes, the team were not 
keen to emulate its failures, particularly in terms of the lack of 
post implementation utilisation. 
In spite of their emphasis on JAD's ownership engendering potential, 
the team suggested that little input would be required from refinery 
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users during 1989, with the one exception being the Project Manager. 
They did however recommend the involvement of a member of Grangemouth 
staff on the team implementing the Laboratory System, with another 
member of staff recommended for work on the MIMI development. They 
would become their departments' experts on their most frequently used 
RIS subsystems. In addition, the team recommended the secondment of 
two members of Grangemouth's computer department onto the system 
development team, "in order that knowledge of the system may be 
retained after the development" [10,11]. The team heralded JAD as the 
path to an effective system that would be used by refinery personnel 
and then severely curtailed the application of the approach in 
practice. 
User involvement was to become much more important in 1990, with a 
"significant input.. required" [10,11]. Since this input was deemed 
"critical to the success of Grangemouth RIS" [10,11], the team 
recommended planning and budgeting for its demands in the refinery's 
operating planning cycle. Inclusion of the requirement in the 
refinery's procedures for that period would serve to legitimate it in 
the eyes of the users and allow effected departments to justify the 
realignment of their staff. This would both raise the profile of the 
development and serve to signal implicit support from senior 
management. According to both reports, user involvement at this level 
would also be required throughout 1991, with additional numbers being 
required in the third quarter for RIS training. There was no 
additional requirement for user involvement in 1992 noted in the Final 
Report. 
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The buffering role of an application support team involved with the 
preparation of ad hoc queries along with general system maintenance 
requirements also had staff deployment implications for the refinery. 
To support the proposed RIS system, the refinery's Computer 
Department organisation will need to be expanded and skills 
broadened to include database design and administration, and 4GL 
programming. We envisage that seven extra people will be required 
to fill the following roles: 
Computer Operators 1 
Applications Programmers (4GL, Database Skills) 2 
Software Programmers (Primarily Fortran, C) 1 
Hardware and Communications Specialists 2 
Database Administrator 1 
TOTAL 
These staff numbers were over and above the current establishment 
numbers. The team did believe however, "that these staff increases 
[would] be offset by productivity gains in the Laboratory and other 
areas" [10,11]. 
Conclusions 
The pathway from the instigation of the 1987 Strategy Study to the 
completion of the Feasibility Study Final Report is revealed as a 
convoluted and highly unstable co- ordination of elements in an 
emerging network. Nothing had yet been built, but innumerable 
stabilisations and changes to the project had already occurred. The 
system design team struggled to translate [12] and accommodate a 
number of "interests" ranging from corporate ideals, their idea of 
best modern IT practice, the changing commercial world, history, 
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precedent, computer performance and economic considerations, to name 
but a few. The framework for a system that is seen to emerge is highly 
contingent and the fluidity encountered in the process is quite 
astounding. Moreover, the account provided is based upon 
rationalisations given some time after the fact. The reports are the 
outcomes of a complex decision process, that must have been, in the 
raw, almost completely incomprehensible. 
However, consistency is emphasised throughout and Grangemouth appears 
as the recipient of the logical successor to Rotterdam's RIS. This 
facade of consistency was however itself soon under attack on one of 
it's key points: the centrality of the Rotterdam system "core" to 
subsequent RIS systems. 
As we have already seen the ideal of flexible user access to 
information was already being significantly mediated by other 
concerns, but the philosophy of Rotterdam RIS possessed obvious 
interpretive flexibility [13] from the outset. The key concept of 
centrally stored integrated information was supposed to allow for site 
specific differences in practical utilisation. This philosophy had 
effectively become embodied in the core of the Rotterdam system. The 
core software was the vehicle through which the philosophy informing 
the Rotterdam system would be transferred to other refineries. 
However, this core was itself not immune to the effects of the 
accomodation of site specifics at each implementation. In the 
following chapter we examine how the software of the Rotterdam system 
was undermined as a basis for RIS at Grangemouth. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ADOPTING A NEW CORE: THE BULWER ISLAND OIL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Introduction 
Although the Final Report of the Grangemouth RIS Feasibility Study had 
concluded that the system to be built at Grangemouth would take as its 
starting point the Rotterdam RIS system, that is not what transpired. 
In fact, Grangemouth adopted the Bulwer Island Oil Management System 
as a basis for subsequent development and implementation. In the early 
part of 1990, when this decision was taken, the performance problems 
associated with the Bulwer system, described earlier, were not yet 
fully apparent. As we noted, the Bulwer system was originally expected 
to become the RIS Mark II for the BP Oil group, and a starting point 
for future implementations [1]. However, this was not the view 
expressed in the Grangemouth RIS Feasibility Study. Whilst some of the 
sub- systems used at Bulwer Island were to be employed as a basis for 
similar sub -systems at Grangemouth ".. [t]he remainder of the system 
is based mainly on Rotterdam [RIS] software" [2]. This chapter 
attempts to examine how this change in approach came about, and how it 
was justified. 
Visiting Bulwer Island - Evaluating the System 
Between the 7th and 11th of May 1990, a BP Oil member of the 
Grangemouth RIS Feasibility Study Team and a Scicon employee who was 
not originally involved in the Feasibility Study visited Bulwer Island 
Refinery in order to evaluate their Oil Management System (OMS) and.. 
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..to decide whether it would provide a more suitable basis than 
Rotterdam's [RIS] for developing a similar system at 
Grangemouth [3]. 
The evident "Mark II -ness" of the Bulwer system within BP Oil was 
reflected in their comments, particularly with reference to it's 
greater adaptability and applicability to other sites. The Bulwer 
system was seen to be more of a "toolkit to assist management, 
engineers and planners in their tasks of maximising value added from 
the operation of the refinery" [2] than the system developed at 
Rotterdam. RIS systems were intended to take available refinery 
information and enable its transformation into commercial advantage. 
Indeed, the heightened commercial focus that was seen to derive from 
RIS implementations impinged upon development approaches to the 
systems themselves. Bulwer's system was starting to look like a more 
cost effective starting point for future implementations in general, 
and for Grangemouth in particular. 
The functionality of the Bulwer system (particularly Planning & 
Scheduling) is less complex, and it is more data driven, which 
gives the advantage that the system should be more applicable to 
different sites without major re- programming... 
Mainly because Bulwer's system is functionally simpler, we 
believe that the cost of developing a Grangemouth RIS is likely 
to be less if Bulwer software is used as the starting basis, and 
we therefore recommend its use [2]. 
OMS, although developed through the corruption of the Rotterdam RIS 
core, once again held out the promise of a common core for future 
systems. Rotterdam was not seen to be a similar refinery to 
Grangemouth any more and even if it were, wide applicability was no 
longer deemed to be derived from similarity. Rather, it resulted from 
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a bare and simple framework coupled with the ability to derive and 
accomodate data driven detail. Not only would Grangemouth be able to 
develop their system more cheaply but a common core would be 
maintained through minimising the complexity of this part of the 
system. Future developments would benefit from the economies of scale 
that Rotterdam had promised but not delivered, through the reworking 
of the system core that had been undertaken at Bulwer Island. OMS 
embodied a new model for subsequent developments. A model that was 
seen, at the time, to be both "progressive and.. attractive" [4]. 
The two evaluators did, however, note some costs for all these 
benefits. The simplicity of the core system meant that.. 
More complex refineries may require to add functionality, for 
example to allow them to schedule and monitor the offsites area 
[2]. 
Moreover, their recommendations were based upon rather scant evidence 
of the functioning and applicability of the Bulwer system. 
In the time available it was impossible to study the whole system 
in detail. The approach was very heavily dependent on explanation 
of functionality and design issues by Bulwer staff, [one 
individual] in particular.., supported by sampling of 
documentation and code [2]. 
The Feasibility Study had produced five volumes, each of seventy plus 
pages. At least four staff had worked on the project for over six 
months, yet one of its main recommendations was overturned by a four 
day visit to Bulwer Island by two people, which resulted in a nine 
page "Visit Note ". Evidently Bulwer Island's OMS had become the 
solution in waiting. The authors of the Evaluation Report sought to 
show the commercial advantages of the sound Bulwer design practices in 
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sharp relief against the ad hocery now seen to have been employed at 
Rotterdam. It is interesting to contrast these comments with those 
used to describe the Rotterdam RIS earlier in our account: "the RIS 
project at Rotterdam.. was one of the first to come in on time and 
within budget and actually do what it was meant to do" [5]. With the 
implementation at Bulwer, Rotterdam's RIS had ceased to be the jewel 
in the IS crown, it was now seen as a foil to OMS. 
Rotterdam [RIS] used a central database to link together, and 
feed data to, existing packages.. The way these packages were 
used in Planning and Scheduling, and the addition of a complex 
offsites system, resulted in some parts of the system being 
cumbersome and also made it difficult to identify core software 
which could be supported centrally. 
Bulwer took the [RIS] business (logical) model, took advantage of 
the experience gained on that project and attempted to develop a 
more flexible, more generic system. They ommitted or simplified 
functionality in some areas where they felt the functionality did 
not support the business effectively.. or involved unjustified 
manpower [2]. 
The advantages for group central support were key for the authors in 
their attempts to justify a major deviation from the Feasibility Study 
recommendations. Rotterdam RIS was seen to be merely a somewhat 
idiosynchratic pre- cursor, or exploratory prototype, to the systems 
nirvana produced at Bulwer Island. 
[These changes mean] that there is an opportunity to define 
appropriate central support, to ensure that other refineries 
benefit from Bulwer and Rotterdam's work, and to enforce a degree 
of discipline on future installations so that common software 
development will be possible [2]. 
The evaluators do not mention whether such discipline was enforced, 
and if so, where it came from, on the Grangemouth RIS project. 
222 
Reservations about OMS 
Performance Worries 
The two evaluators were obviously aware of the consequences of time 
limitations on their evalutation, and they were not uncritical of 
aspects of the Bulwer system. For example, they noted that during 
their visit.. 
..the loading on the main computer varied between nearly 100% 
when an LP was being run on it and PDC [Process Data Capture] 
historical recovery was in progress, and quite low loading at 
other times [2]. 
Although cautioning "other refineries installing the system" to make 
significant investments in computer hardware, as Bulwer had done, in 
order to reduce the risk of overloading the system, the evaluators' 
main concern about machine loadings at Bulwer was that they "..made it 
very difficult to make an objective assessment of system response" 
[2]. Given the concerns expressed throughout the Feasibility Study 
about machine loading, this response seems inconsistent and 
inadequate. A loading of "nearly 100 %" would preclude simultaneous 
access to the database for complex queries and would undoubtedly 
result in the "..enquiry and reporting capability.." for "..trouble 
shooting investigations" [6] only being available part time. 
Practically speaking, at certain times "..all systems and users.." 
would not "..have free access to the data via a common pathway" [6]. 
Moreover, the use of the word "objective" in this context seems 
somewhat extraordinary. Perhaps no standard assessment would be 
possible, and perhaps it would be more subjectively annoying when 
attempting to run queries at certain times. But the key point remains, 
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"objectively" the data base would not be available for complex queries 
or for other applications when the machine loading was of the 
magnitude described. Indeed, as we noted in an earlier chapter, the 
machine loading caused by the LP system constructed at Bulwer was 
later to be revealed as responsible for the downfall of that system. 
Thus although concerns were raised, the seeming inevitability of the 
OMS solution precluded their full explication by the evaluation team. 
They seemed, to a certain extent, to know what the outcome of their 
evaluation should have been. 
These things sort of happen. BP is a loos0j well knit company 
[laughter] and so there are fora in which refinery management get 
together, production controllers get together. These things are 
aware, interest is generated, and the formalisation sort of 
evolves [4]. 
The evaluators did note other performance worries, but these were 
deemed not to impinge on an OMS based system built at Grangemouth if 
Bulwer's experience of the problems was exploited, although "..[i]t 
was rather difficult to verify this because of the machine loadings 
mentioned [previously]" [2]. 
The hierarchy structures in the database would not normally be 
recommended where performance is a serious concern. However, 
Bulwer believe that they have overcome performance problems by 
careful tuning of database enquiries [2]. 
Again, free and open user defined querying of the database seems to be 
the victim of competing design criteria. The flexibility of Oracle's 
relational database system was to be used to enable multi -site 
applications of a family of similar technological systems, not 
unmitigated flexibility for the users of each of these systems. 
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Other Conerns 
The evaluators did express other concerns about the portability and 
sustainability of the Bulwer system. They were perhaps not as central 
as the performance worries described above, but they were each capable 
of aggravating the smooth transfer of the system, and their combined 
implications were potentially devastating for a successful and cost 
effective tranferrence. 
As we noted earlier, the authors of the Feasibility Study for the 
Grangemouth RIS had made reference to the key role that they expected 
experienced staff from the Rotterdam implementation to play in any 
Rotterdam RIS based implementation at the refinery. Now that the 
Grangemouth system was to be Bulwer based, the issue of experienced 
staff availability took on a new importance. Shifting staff between 
two refineries in Europe is one thing, but shifting staff between the 
Northern and Southern hemispheres is quite another. Moreover, the 
small size of the Bulwer refinery meant that "spare" BP Oil staff with 
experience of the system implementation were few and far between. 
Staff who possessed this knowledge were required to support the system 
at Bulwer and to transfer their skills toArest of the Bulwer Refinery 
staff. 
Knowledge of the Bulwer system is concentrated in a few key 
people. The risk of porting the software could be reduced 
significantly by [getting] one or two of these people involved at 
the start of the project to pass on their detailed knowledge of 
the software. 
These staff are scarce however and it is not certain that any 
will be available to assist Grangemouth [2] 
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We will see later how even at the larger refinery of Grangemouth, RIS 
expertise, post implementation, was at a premium. 
In comparison to the approach advocated in the early stages of the 
Grangemouth RIS Feasibility Study, Bulwer Island had been woefully 
lacking in their commitment to sound project management procedures. 
Grangemouth intended to use their own staff, staff from Scicon, and 
some support from the Oracle corporation to implement their RIS 
system. They adopted Scicon's approach to system analysis and 
emphasised the role of firm management control by the Design Team and 
the Steering Committee in the successful delivery of a useable system. 
Lessons from Rotterdam's good practice and successful outcome were 
being explicitly learnt at Grangemouth. However, the Bulwer system was 
to be RIS Mark II, the starting point for future installations since 
Bulwer's system had improved upon the Rotterdam design. Apparently 
though, this had not been achieved through the application of sound 
project management disciplines. 
..the code was produced by a mixture of several different 
software houses and project staff.. 
The lack of QA [Quality Assurance] applied to external 
contractors raises concerns about the robustness and 
maintainability of the code they produced.. [P]rojects porting 
the software would need to satisfy themselves that the quality of 
code was satisfactory for it to be supported successfully after 
implementation. 
..coding standards are.. variable. Bulwer did not impose their 
own standards or quality control procedures on the software 
houses. They tested the delivered code for functionality only. It 
is therefore difficult to make a judgement about the quality and 
robustness of the code [2]. 
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The lack of quality assurance increased the need for experienced staff 
in subsequent installations of Bulwer type systems, and these problems 
were further exacerbated as the lack of central control also extended 
to the production of system documentation. With variable coding 
standards and a lack of knowledgeable staff, system documentation 
would prove vital to an adequate understanding of the system. 
Without input from Bulwer staff, the importance of accurate, 
readable documentations increases [2]. 
However, although.. 
[d]ocumentation is good at the high level.. there is some concern 
about the standard of documentation at the more detailed level. 
Because the code was produced by a mixture of several different 
software houses and project staff, the documentation standards 
tend to be quite variable. In addition, our random sampling 
seemed unnervingly successful at finding "holes" [2]. 
The contradictions between the acceptance of the Bulwer starting point 
and the recommendations of "good practice" made in the Grangemouth RIS 
Feasiblity Study either went unnoticed or unacknowledged by the 
evaluators in their Visit Note. The performance of the Bulwer system 
was almost impossible to ascertain "objectively" and the way in which 
that performance was achieved was inpenetrable due to the poor quality 
of documentation and checking of coding standards. Nevertheless, OMS 
was the solution in waiting, RIS Mark II, the starting point for 
future implementations, and thus it was to be the basis for the 
emerging Grangemouth system. 
The brevity of the evaluators visit was ameliorated by the subsequent 
production of a detailed evaluation of the Bulwer system in August 
1990 [7]. However, this report was produced some time after the Bulwer 
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system had been "fixed" as the core and basis of the Grangemouth RIS 
development in the "Grangemouth Refinery Information System Overall 
Design Report" produced by two members of Scicon's Energy Division in 
May 1990 [8]. 
Stabilising the Starting Point - The Overall Design Report 
Once approved, this report becomes a working project document, to 
be used by the designers of the Grangemouth system as a framework 
for the design of individual subsystems [8]. 
The Grangemouth Refinery Information System Overall Design Report was 
produced in May 1990 and sought to stabilise a framework within which 
RIS at Grangemouth could be built. The flux that had characterised the 
Strategy Study, the Feasibility Study and subsequent documents was to 
be partially hardened to produce a relatively fixed structure and 
allow consistency between the central database and each of the 
subsystems of RIS at Grangemouth. 
Many specifics were not finalised in the document, these would be 
fixed during implementation, but it did provide enough consistency to 
allow "the detailed design and development of individual systems 
within RIS, independently of each other" [8]. Since RIS was to be an 
integrated system, certain key characteristics of the overall system 
and the design approaches to be adopted for subsytems were fixed to 
enable independent development of those subsystems. 
[The] report presents an overall logical design for the 
Grangemouth Refinery Information System (RIS), in terms of a 
functional analysis and a logical data model, together with other 
design considerations [8]. 
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In essence, the Overall Design provided the necessary pre- requisites 
for the modularisation of the design and implementation of RIS. The 
inputs, outputs and functions of each subsystem were specified, and 
the design of the central database was established. 
Since RIS systems tend to be tightly integrated, the operation of 
system functions is heavily dependent on the physical structure 
of the database and its contents [7]. 
RIS was to be developed from "software from RIS -type systems at 
Rotterdam, Bulwer Island, and Gothenburg" [8] and from scratch, where 
this was deemed necessary. In particular, the logical data model at 
the heart of Grangemouth RIS was.. 
...derived from an analysis of data structures at Grangemouth, 
together with knowledge of the Rotterdam and Bulwer Island 
logical data models [8]. 
In the design process, the general principle has been and will be 
followed that the data model will copy established RIS data 
models - in particular that from Bulwer Island - unless there is 
a requirement to deviate from it [8]. 
The centrality of production planning and scheduling to RIS and the 
decision to adopt the "Bulwer Island Strategic Target Setting System" 
as a basis for these subsystems, made the OMS database the most 
appropriate starting point for Grangemouth. 
Through its acceptance in the Overall Design Report, the Bulwer Island 
central data model formally became the basis and core of the 
Grangemouth RIS despite the fact that the Bulwer Island system was, at 
the time of the Report, only "nearing completion" [8]. It had not been 
up and running long enough for its deficiencies to be noticed. 
229 
Reassessing Bulwer Island 
The detailed Bulwer system evaluation produced in August 1990 [7] was 
intended to "assess how well the Bulwer System fits Grangemouth's 
requirements ". The Overall Design Report had formalised the 
replacement of the Rotterdam starting point with a Bulwer based 
system. Essentially, the Grangemouth to Rotterdam "fit" calculation 
carried out in the Feasibility Study was repeated in order to specify 
the fit between Grangemouth and Bulwer Island. The comparison was 
primarily concerned with the central data model and the application 
systems developed at Bulwer. 
The Bulwer system's facilities to capture data, and to provide 
interfaces with external systems, are of little interest to 
Grangemouth because of the different systems in use at 
Grangemouth [7]. 
The deficiencies of the Bulwer system, noted and briefly described in 
the Visit Note were reiterated, but it was nevertheless concluded that 
Grangemouth would.. 
..adopt the physical database design from the Bulwer system and.. 
avoid changing it unless modifications are required to support 
local needs [7]. 
The authors did however, demonstrate an awareness of the tightrope 
they were required to walk in the implementation of RIS systems: 
between reflecting local circumstances and maintaining a common core 
to all similar systems. 
A common physical data model is crucial if there is to be any 
hope of common software for RIS systems. However, different sites 
will have different requirements and implement different 
subsystems which will require different things from the 
database.. There is a strong danger that the implementation of 
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effective subsystems at Grangemouth could be compromised by 
idiosyncrasies in the data model which must be preserved for the 
sake of common software [7]. 
Indeed, notwithstanding the commitment to a Bulwer system basis, the 
document was far more critical and reflective on the suitability of 
the Bulwer system for Grangemouth. This critique was not restricted to 
consideration of the impact of local circumstances. It extended its 
purview to assess the Bulwer system in terms of its performance and 
design characteristics. At Bulwer Island, for example.. 
Many complex views have been defined to extract data to populate 
MIMI tables and sets. The effort required to evaluate these views 
must place a significant overhead on the initialisation of the LP 
run and impact on the database response to Oracle users. The 
strategy for storage of MIMI data in Oracle should be reviewed to 
establish whether the Bulwer mechanisms should be modified for 
Grangemouth [7]. 
These concerns lead to strategy proposals for the development of the 
system that explicitly left some space for further evaluation before 
committing designers to a replication of the Bulwer system. It may 
have been that the problems associated with Bulwer's system, described 
earlier, were becoming apparent and the authors of the Bulwer 
Evaluation Report were keen to defer judgement until these problems 
had been solved, or declared unsolvable. Thus, the Evaluation Report 
did not recommend strict adherence to Bulwer's approach. In the 
planning area for example... 
The Bulwer system provides a set of tools for the creation of a 
production scheduling system for Grangemouth.. However, because 
of performance problems with some key parts of the system,.. and 
reservations about how Bulwer have represented their refinery 
within the LP, extensive work is still required to realise 
Grangemouth's requirements [7]. 
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In fact, although the commitment to utilise the Bulwer physical data 
model as a core for the Grangemouth system was reinforced, the 
Evaluation Report made great play of the lack of specific definition 
of requirements for a number of the proposed Grangemouth subsystems, 
and used this uncertainty to leave open the potential for departures 
from strict adherence to the Bulwer base. The Visit note and Overall 
Design Report had firmly instated Bulwer Island's model as the core of 
the Grangemouth system, but the detailed Evaluation Report sought to 
ensure sufficient space remained for system designers at Grangemouth 
to build the system the refinery "wanted ". Where the specific 
requirements for Grangemouth subsystems were known, their deviations 
from software available from Bulwer were noted, lending further power 
to the Grangemouth designers' elbows. 
By the time the Evaluation Report had been produced, the need for some 
changes to the database for Grangemouth had already been established. 
The Grangemouth designers' room for manouvre was being simultaneously 
closed and opened all the time. 
The database definition at Grangemouth differs significantly from 
that at Bulwer in certain areas, in particular the definition of 
Grades and Grade Specifications are markedly different [7]. 
However, the general strategy of maintaining the Bulwer Database 
physical design remained intact, as did the intentions behind the 
strategy. "This is to maximise the benefit to Grangemouth of past 
investment in RIS systems" [7]. Changes to the physical database could 
be made, but they necessitated a strong justification, particularly if 
they were deemed to be "High Risk ". Thus, the physical database design 
strategy was given as follows: 
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The basic principle for the design of the Grangemouth Database is 
to adopt the Bulwer Database physical design without change 
[emphasis in original]. This means that the Grangemouth database 
will exhibit most, if not all, the characteristics of the Bulwer 
database - for better or for worse. 
Changes will only be considered if they are required for the 
support of additional system functionality. Changes will be 
treated according to whether they are High or Low Risk. 
High Risk changes are those which seek to modify existing 
structures. For example, to change the contents of a field.. All 
such changes will be assessed for impact on the existing system. 
High risk changes will be avoided if at all possible. 
Low Risk changes are those which seek to add new structures to 
the database. For example, to a new field.. All such changes will 
be assessed to ensure that they are not actually seeking to 
replace existing structures and that they cannot be accommodated 
within the existing structures. Low risk changes will be adopted 
provided they do not run against the overall philosophy of the 
physical db [database] design or pose a risk to compatibility 
with other systems. 
It should be emphasised that physical database changes should 
only be considered for the support of additional functionality or 
flexibility. Stylistic changes will not be made for the sake of 
them [7]. 
In the next chapter we examine how the system designers and 
implementers utilised the space left for them by the Overall Design 
and Bulwer Evaluation Reports to build a RIS system at Grangemouth. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ENGINEERING THE SYSTEM AT GRANGEMOUTH 
The System Builders 
The RIS system to be built at Grangemouth was designed and implemented 
by a team made up of both Scicon and BP Oil employees. The size and 
constitution of the team varied through the development and 
implementation process. From the small System Design Team of four 
people who undertook the Grangemouth RIS Feasibility study, the team 
was to grow to a peak of between 25 and 30 people [1]. At the start of 
the implementation approximately half of the team were BP employees, 
although as the implementation progressed more Scicon staff were taken 
on to carry out programming work. At it's largest the team was 
expected to be.. 
..probably about 27 people of which ten [will be] BP [and] 17 
Scicon, something of that order. That includes users, full time 
users on the BP side [seconded onto the project]. So in terms of 
BP programming staff, there's only three.. as opposed to about a 
dozen Scicon I suppose [1]. 
Non -programming staff were primarily involved in systems analysis, 
specification and administration. 
Scicon come along with the technical skills, the actual 
information systems skills and also with the experience of what 
they've done with implementing RIS's in other refineries. And 
Grangemouth is providing primarily the user expertise, the local 
expertise, but also the people to support the system in the 
longer term [1]. 
Unfortunately, it was impossible to involve Scicon staff in the study 
as they insisted on charging the refinery full consultancy rates for 
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any time spent talking to the researcher. It was however possible to 
speak to all of the BP programming staff on the project and a number 
of the seconded users. 
In this chapter an account of the implementation process is provided 
from interviews conducted with the BP programmers and other personnel 
with systems responsibility, both within the refinery and at BP Oil's 
Corporate, European and UK Head Offices. The material derived from 
interviews with seconded users is dealt with more fully in the 
following chapter. 
The interview data gathered by the researcher allows consideration of 
the RIS story, up to and including the establishment and early 
development of the major sub -systems that were to communicate through 
the central database. 
General Orientation 
The BP staff involved in the Grangemouth RIS implementation adopted a 
general approach to building the system that sought to deliver a 
commercial advantage to the refinery. As we noted earlier, most of the 
value added opportunities in refining are oil based [2] and so the 
core application of the developing RIS system was seen to be 
"Production Programming" [3]. RIS was seen to be an integral element 
of a general change that sought to render activities in commercial 
terms in order to engender a commercial orientation within the 
organisation. 
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The objectives of the system are to take operational information 
and hold it centrally, and then to analyse that information in 
terms of commercial rather than operational criteria. It's part 
of a wider project to alter the focus of the plant to emphasise 
commercial, financial issues [4]. 
The lack of this sort of information prior to RIS was seen to be one 
of the key reasons behind the lack of demand for RIS from the site and 
also one of the key benefits of the introduction of a RIS system. 
You've got to take the control, it's no good putting plans in in 
isolation from commercial reality. And what RIS attempts to do is 
to try and make the whole refinery more commercially responsible, 
aware, i.e. to increase that degree of benefits control, 
performance measures [2]. 
The "need" for information to improve the refinery's performance could 
not be articulated without information on the refinery's performance. 
The measures on refinery performance were a lot cruder than they 
really are today, and they're pretty crude today. The refinery 
had measures of value added type profitability, but they're 
rather imprecise and aren't given quite as much credence as they 
would be if it were a solely operated company... Since the 
refinery wasn't really operating in a plc mode and since it's 
bottom line wasn't all that visible with credibility, that's why 
I think it wasn't pulling this into being beforehand. In a sense 
it's the management environment which sets the expectations and 
the criteria of success, for what [the refinery] is actually a 
division within Manufacturing and Supplies. It's an 
organisational issue really [2]. 
Managers at Grangemouth were not seen by the implementers of RIS to be 
generally keen on information systems. This was deemed to be partially 
a result of "overselling in the past" [3]. However, as we noted in the 
previous chapters the introduction of RIS was virtually a foregone 
conclusion. Sceptical managers may have been able to ignore RIS or 
partially divert its developmental trajectory but they had little 
alternative but to accept the implementation of some sort of RIS type 
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system. The project was further legitimated by Scicon's involvement 
and the implied authority behind their system's "professionalism ". 
The implementation "proper" started in July 1989 and in the first year 
the system builders' work consisted of the production of an overall 
design framework for the system (see previous chapter) and the 
implementation of a stand alone proprietary laboratory analysis system 
[3]. During the following year the Bulwer Island database was 
implemented and the changes required for Grangemouth were 
consolidated. A great deal of effort was devoted to infrastructure 
changes, basically a very widespread data capture, to ensure a well 
populated database. These changes were seen to provide "little direct 
benefit for the refinery" [4] but were a necessary pre- requisite for 
the subsequent development of major applications. The choices over 
which data should be captured and at what level of resolution they 
should be recorded reflected wider concerns surrounding the overall 
purpose(s) of RIS and the perceived limitations of the technology 
employed. 
There was a compromise made as to the number of operational data 
collection points out of that mass of ironwork out there on the 
refinery that would be collated for production planning purposes. 
The design is for relevance in the overview level of production 
control, not in terms of the technical control or operations 
control of the plant [2]. 
As we noted in the previous section, the framework established prior 
to implementation allowed and necessitated an ongoing evaluation of 
RIS's constituent parts and their integration. Experience derived from 
earlier implementations provided some consistency and a guide for 
action here. 
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We've never been able to do a complete specification, we've 
always had to do it kind of piece meal and accept the risks that 
go with that. We've been able to do it because we've known enough 
about how it's been done at other sites to be able to cope with 
the changes that come through with that [5]. 
The physical database adopted from Bulwer Island's OMS system may be 
seen as an artefactual embodiment of this general precedential guide 
to design. 
The Central Database 
A central database at the core of RIS to organise the production of 
commercially oriented information was the corner -stone of the system 
at Grangemouth. The aim was to have "common rather than distributed 
information" [4]. A central database would not only provide a neat way 
of organising the interfaces of a number of subsystems [6], but the 
sharing of information that such an organisation encouraged was seen 
to enable a wider integration of the refinery system. 
Hopefully the sharing of information in a common database will 
result in a better understanding and working relationship between 
departments [4]. 
The database implemented was seen to be.. 
..still very much based on the Bulwer Island model. We still use 
Bulwer tables as a starting point, but we don't implement any 
columns we don't require, and we've implemented columns of our 
own as needed. The basic philosophy is to use the Bulwer model 
until we cannot. We've not been able to use as much of the Bulwer 
model as we first expected. Bulwer Island is a much simpler 
refinery than Grangemouth and so we had to diversify from the 
model they used [4]. 
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Indeed, one of the designers said that "we've had to make more changes 
to the Bulwer Island model than I would've expected use of the 
Rotterdam model to involve" [7]. Staff at the refinery were keen to 
ensure that they did not transfer the Bulwer system's performance 
problems along with its central database. Again, embodied and 
contextual experience were seen to play key roles in minimising risks. 
Technological positioning was an important battle ground here. Staff 
brought into Grangemouth to produce the system were keen technological 
innovators (see earlier description of the Feasibility Study's 
orientation) whilst "indigenous" staff were happier to adopt tried and 
tested solutions. 
Our general policy has been not to take technical risks. 
Yesterday's blue sky is quite good enough I think and no nasty 
surprises has been a policy I've been very happy with. And I do 
have a say because although the RIS project is separately 
managed, separately funded, and separately staffed, I still end 
up with the responsibility of running it once it's been 
developed, which of course is its benefits stage [2]. 
Grangemouth's location and particularly the local skill base also had 
an important role to play here. 
We are in a relatively small town in Scotland [and] expertise in 
this sort of development has to be imported. We're quite reliant 
upon this little set that is in place. Why start trying to 
reinvent the world or invent a new world halfway through? It 
doesn't stack up too well [2]. 
Within the wider BP Group the adoption of a Bulwer Island starting 
point was losing some of its attractive gloss as the system's 
performance problems became more apparent and the issue of a centrally 
supportable core once again reared its head. Bulwer's evident Mark 
II'ness had not turned it into the basis of all future implementations 
as the visitors fron Grangemouth had suggested. It was now seen as 
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something of a technological blind alley, a mistake in systems design 
from which future designers could learn important lessons. Conceptions 
of appropriate solutions to business problems had to be congruent with 
the "technological" capabilities of the systems that were to support 
them. 
[At] the second RIS implementation in Bulwer Island.. they 
overstretched themselves in terms of the production system design 
and because of that they basically failed to meet their goals and 
are still trying to implement the system. They were just trying 
to go too far with the technology available [8]. 
A group reorganisation emphasised the problem of centrally supportable 
core software. In mid -1990 the BP organisation was split into 
geographical areas, with BP Europe providing a corporate centre for 
European operations [8]. Not even the smaller enclave of BP Oil Europe 
could maintain a centrally sanctioned core for RIS systems since.. 
..we were locked into a lot of these developments before Europe 
was formed. So within Europe everybody bar Grangemouth has got 
the Rotterdam system and.. with hindsight I don't think 
Grangemouth would've gone for a Bulwer system. Quite honestly 
it's not lived up to their expectations and I think we would've 
liked to have harmonised in Europe if we'd had the opportunity 
[8]. 
The promise of centrally supportable core software could only be 
fulfilled by a new generation of RIS systems, built from a fixed 
starting point. For the present generation cost savings could be made 
by importing and modifying software developed elsewhere, but there was 
to be no centrally supportable tool kit. 
The original RIS project when it came into Grangemouth came with 
the expectation that about 50% of the code and design back would 
be portable and the rest of it could be written, so you get 
basically a half price project. You could spawn the economies of 
scale of having lots of refineries within one company and as far 
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as Grangemouth RIS project is concerned I think that assumption 
has turned out to be largely true. Approximately 507 has been 
obtained free and the remaining 50%, cheap at eight million 
[pounds] I suppose [2]. 
However, as we noted in earlier chapters, although each site only had 
to develop about 50% of their own system, the 50% imported was not 
common to all sites. "Bits" of software were available elsewhere, cost 
free, but there was no consistent central core around which each 
system was to be designed and thus the possibility of cost effective 
central group support was strictly limited. In the next section we 
examine how the system builders set about implementing a number of 
system applications around the central core that they were "locked 
into ". 
Building System Applications 
As we noted above, the key application of RIS at Grangemouth was the 
production planning and scheduling system. Particularly with regard to 
the more detailed area of production scheduling, the system builders 
recognised that they couldn't automate all the decisions that staff 
were required to make "so instead we're aiming to provide the 
information to make those decisions and provide facilities for him 
(sic) to use that to allow 'What if ?' analyses" [4]. For example... 
The MIMI LP will provide a first cut schedule based on the 
planning information. This will then be given to the scheduler so 
that he (sic) can fine tune it on the basis of his knowledge. 
We're aiming to get an approximately 70 - 80% correct solution 
from MIMI [4]. 
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The authors of the Feasibility study had been keen on the potential of 
an advanced scheduling tool with expert system functionality, MIMI -S 
that was promised in the near future by MIMI's suppliers. However, in 
the atmosphere of technological backtracking that pervaded refining 
systems at the time of the Grangemouth implementation this was seen to 
be an unworkable technicist solution. The decision to reject MIMI -S 
was also dependent on earlier choices concerning the level of 
resolution to be used when recording and modelling the refinery within 
the RIS system, choices predicated upon knowledge of the performance 
implications of the more complex refinery representation that had been 
employed at Bulwer Island. 
If we took MIMI -S as it was there would be a lot of work involved 
taking the MIMI -LP as output and breaking down the schedule to 
tank level because our LP isn't defined to tank level. So what 
we're instead taking is the raw LP output and we are breaking 
that down ourselves to tanks with what we see as a relatively 
straight forward algorithm [1]. 
RIS was a tool for, not a replacement of, refinery personnel. Staff 
savings were, as we noted, expected in some areas but the increased 
computer support that RIS was seen to necessitate meant that there 
would be little or no net reduction of staff as a direct result of the 
implementation. The RIS development was to be kept distinctly separate 
from improvements to the process control systems [5]. 
The object is to give people as much information as they need to 
do their job, without trying to do their job for them [1]. 
Both the indigenous systems staff and the programmers brought in to 
build RIS were adamant on the distinction between RIS and the systems 
that directly controlled the operations of the refinery. There was no 
attempt to automate the control of the refinery under the auspices of 
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the RIS system. Moreover, even the possibility of future developments 
in this direction was largely dismissed by the systems staff 
interviewed. 
If there is to be increased automation then that added 
sophistication needs to be within the control system itself and 
anything that comes from RIS would be in the form of price data, 
or some constraints and targets which would feed into the process 
control system. There are too many safety implications of 
expanding RIS into the process area. It's got to come the other 
way, perhaps being driven by information coming from RIS. There 
are two different standards of reliability that you have to 
consider in the two systems [5]. 
I think the perception is that at a certain level of detail 
process plants like this are a little bit like weather systems. 
There is a degree of unpredictability built into them and to 
retain responsibility for that continuous operation you probably 
need to put some human being in charge of it. Somebody who, if 
you like, can put the umbrella up when it's actually raining 
rather than when the weather forecast says it should be. And I 
don't see full automation as being in the scope of plans or 
realism for refineries. It is a question of how clever one can 
be, how smart, how effective [9]. 
Indeed, at an old site with built in "unpredictability" and concerns 
about the consequences of the automation of control, the importance of 
accurate and timely management information was seen to increase. Not 
only was an automated control loop for refinery processes rejected, 
simple automation to allow remote human control of valves was also 
"impossible" for economic reasons. Benefits of such an automation were 
not seen to "warrant" or "justify" the investment required [2]. As a 
result, better information was required due to the lack of immediacy 
in process control mechanisms, and in turn, this lack of immediacy was 
seen to introduce a constraint on the benefits derivable from RIS 
information. 
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I think it means that if you've got operators running round the 
off sites and tankage areas in order to make blends and line them 
up to ships.. you actually have to be as certain as you possibly 
can that the plan to which they're operating is viable and good, 
because you haven't got the chance of changing things so robustly 
at the last minute. And that means that it should pay off, it 
should add to the overall value, but it would be even more error 
free I suppose if you could automate that final step as well, or 
increase the automation in it [2]. 
There were however problems noted with this approach, fundamental 
questions needed to be asked about the functions of the refinery 
operators. Given that the control and planning systems were not to 
converge, effort was to be devoted to improving the interface between 
them, that is, the operators role. 
I think the challenge in the future and the interface that is 
going to be concentrated on is actually the human interface. What 
is the operators job? What are his (sic) tools? What information 
is he being given and what responsibilities has he got? [9]. 
Whilst it was... 
..quite conceivable that in years to come the process control 
side will grow some degree of.. control intelligence, IS 
characteristics, so long as it's in real time and deals with 
automated oil flows, I don't have a problem [9]. 
It was, however, important to ensure that RIS was not viewed in the 
same way. 
I think we have to be careful.. that we don't kid ourselves that 
a RIS project is in real time and is associated with activating 
control valves [2]. 
These problems would be particularly acute for operators who were not 
only receiving information from RIS but also directions and 
information from the Honeywell process control system. Given that the 
systems did not look likely to converge in the near future, there was 
a "need to adjust human resources to technical capabilities" [2]. 
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These differences and their implications needed to be made crystal 
clear to the operators. 
Look at it from the process operator's perception: at the moment 
he's going to see two different screens, very different things, 
and he's probably going to be slightly confused. He's getting 
some information out of his Honeywell control screen, which is 
real, and some of it's calculated. And he's got plans which are 
there and targets to meet [2]. 
We go on to look at RIS's implications for roles within the refinery 
in the following chapter. 
Returning to the core application, the MIMI LP system was seen as a 
success by the system builders: "The Production Department seem to be 
very happy with it" [4]. Wider benefits were seen to have accrued from 
the introduction of a new LP. Staff in the Production Department "had 
a lot of work in terms of understanding why they're getting particular 
results" [4] due to the fact that they "had to go through and test 
MIMI against Sciconic" [the LP system used prior to the introduction 
of the RIS -based MIMI system] [4]. As a result Production staff were 
seen to "understand the results they're getting a lot better" [4]. 
Benefits from RIS and their management are considered in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
Other applications that were deemed to be "more important perhaps in 
that they are the more commercially orientated, rather than the more 
technically orientated activities ", such as Performance Monitoring, 
were "much less clearly defined" [4]. There was no problem with the 
availability of data for the support of these applications, rather the 
problem was in terms of "identify[ing] what you are actually 
monitoring, what does it mean, performance monitoring ?" [4]. 
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Are you measuring against your LP targets? Are you measuring 
against your process model targets? Are you measuring against 
both I suppose? And what sort of sensitivities and how do you 
want to see it? How do you want it grouped? [4]. 
Similar concerns were expressed over the specifications for the Mass 
Balance Reconciliation System. Whilst a need was recognised for "those 
types of report" [4] the requirements for producing the reports were 
harder to specify. Requirements needed to be "looked into in more 
detail" [4]. For example.. 
The standard approach is to say, well, we assume we don't lose 
anything.. and you reconcile the flows so that you say "Well this 
flow meter must be reading incorrectly." And that's a self 
fulfilling prophesy I suppose [4]. 
A Movements Monitoring System was also under development and was seen 
to be particularly important for the management of off sites 
operations [1]. This system was to be built around a prototype system 
that had been developed at Vohburg refinery. A decision was taken by 
the BDU Systems Group to split out the interface of the system from 
its functionality. Work on the interface was underway at BP's central 
engineering and research centre at Sudbury, whilst the functionality 
of the system was seen to be "too refinery specific to warrant 
building a generic and Grangemouth have grudgingly accepted that" and 
were to build that part of the system themselves [1]. Again we can see 
the conflict between reflecting local needs and the demands of 
centrally supportable software. In building the functionality of the 
system at Grangemouth... 
..the main driver will be cost, but we will consider 
possibilities for a generic system. The centre can far more 
easily use gencricism as a justification for development costs 
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than we can. At Grangemouth genericity will come second to 
budgets and deadlines. The case is similar for large parts of the 
scheduler [1]. 
Some of the problems of genericity and specificity of applications 
were seen to be soluble through the use of more flexible reporting 
formats. The demands of genericity not only impinged on systems to be 
used between refineries, but also on those to be used within 
Grangemouth. Standard reports may not reflect and accommodate 
particular concerns. Flexible reporting tools provided a potential 
solution. 
I think I did at one time think that these flexible reporting 
tools would actually reduce a lot of the standardised screens we 
needed. I'm not so sure that that's true. I think what it does do 
is stop people getting irritated by not being able to do things 
with the standard screens [5]. 
In the next section we go on to consider the provisions made for 
database reporting at Grangemouth. In some senses applications can be 
considered as a subset of database reporting, but we will be more 
concerned, in the following section, with the tools provided to users 
to help them deal with the relatively non -repeating issues that 
confronted them in their work in the refinery. These issues are not 
infrequent. As we noted above, the refinery was seen as a complex 
system which possessed a certain amount of in -built indeterminateness 
and unpredictability. And the increasing volatility of Grangemouth's 
and BPOUK's trading arrangements sought to ensure that this potential 
for uncertainty was often expressed. 
248 
Database Reporting 
Requirements for database reporting were defined relatively late in 
the implementation of RIS. Each of the BP programmers working on the 
project and systems staff in the wider BP Group with an interest in 
Grangemouth RIS, had their own "intuitive" views of what should be 
provided. There was however little agreement between these views and 
the diversity of reporting tastes within the group was reflected at 
different RIS implementations. For example.. 
At Alliance refinery in New Orleans they ended up putting in a 
data capture system which was very reliable and they gave people 
facilities using Mac PC's. So they used the power of the Mac to 
allow people to do things like trending process data [and] 
extracting data into spreadsheets [5]. 
Both Bulwer Island and Alliance gave some users access to the 
system prompt [Access to the "system prompt" entails the 
opportunity, but not necessarily the ability, to partially 
"write" the system as one's usage needs arise]. The intention is 
not to do that here [at Grangemouth] [10]. 
At Rotterdam they drifted from the ideal of open access to the 
system prompt and instead used a number of pre- defined specific 
screens. Other refineries have started from Rotterdam's final 
model and moved back towards the ideal [For this programmer "open 
access" was seen to be the "ideal "] [10]. 
At Alliance ad hoc reporting was question and answer based [4]. 
Bulwer Island used general parameterised forms for reporting. So 
there were less forms than at Rotterdam, but they were more 
general [6]. 
Gothenburg took an extract from their main database to a mini 
database on which users could write their own inquiries using the 
20:20 spreadsheet package [10]. 
Thus, there was no general agreement within the BP group over how 
database reporting facilities should be provided. According to one of 
the system builders... 
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The Management Steering Group either doesn't have a view on this, 
or if they have, I haven't found it yet [11]. 
Within Grangemouth refinery the system builders settled on a number of 
different approaches to satisfying users' reporting nee'ís. The number 
of different approaches to reporting on the part of the system 
builders were accommodated through the provision of a number of 
different reporting routes. However, some views could not be 
accommodated "technologically ". 
There's three groups: there's the standardised reporting screens; 
there are.. ones which have more flexibility; and really if none 
of them will suit, people will resort to the computer 
department [5]. 
These differences in approach reflected different conceptions and 
representations of the capabilities and requirements of refinery staff 
and managers. The "potential" of the technology employed was seen to 
interact with the competencies and wider context of refinery 
management. For example, a member of the BDU Systems Group who had 
been intimately involved with the development of the Rotterdam system 
and the early stages of the Grangemouth implementation, believed that 
whilst relational database technology provided a simpler and neater 
way of conveying information between subsystems than a hierarchical 
structure would allow, complications re -arose when the database was to 
be queried [6]. 
Managers were seen to be "too busy" to learn the skills required for 
sophisticated interrogation of the database, but they nevertheless 
wanted access to the sort of information such queries would provide. 
Whilst staff and some managers could, and did, use spreadsheets (for 
example at Gothenburg and later at Grangemouth) to manipulate data 
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extracted from the database. They were not seen to be capable or 
willing to use 4th generation "natural" language tools to manipulate, 
and indeed extract, the information required. Hence the reluctance at 
Grangemouth to give users access to RIS at the system prompt level. 
Moreover, there was little experience at Grangemouth of natural 
language type interfaces, whereas Lotus spreadsheets were quite widely 
used [7]. 
End users cannot use fourth generation languages. They need 
professional support both for security reasons and in terms of 
data definitions. There's no problem with simple systems but with 
larger scale systems the complexity of table linkages precludes 
their use by the non -expert [6]. 
Similar views were expressed by one of the system managers at 
Grangemouth with responsibility for RIS and the view was solidified in 
the database reporting made available at the refinery. Although 
predicting future demands for non standardised information, he saw 
little evidence of current expression of these demands. 
I always expected that the computer department would have to 
provide a facility where they would respond very quickly to 
particular queries. Nevertheless, I don't see any evidence of 
that sort of thing happening. I still expect it to happen. Once 
we've got all our data in the database I think managers are going 
to have need for ad hoc queries and they're not going to set 
these things up themselves [5]. 
Others noted the practical limitations of the tools provided. 
We have an ad hoc reporting facility with an interface to the 
Lotus spreadsheet package. In theory it should allow the user to 
write their own completely ad hoc query to download any available 
data into Lotus for spreadsheet analysis. In practice the 
download is being carried out either by RIS project staff or more 
recently, by the Computer Support Committee [4]. 
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Lower level staff with more experience of spreadsheet usage may have 
been capable of producing the information they wanted using such 
simple tools, but they were not seen to be users of non -standardised 
information. 
I'm sure there'll be some [queries] that [managers] can't deal 
with. These facilities are still geared pretty much at looking at 
the raw data. They're going to have requirements which require a 
certain amount of processing of that raw data and I think that's 
going to require computer services.. I guess you can do virtually 
anything with a Lotus spreadsheet if you put the time into doing 
it, but a manager's not going to do that.. but I think for the 
majority of users those tools that we've provided should actually 
meet their needs [5]. 
Whilst the manager quoted above was "keen on ad hoc" facilities [3], 
they were seen to be "dangerous ". He thought that they could be 
provided to "more sophisticated users" but that such users would still 
require a user support team to set up appropriate access to the 
database for them [3]. Another system builder.. 
..envisage[d] ad hocs actually being done by the users 
themselves, without recourse to applications support [4]. 
Although... 
One problem with this approach [to ad hoc querying] is that the 
size of the reports that can be generated by novice users could 
actually kill the machine [4]. 
However, one of the system builders who had worked at Bulwer and 
Alliance where access to the system prompt had been provided for users 
suggested that such "privileges" had not "significantly contributed to 
machine loading" [10]. There had been performance problems at Bulwer, 
as we noted earlier, but these were seen to be due to the rate of data 
capture and the complex design of planning and scheduling applications 
employed [10]. 
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As we noted above, there was a perception of a potential future need 
for such information from higher management, but the remit of the RIS 
system was seen to limit the usefulness of the information available. 
RIS was seen to be of limited use for higher management since it only 
contained oil production data [3]. This data was primarily utilised to 
"set targets for the process units and send out instructions" with 
this information being communicated through the use of "standardised 
screens" [5]. The production of standardised screens to deliver pre- 
defined information for applications was where the "bulk" of the 
database reporting effort was required [5]. 
Cross referenced information emanating from more than one RIS 
subsystem and from other systems communicating with RIS, was provided 
by some standard screens, but this sort of information was not seen as 
"important" for refinery managers, its production was not "justified" 
[12]. RIS was seen as "just" an oil production planning system, access 
to, and combination with, other sources of information was not seen as 
important [12]. 
Higher management were not seen to be aware of what cross referenced 
information they required [12]. The "activity based" nature of the 
site meant that such information was seen to be required only in 
certain circumstances, for example, comparing relative performance 
against budgets, and standard reports were already available for such 
purposes [12]. More general information to assist in understanding 
wider, more fundamental questions, was not seen by management as 
appropriate to their roles and was, perhaps more importantly, 
explicitly outside the scope of the RIS system [12]. And the system 
builders were keen to retain this restricted scope: "..we've 
avoided 
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looking for expansion" [5]. Strategic information for refinery 
management came from Head Office staff viewing trends to examine wider 
issues. Indeed, there was seen to be a very clear differentiation 
between the time frames of various activities, as opposed to other 
businesses, where the divisions between operations, tactics, and 
strategy were seen to be "largely arbitrary". This restricted view of 
managerial responsibility meant that aggregated, cross referenced 
information on wider issues was irrelevant to managers at Grangemouth 
[12]. 
Another concern was that users at the refinery were generally of 
"limited" computer experience. 
The users we targeted.. were the ones that worked with PC's 
normally.. because they were the type of people who were likely 
to need that sort of flexible facility [5]. 
There was little availability of PC's on the site until about five 
years before the implementation of RIS, and hence computing knowledge 
was mainly in the hands of people new to the site [11]. Reporting of 
the database in non -standardised form required quite detailed 
knowledge of relatively complicated Standard Query Language (SQL) 
programming. The example below, which displays a monthly salary bill 
for each department of an organisation, comes from the British 
Standards Institution's Specification for Database Language SQL (BS 
6964: 1988) : 
SELECT DNAME, SUM (SAL) FROM EMP, DEPT 
WHERE EMP.DEPTNO = DEPT.DEPTNO 
GROUP BY DNAME; 
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However often unknown "experts" were thought to exist in certain 
departments, their expertise having been acquired through "hobby 
usage" [10]. As a result, one of the system managers with 
responsibility for RIS was, from his programming perspective, keen to 
allow such users access to the SQL system prompt to enable them to 
structure their own queries. "Hobby users" were seen by this builder 
as a potential resource that should be exploited. 
It makes things easier and allows them to do possible little odds 
and sods not anticipated in the programs [10]. 
Ironically, the limited scope of the RIS information was not seen by 
this manager to be a reason for not providing flexible access. 
Instead, RIS was seen to offer the potential of more open access than 
"most company information systems since it doesn't contain much 
sensitive information, particularly personnel files and payroll" [10]. 
He did however note that there were quite big differences between 
users "levels of imagination and realisation of the potential of the 
system" [10]. In his opinion, user imagination was the limiting 
factor, users seemed to "want to be told what the system would 
deliver" [10]. 
The "dangers" of such an open approach for the other system builders, 
coupled with a perceived lack of demand for such facilities at 
Grangemouth meant that this was not allowed to happen. This may 
reflect "protectionism" on the part of the designers, reflecting a 
very real fear that they could lose control of the system. And, as we 
hinted above, even the analysis of data downloaded by a support group 
was seen to be beyond the willingness and capabilities of management 
[7]. Trend analysis and the manipulation of RIS data using Lotus were 
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seen "a more sort of advanced thing" [1] and, initially at least, 
these facilities were only made available to, and used by, key 
individuals, particularly technical specialists who were deemed to 
have the appropriate skills (see next chapter) [10]. At first the 
Lotus interface only allowed the download of data from "a single file" 
but a sandwich student working on the project "introduced the ability 
to download from multiple files" [4], although whether such direct 
access was available "in practice" remains unclear. 
Opinions on appropriate reporting seemed to change throughout the 
implementation. One of the system builders had, at the feasibility 
stage, thought that.. "access to the SQL prompt was the best idea" 
[11] but as the implementation "proceeded and we realised the size of 
system and the potential complexity of reports" he decided to opt for 
the "same approach as Rotterdam and not allow such access" [11]. Not 
only were there doubts about the "overall business benefits ", such 
complex inquiries were seen to require "programmers" and the training 
required to get general users to "this level of competency" was deemed 
to be "unjustified" [11]. Instead the refinery opted for a fast 
response (in the order of half an hour) to complex queries from the 
Computer Services Committee. Users had not previously approached the 
CSC with information requests "because of the slowness of response" 
[11]. As part of the general aim to encourage a more commercial 
orientation within the refinery, the CSC charged user departments for 
the time involved in answering such queries [11]. 
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As some of the previous quotes suggest, it was also expected that user 
demands, expectations and ownership beliefs concerning information 
would change over time. 
When the feasibility study was first mooted we expected 
departmental managers not to be keen on open information. This is 
changing and now I think a request for any data would be seen as 
reasonable [7]. 
However, this spirit of openness was not quite all pervasive. Users in 
the Production Department were not keen on allowing Head Office users 
access to parts of the system that might contain provisional plans 
that had not been ratified. These concerns were seen to reflect a 
level of distrust between Head Office and Production Department staff. 
There was a great deal of overlap between their responsibilities and 
Production staff saw H.O.'s involvement as an unreasonable and 
unnecessary continual checking of their activities [10]. 
Needless to say, Head Office people do not share this 
impression [10,13]. 
The users, use and type of information required of RIS was also 
expected to change. Whilst at present higher level managers saw little 
use for the system, some of their subordinates were extensive users. 
Thus the demands made of RIS were likely to change as those 
experienced users move up the organisational hierarchy and continued 
and expanded their use of the system [10,11]. 
In summary, these concerns and pressures resulted in the provision of 
ad hoc reporting through the use of SQL forms, written by support 
personnel, that took the form of menus. In some cases these menus 
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could be parameterised by users, allowing them to select of subset of 
a pre- defined inquiry, to bring about the download of the data they 
required [1]. 
We thought we could cover that [ad hoc reporting] by Lotus, 
"Trends" [a trending program, written at Rotterdam and picked up 
by Grangemouth] and tabular reporting of time against 
qualities.., any tank data, and some movement data [1]. 
We decided that we would package the three of them into a user 
defined reporting set or group of facilities and we would 
standardise the interface to them so that the users used the 
three of them in the same way [5]. 
The facilities provided were seen to represent a balance between 
provision of pre- defined reporting formats to reflect and embody 
"business needs" deduced and constructed by the system builders in 
their discussions with users, and predicted and current user demands 
for ease of access to novel information. The forward looking 
orientation of RIS at Grangemouth was recognised to require some 
flexibility in the design of future reports. Lessons learnt from 
previous and ongoing RIS implementations were built into the system's 
reporting structures. And system builders were, on the whole, happy 
with their response to these demands. 
You can't afford to go to either extreme. And I think we've got 
the right balance here (laughter) [5]. 
In the next section, we examine how the realisation of the benefits 
that RIS was expected to provide was managed at Grangemouth. 
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Managing the Benefits of RIS 
As we noted earlier in our account, obtaining ratification and funding 
for RIS type systems within the BP Group became "more difficult" in 
the period preceding and during the Grangemouth implementation as a 
result of the emergent "perception of failure" surrounding the first 
two implementations at Rotterdam and Bulwer Island [8]. Whilst these 
"failures" were primarily attributed to changes in environmental 
circumstances and technical difficulties respectively, the resulting 
increased reluctance on the part of senior managers to support large 
scale IS projects at refineries led to increased demands for the 
provision of systematic benefits management procedures on concurrent 
and subsequent projects of a similar nature. The key to successful 
benefits management was seen to lie in an early, systematic enrolment 
of the system's prospective users. One of the senior managers involved 
in the Rotterdam project, who was also a member of the Grangemouth 
Management Steering Committee, had this to say on the subject: 
I think the key thing is having solved the technical problems 
with putting the systems in, you then have a secondary problem in 
that if you don't use the system and.. the users, aren't 
committed to it, then you don't get the benefits. And that is one 
of the key problems that we're facing really.., bringing the 
users along with the implementation of the system and ensuring 
that they use it after the event [8]. 
The benefits management procedures employed at the Grangemouth 
implementation were exemplary in this respect. Although "a 
bit 
bureaucratic.. having seen the lack of enthusiasm, certainly 
in the 
Rotterdam refinery" it was seen as "important that" an attempt 
be made 
to "boost" enthusiasm early in the project [8]. 
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[One of the system managers] at Grangemouth has picked up on this 
point.. and he's actually generated some ideas on management of 
the benefits. And the way he approaches that is he actually 
allocates responsibility for recovering benefits to people who 
claimed for individual components of the system. He's aiming to 
delegate the responsibility and what he proposed is that as bits 
of the system are implemented they will be audited and what I've 
recommended is that twelve months after the completion of the 
whole system we audit it again, just to make sure [8]. 
Although coming late to such an orientation the system manager 
referred to in the above quote adopted the approach wholeheartedly. He 
saw future projects as insupportable in the absence of such procedures 
and spoke ruefully about the lateness of his conversion. 
In fact for any project coming along now I don't think it should 
be sanctioned unless they have a Benefits Management plan in 
place [5]. 
It would have worked an awful lot better.. if I'd done benefits 
management procedures right at the beginning of the project when 
we were getting the thing authorised [5]. 
Concerns were, however expressed by the senior manager on the 
Grangemouth Management Steering Committee about the manageability of 
such an approach. 
Now whether, at the end of the day, that's actually a manageable 
thing, I don't know.. it's a step in the right direction [8]. 
And these concerns were reflected by the system builder at the 
refinery who proposed the approach. Coping with these complexities 
resulted in a questioning of extant refinery role allocations. 
If you take performance monitoring where one person is 
responsible for setting the targets and monitoring what's 
happened and another one is responsible for actually taking some 
action to improve things then it's a little bit difficult to 
see.. who's responsible for making the whole thing generate 
dollars at the end of the day [5]. 
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Other organisational changes underway at the time of the 
implementation increased the visibility of these issues, and problems 
were exacerbated by the ephemeral nature of some of the benefits 
thought to accrue from the system and made particularly acute by the 
emerging commercial orientation that RIS was expected to play a role 
in delivering. 
Many of the benefits are cultural and although lots of them are 
measurable, they are very difficult to cost justify [4]. 
Nevertheless, despite the potential problems with the approach's 
application, benefits management at the refinery was seen to have 
furthered its cause. The uncertainty and impreciseness of the 
procedures were not perceived to undermine their effectiveness. 
The principle of using Benefits Management in order to make 
people think ahead about how they're going to use the system and 
what the implications are for their department has been really 
useful. Clear accountability is one part of it and can help. If 
you can get to the point where a person is responsible for 
producing a million dollars worth of benefit then it certainly 
helps to concentrate their mind a bit! (laughter) [5]. 
Before turning to consider less systematic methods of benefits accrual 
it is worth noting a minor controversy over the origin of the benefits 
management proposals discussed above. Whilst not disputing the 
effectiveness of the benefits management procedure, another systems 
manager at the refinery suggested that its instigation was not merely 
a particularly astute local reading of wider pressures. Head Office 
intervention to ensure that strategic concerns were not consumed by 
more pressing local "firefighting" was seen to be the direct driver 
behind RIS's benefits management system. The aims of the system and 
the mechanisms for their achievement were seen to be stabilised and 
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maintained by the application of guidelines for development 
constructed at the group's corporate centre. These guidelines entailed 
the application of Benefits Management procedures to the project. 
It's been kept in my opinion relatively fixed because it really 
has had the full weight of BP's IS project management guidelines 
behind it.. Because of the background, refineries have been asked 
to act in by and large a reactive mode. And that basically means 
that maintenance always wins over development. Now the refinery 
has had, and will.. no doubt., continue to have, its fair share 
of operational ups and downs and maintenance type priorities 
short term. And so what BP did is.. put down certain standards 
through its more centralised Head Office type functions., and 
require, for example, the General Manager to chair a project 
board, it required one or two external appointees on that board, 
it required certain aspects like Benefits Management to be 
documented. In other words, it was assuring that the refinery 
would not let this development trickle between its fingers [2]. 
The belief that projects "should not be sanctioned unless they have a 
benefits management plan in place" [5] may simply have been a self 
sustaining reflection of one element of a set of directive 
"guidelines ". 
Ensuring Accrual of Less Specific Benefits 
The SIS system that had been the pre- cursor of RIS at Rotterdam and 
had, in part, fabricated a need for RIS at that refinery, was designed 
to facilitate the traders' ability to trade. RIS was supposed to 
redress the resulting imbalance in power /knowledge and to provide a 
check on the traders activities. 
Clearly there's a certain amount of information the traders have 
to use, have to find, as part of their day to day business. 
If 
there is something extreme that needs some consideration and.. 
needs to be bounced off the refinery, instead of the refinery 
giving a seat of the pants answer which is what would happen 
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today, you have the opportunity to analyse the thing.. The short 
term you really have to still do.. seat of the pants but if you 
have., half a day, one day to analyse then you can see what.. 
impact, let's say of bringing in crude in the middle of your 
existing schedule, will have on the refinery and put dollars and 
cents against it. So that maybe the trader's got a good deal at 
his end but if that's impacted on the optimisation of the 
refinery, you may have lost more at the refinery than the 
trader's gained at the other end.. I think the communication [at 
Rotterdam] was such that the trader believed he (sic) was getting 
a good deal and didn't worry too much about the refinery aspect. 
And it was always retrospective that they'd discover they'd lost 
money on the deal.. It just gives more power to the refinery's 
elbow [8]. 
To be able to use the system for such purposes required a system that 
was "bedded in" [8]. At Rotterdam this had not been allowed to happen 
and thus benefits had not accrued. 
I think you have to go through a learning curve, you have to 
implement the system first, settle it down, get confidence in it 
and get sufficient speed really to be able to do such things. In 
the long term.. that would be the goal. I don't think we've 
achieved it to date [at Rotterdam] but that's not the system's 
fault. That is.. the circumstances surrounding the refinery.., 
the fact that we went into the joint venture and had to go back 
to square one [8]. 
Notwithstanding our earlier comments about the distrust that RIS 
information was seen to perpetuate between the Head Office and the 
Grangemouth Production Department, RIS was seen as a system that could 
break down such barriers. 
I can only think that it can help the situation because the 
relevant data becomes visible to the Head Office and therefore 
points the refinery's putting across are visible to them as 
well [8]. 
These promised but unachieved benefits of Rotterdam RIS were again a 
desired outcome of the Grangemouth implementation. With regard to the 
refinery Head Office relationship, RIS information was seen to have 
enabled new accountabilities through the visibility it provided. 
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We're talking about a contract between the refinery and BP Oil 
Europe which details certain performance characteristics. Now 
that's not to say that the refinery's accountable for its bottom 
line full stop, because that's determined far too much by the 
market over which the refinery has precious little control. But 
concepts like "per cent of a theoretical refinery margin 
achieved" takes that market volatility out and starts to put [in] 
a more meaningful measure in terms of what the refinery has 
actually done [2]. 
Similarly, RIS information would provide benefits that cut across 
internal refinery boundaries. 
I think over the course of time having a database of relevant oil 
type parameters for the refinery will provide a wealth of data 
[and hence] better understanding, better quality control of the 
manufacturing process [and] plant operations.. I think it offers 
the potential for a wider and better understanding.. RIS type 
information offers an opportunity to share, and if it shares in 
an environment and an atmosphere that is constructive then that 
augers well for the future [2]. 
We examine explicit attempts to create a "constructive environment" at 
the refinery and within the wider group in the epilogue. These 
attempts reflected a wider belief that the major blocks on the 
achievement of commercial advantage from RIS would not be technology 
based. 
What are the barriers to use of information? Where does the 
responsibility lie? This type of information technology can 
channel that information theoretically, anywhere you like. So the 
bottleneck is likely to be organisational or quality [of] data 
rather than the structure or availability of information [2]. 
As we noted above, achievement of these latent benefits was expected 
to be particularly hard to quantify in the commercial terms of the 
orientation RIS was intended to engender. 
The biggest difficulty of course is when you take advantage of 
some of these opportunities what is the difference worth compared 
to what you were doing before? And that measurement of change is 
notoriously difficult to actually get hold of [2]. 
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Echoing the point made by the senior manager from the Management 
Steering Committee, the refinery manager quoted above saw 
opportunities for "risk management" benefits through the colonisation 
of the future that a forward looking RIS planning system provided. 
You take a calculated risk when you decide to fly or go by train 
or whatever. If you're very unlucky some of those risks will 
actually come home and you'll fail to make the journey on time, 
or whatever, and you take the consequences. We have the same 
issue in practice every day. Understanding the risks ought to be 
improved as a simple by- product of having this sort of system 
[2]. 
"Risk management" was seen to be particularly valuable when examining 
the risks of management processes. The refinery's adoption of the 
International Safety Ratings System, developed by the International 
Loss Control Institute, served to further sensitize the minds of 
managers to these issues. 
It [RIS information] actually gives you the opportunity to 
investigate and review not just the failure of equipment, which 
undoubtedly will last for as long as the place is here. It's also 
going to understand the risks of loss of management process and 
my bet is that the latter is by no means insignificant in 
comparison to the former. Technical breakdown can be very visible 
but behind quite often is something in terms of more deep lying 
management process. We do of course sometimes make mistakes, like 
getting the wrong component into the right tank, and that's got 
nothing to do with equipment. It is solely to do with quality of 
planning or implementation.. The question is, what do you do 
about it? [2]. 
RIS offered opportunities for a critical reassessment of activities 
and particularly their planning. Planning activities and improving 
planning procedures were seen to be the key to commercial success. 
I don't see how you can run this sort of outfit commercially 
effectively and in a competitive fashion if you cannot create an 
implementable plan [2] . 
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The predictability of operations at the refinery, achieved through 
planning, was essential for integration of activities in the wider 
group. 
There is a team effort involved between the refinery and the rest 
of the company. It's not contributing very well to that team 
effort if it's not functioning in a predictable fashion.. If you 
can increase your certainty of operation you can reduce your 
insurance of stock holding under certain circumstances [2]. 
Other symptoms of unpredictable operations such as the distressed 
purchasing witnessed at Rotterdam could also be addressed. Although.. 
Interestingly enough that particular performance measure.. I 
suspect comes through in terms of the traders' performance [and] 
doesn't actually show up as a blot on the refinery or on the 
[H.O.] supply organisation sitting between the refinery and its 
markets [2]. 
However, the integration of activities that shared information was 
seen to enable, subject to the wider commercial orientation that RIS 
was seen to engender, meant that the parochialism that the above quote 
suggests was not seen to achieve expression in activities. 
At the end of the day the shareholder is not in the slightest bit 
interested in a squabble between the traders and the refinery.. 
So there's a number of areas outside the refining box itself, 
within the total oil business, which would benefit [2]. 
This shift in orientation was also predicated on other organisational 
initiatives that are briefly considered in the epilogue. 
Thus the "technology ", at least at Grangemouth, was not seen to be the 
constraint on the accrual of benefits from the system. Getting 
organisational commitment to RIS in the early stages of its 
implementation was particularly problematic. 
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There is a problem with the users lack of widescale awareness of 
the system. It's very difficult to do much about this at the 
moment as so little is actually available to the users. There is 
a recognition that RIS will have to be sold. Most people don't 
know anything about RIS and don't see much benefit [4]. 
Specific, easily quantifiable benefits could be managed through the 
application of systematic benefits management procedures. Users who 
had been seconded onto the project and socialised into its objectives 
and methods were not seen to be the problem. 
The reaction so far from people who have been brought into the 
project has been very positive, so I see awareness of RIS as the 
main problem we have to overcome [4]. 
But awareness was also seen to be interrelated with usability. Given 
limited awareness the system had to reinforce itself early in the 
hearts and minds of the users through the ease of use and consequent 
organisational success it offered. Thus, although organisational 
factors were seen to provide the major stumbling blocks to a 
successful implementation, their complementarity with the system 
created a responsibility for future usage that was seen by the system 
builders to rest on their shoulders. 
My big worries are about the specifics of the usability of the 
system. In one sense if the system's not used it's seen as our 
fault for not providing the right product. So it's our 
responsibility, of course working with other managers throughout 
the site, to get it right and sell it to the users [4]. 
And enrolment through training and insistence on users providing and 
accepting specifications for elements of the system in their areas, 
were the keys to fulfilling this responsibility. Seconded users were 
also to act as Trojan horses in their departments in the battle to 
gain user acceptance End commitment to the system. 
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We insisted upon the users coming along to provide acceptance of 
plans and we tried to get that on board at an early stage. I 
think.. the fact that we've had one or two people working with 
the team.. was very important. That's been very good [1]. 
This insistence was timetabled and procedularised and hence fed back 
from the users in the form of tighter demands on the system builders. 
We're also trying to get the users to know in advance precisely 
when they will be required to be inputting specifications. So 
there's a bit more pressure on us to try and achieve those 
deadlines, all well and good I guess, but it means that we can 
help the users have a bit more opportunity to schedule their work 
round when we need them [1]. 
This proceduralisation was a response to particular concerns 
surrounding user involvement in a number of departments whose 
commitment to the system was seen to be paramount to a successful 
implementation. For example, in the Production Department.. 
The biggest problem they've had is simply the availability of 
staff for training which means they're still dependent on one or 
two individuals [to operate the system].. That's really just down 
to staff holidays and the limited number of staff available in 
production [1]. 
The lack of time available for training meant enrolment through 
specification and testing became all the more important. The problems 
were exacerbated by some of the other organisational changes underway 
at the refinery that are discussed in the epilogue. 
Several of the key people who we want to do testing and things 
like that on RIS are also the key people who are involved in 
those other projects... It's meant a bit more effort and it's 
meant a bit of frustration I think, more within the team than 
anything else. Because they've worked extremely hard and then to 
sit down and see.. not to see the users letting them down 
somehow, because they appreciate the users have other jobs to do 
as well, but it can be a bit frustrating when you're working long 
hours and the user staff just aren't available to follow up the 
work you're doing.. but there's certainly no ill feeling between 
the users and the team [1]. 
268 
Thus although bedding the system down with the users was seen to be 
fraught with difficulties, the system builders were convinced that 
this aspect of the project was proceeding as successfully as 
circumstances would allow. And other socialisation processes were seen 
to be both enabling and exemplifying this belief. 
We had a team party to celebrate the system going in and we 
invited a lot of users along to that. We actually invited 
something in the region of twenty odd users I think, quite a 
considerable proportion of whom did come along. So again, I think 
that shows there's certainly a good rapport I think between the 
team and the users [1]. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
USING THE SYSTEM AT GRANGEMOUTH 
Introduction 
As RIS was introduced as a "phased development" it was impossible for 
the researcher, in the time available, to examine overall user 
involvement in, and acceptance of, the RIS development. Indeed, it is 
important to note that the characteristics of the system described in 
this research are not necessarily those of the "final" form of RIS at 
Grangemouth. As we have seen in earlier chapters, RIS is a contingent, 
mobile and transient system that has changed, in some cases beyond 
recognition, throughout its development and dispersal. It will no 
doubt have changed again before a "final" version of the system is 
deemed to have been built at Grangemouth and will probably continue to 
change throughout its "useful" life. 
The following is a collection of some early accounts of experience of 
RIS provided by some of the key refinery users. It is however 
important to note that the profile and size of the user group was 
expected to change quite significantly during and after the 
implementation as more data became available, and more "informing" 
applications were developed. As we noted in the previous chapter, 
despite the overarching commercial information orientation of RIS, 
these applications were deemed to be the most difficult to provide. 
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Enrolling the Users in Joint Application Development (JAD) 
Joint Application Development (JAD) was seen by the authors of the 
Feasibility Study to be the only route to follow for a successful 
implementation of RIS at Grangemouth. 
There is only one realistic development approach for the 
Grangemouth RIS system. This is the approach variously known as 
"end -user computing ", "user -led computing ", or - our preferred 
term - "Joint Application Development" [1]. 
We noted in an earlier chapter how many of the demands of JAD were not 
met as it was felt that they had been adequately dealt with at 
previous implementations. In this section we examine the users' 
accounts of their involvement in the JAD that did occur at 
Grangemouth. 
Enrolment of users in the development of RIS took a number of 
different These "key" users onto the 
System Design Team; requiring users to assist in the production of 
application specification and acceptance; and training. Seconded 
"users" came from two main sources: staff from departments expected to 
be major users in the future, particularly the Production Programming 
Department; and staff from the Computer Services Committee (CSC) who 
were expected to support the system and its wider user group in the 
longer term. 
In terms of longer term support, we're trying to build 
up a team 
there in application support.. and actually one of 
the users 
complimented us last night, he said he thought that 
was good, 
that somebody who had some confidence and who'd 
worked on the 
system had gone back to CSC and was going to support 
it. By the 
end of the project there should be four people 
in CSC who've 
worked in the sort of development and have a reasonably 
good feel 
for the system. I mean it's very difficult 
with a system as 
complicated as RIS for four people to know everything 
there is to 
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know but we are trying to make sure it's not a question of the 
project team walking out and leaving an unsupportable system 
there [2]. 
There'll be something in the region of a dozen people I guess 
who've worked with the RIS system quite closely staying on.. The 
users, the three or four users., will go back to their various 
departments.. Scicon come along with the technical skills, the 
actual information systems skills, and also with the experience 
of what they've done with implementing RIS's in other refineries 
and Grangemouth is providing., primarily the user expertise, the 
local expertise, but also the people to support the system in the 
longer term [2]. 
Enrolment of staff from Production Programming, which encompasses both 
Production Planning and Scheduling, was particularly problematic. Not 
only was this department seen to be one of the key users of RIS, it 
was, after all, an "oil management system ", it also had the greatest 
problems associated with staff availability for involvement in the 
development. One of the department's senior production planners 
expressed concerns about this issue, as did a number of the system 
builders. 
I would've preferred the production programming team to have been 
strengthened before the implementation in order to allow some 
slack of experienced staff to liaise with the RIS team over our 
requirements.. Production programming has very few experienced 
staff due to the excessive staff turnover in the department. The 
staff we have are able to do the job adequately but they lack the 
broad depth of knowledge needed to look over the fence and beyond 
the immediate job [3]. 
These problems were exacerbated, as we noted in the previous section, 
by other ongoing organisational initiatives that produced their own 
demands on the time of key refinery personnel. Again, this problem was 
particularly pronounced in the Production Programming Department. As 
one of the system builders noted: 
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One of the problems is that people have been writing a lot of 
procedures and RIS doesn't necessarily come top of the list for 
it. So we have had problems, particularly again with Production 
Department, with staff availability to write the new procedures 
[2]. 
The senior production planner, quoted above, wanted to work with the 
RIS team himself, since he was "very aware that involvement is 
important is identifying possible appropriate solutions." If the 
promised commercial benefits were to be achieved, "the tool must be 
usable" [3]. Staffing pressures meant that instead he was forced to 
accept the involvement of a more junior member of his department with 
the team. Other commitments conspired to ensure that this junior 
planner "was not exactly keen" [3]. The exigencies of his routine 
tasks cast involvement with the RIS team as an unnecessary luxury that 
the department could not really afford. However, for the system 
builders, the secondment of a relatively inexperienced user was seen 
to provide distinct advantages. Other, more senior, production 
planners had previously been involved with the team building the 
system, which was "excellent from the point of view of understanding 
what [the production programming tools] mean" but.. 
we felt we needed a different outlook.. He's less experienced so 
he may well have requirements which [an experienced production 
person] doesn't have. I think it will be very useful having him 
on board.. There are things that, if you're new to the.. job you 
might want: information, assistance, help, which somebody who's 
got a lot of experience doesn't need. He know's it [2]. 
Thus, the exigencies of ongoing "routine" refinery activities 
necessitated the involvement of inexperienced personnel with the 
builders. However, as a result, the system could be better adapted to 
the needs of less experienced personnel who tended to populate a key 
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department with an acute staff turnover problem. A staffing problem 
was translated into a partial technological fix. 
Enrolling Non -Users 
The enrolment of other key staff from a very different part of the 
organisation was also problematic. Whilst not seen to be important 
users of the system, the operators of the plant, particularly in the 
blending areas of "the off -site tank farm ", had an important role to 
play in the provision and maintenance of the data upon which RIS was 
to depend. An interesting tension developed here between the remit of 
the system and the demands of this group of employees whose co- 
operation was essential for a successful implementation. These 
concerns extended beyond the immediate offsites personnel. As another 
of the senior production programmers noted: 
RIS is quite a flexible system but we would have perhaps 
preferred a rather broader scope for the development. The 
problem, as always, is the allocation of funds. For example, 
offsites activities in this refinery involve many man hours of 
operations. RIS would've been a good opportunity to completely 
automate these processes, and perhaps that should've been done. 
But the costs in terms of machinery are probably high whilst 
offsites employees are relatively cheap. When you implement new 
tools for production programming they are less costly since much 
of the information is already there, you're not automating from 
scratch. And the benefits are bigger because we plan the entire 
site's production [4]. 
This point is exemplified from the perspective of one of the offsites 
operators. 
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We were involved in consultation over RIS, but it was clear quite 
early on what we weren't going to get. We had hoped for an 
advanced measurement and control system. Due to the high costs 
involved, this was not forthcoming. It was made plain to us that 
the only data that would be available would be from the existing 
Whessomatic ATG [Automatic Tank Gauging System]. Offsites is very 
much under manual control which is potentially problematic. 
There's scope for a lot of errors and quite a few occur! [5]. 
Prior to the RIS development the blending area on the tank farm had 
been managed through a "fragmented system of operator knowledge, paper 
records, pro -forma sheets and big books" [5]. Whilst about 90% of the 
measurement of tank contents and product movements was automated there 
was little or no automated control of those tanks and the movements 
between them. Each tank was, and is, individually, manually controlled 
[5]. It would seem as if the proposals in the Feasibility Study for 
improvements to the blending area did not reach fruition. 
In the absence of the sort of system they required to support their 
tasks, the system builders had a difficult task enrolling these 
relatively low status, low paid, offsites operators who nevertheless 
had an important role to play in the RIS development. The comments of 
an oil accountant at the refinery illustrate the lowly status accorded 
to "off- site" personnel by those in the core of the refinery. Although 
seeing the advantages of providing access to the COMA system (the 
Computerised Oil Management Accounting system that was to interface 
with RIS) to those working at the rail head on the dispatch of 
products by train, he did not envisage this access as being direct. 
I'd like to see a side package for the boys at the 
rail head 
which mirrors COMA. You couldn't give them access 
to COMA 
directly, it would be too dangerous, they'd wreck it! [6]. 
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The proposed Movements Monitoring System RIS Application required 
offsites personnel to manually record valve statuses [5]. According to 
one of the offsites operators: 
One of the pre- conditions for RIS was that it shouldn't increase 
operator workload. As a sweetener offsites will be provided with 
reports associated with the start and end of movements 
information. This should increase reliability as these reports 
are currently done manually by the operators [5]. 
The system builders were obviously aware of these issues, but render 
them in rather different ways. The problem was seen to be one of 
perception and the seconded "user" from the tank farm was expected to 
act as a Trojan horse, re- engineering his colleagues resistance or 
apathy towards the system into support for "their" new "tool ". 
We've got a chap from our tank area in as well who's looking at 
[the Movements Monitoring System] from the user point of view and 
he's starting to build up the maps and so on. And once he's done 
some work on those lines he will get the operators involved and 
try to build up some enthusiasm. I think that's going to be the 
key part there, getting the operators interested, convincing them 
that it really is useful to them.. One of the functions of the 
system is to capture in the database everything that happens in 
the tank farm area, so.. they need to use the system. We're 
designing it so that they don't have to put in a lot of manual 
data, but they do have to confirm that things are happening, they 
have to accept warnings. [Interviewer: So they are still involved 
in populating that database ?] That's right, although that 
shouldn't be obvious to them. They should perceive it as a tool, 
purely to help them [7]. 
Thus we can see how a tension developed between RIS's objectives: to 
support oil management activities; to meet the users' "needs "; and to 
deliver a commercial advantage. RIS could not after all extend its 
purview to encompass automation of antiquated elements of the refinery 
system in order to facilitate more remote and immediate oil management 
operations. The labour to be replaced by such a move was too cheap to 
warrant it. Automation was not seen to be commercially viable. This, 
277 
as we noted, created particular problems for the system builders in 
their attempts to portray themselves as the partners of the refinery 
users, seeking to create a system servant to satisfy their future 
needs. Indeed it reveals the extent to which a particular form of JAD 
was seen to be the only "realistic development approach" for 
Grangemouth RI S . 
Users had to be enrolled but not necessarily satisfied. User 
satisfaction was secondary to the overall aim of the delivery of a 
commercial advantage through a colonisation of the future, and was 
certainly a minor consideration in terms of shorter term cost 
considerations. Commercial advantage and user acceptance could be 
gained by giving users "what they wanted ", but this was not 
necessarily the only route to such an end. Rather, users had to be 
enrolled, or configured [8], to ensure the success of the system, and 
that success was to be measured in terms of its implications for the 
refinery's bottom line, the value it could add. Users were, as we 
noted earlier, not "expert" enough to know what they wanted. What they 
"really" wanted, as the system builders "knew" only too well, was a 
relatively cheap technological fix to ensure the future generation of 
"value ". As we saw in the previous section systems staff saw a "need 
to adjust human resources to technical capabilities" and indeed, to 
the demands of a commercially successful future [9]. 
This orientation is most pronounced in the comments of one of the 
system builders who indicted the inadequacies of the reporting 
approach adopted at Alliance refinery in the U.S.A. where 
a simple 
database was produced that.. 
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..used the power of Mac [Apple Macintosh] to allow people to do 
things like trending data, extracting data into spreadsheets, and 
they're the things we've done with user -defined reporting 
screens.. Now I think that's a little bit dangerous [7]. 
They saw the weakness of [an overstructured approach at 
Rotterdam] and they wanted to provide something which was what 
the users wanted. And I think it shows the dangers of going too 
far in that direction. You know, what they ended up with [was] 
they implemented a nice, neat, tidy, simple data capture system 
using Setcon as a process database and they brought the data from 
Setcon into the RIS database at hourly intervals. So they took a 
lot of the loading off the machine by reducing the frequency of 
the data capture. And they've got a nice reliable data capture 
system because they've implemented all that, but because they 
channelled their efforts into making it nice and friendly for the 
users to use process data, they haven't really thought about what 
other kinds of data they want. They haven't thought about 
business need. At the end of the day, all they've got is data and 
a way to look at it [7]. 
You can't afford to go to either extreme, and I think we've got 
the right balance here (laughter). [But] when you show it [the 
Grangemouth RIS reporting system] for the first time to users 
they don't open their mouths in awe, like you know, they do with 
the Apple Mac. The user response to the Apple Mac was incredible. 
It's seldom I've seen a demonstration of something to users where 
they've all sort of grasped it straight away, and said "Oh, we 
want this!" you know, "This is fabulous!" [7]. 
Users may have thought the system was "fabulous ", and they may have 
"wanted" it, but it did not constitute a satisfaction of user needs. 
User "needs" were defined by their positioning in the overall refinery 
production network and the roles ascribed to them by the demands of a 
commercially oriented future. And only the business and systems 
analysts who made up the system design team had the appropriate 
expertise to arbitrate on what those needs were and how, in the final 
analysis, they were to be satisfied. 
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The Nature and Quality of RIS's Data, Information and Users 
As one of the systems staff at Grangemouth noted: 
The bottleneck is likely to be organisational or quality [of] 
data rather than the structure or availability of information 
[9]. 
In this section we consider users concerns surrounding issues of the 
quality of data and the structure and availability of information. 
Explicit attempts to remove organisational "barriers" are briefly 
considered in the epilogue to our account. 
A number of the RIS system's actual and potential users raised the 
issue of the quality of the data on which RIS was to depend. RIS was 
seen as a response to both the inadequate commercial use of already 
available data and the adequacy of the data that was available for 
translation for such purposes. The latter concern was simultaneously 
seen to be both more fundamental and something of a secondary issue. 
For example, one of the senior production programmers noted that some 
of the tank dipping equipment, that provided information on tank 
contents, had been producing "bad" readings which could potentially 
cause problems [3]. According to a member of the refinery's 
Reliability and Loss Control Group: 
The RIS system is only as good as the ATG [Automatic Tank Gauging 
System] on which it is based. There are 130 ATG's on the 
refinery 
and maintenance of them is virtually a full time job for at least 
one engineer. At present we have customs approval [as 
providers 
of information for the allocation of duty] for about 
100. 13 are 
not in service and we are attempting to gain approval 
for 17 of 
them. Nothing measured on them is acceptable for customs 
[10]. 
Moreover, 10% of tank readings were manually produced 
and these 
readings were seen to be particularly dubious. 
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Systematised automated dipping is more reliable than manual. Dips 
that are different will not be different purely as a result of 
operators' different dipping techniques [10]. 
Whilst it was pointed out that "this had always been the case" [3] 
production programmers felt that RIS had increased visibility and 
hence awareness of the problem. It was seen to be essential that all 
the data picked up by RIS could be relied upon with a high degree of 
certainty. 
Otherwise people will lose faith in the system. I cannot 
overemphasise the importance of confidence in the data provided 
[3] 
I foresee the major issues being ensuring the reliability and 
validity of the system [11]. 
Another user who was involved in Oil Accounting at the refinery 
pointed out this general problem with the data and information 
generated on the site. Although "ideally" he wanted "RIS to automate 
everything" the reliability and validity of the information provided 
on site served to make this impossible. 
The complexity of the site makes the checking of the 
reasonableness of information by Oil Accountants very difficult. 
We have no idea whether the information with which we 
are 
provided is accurate [6]. 
The maintenance issues, briefly raised above, were seen 
to have 
important wider causes and implications. As we noted in 
an earlier 
section considering the importance of Benefits Management 
procedures 
at the refinery... 
Because of the background, refineries have 
been asked to act in 
by and large a reactive mode. And that 
basically means that 
maintenance always wins over development [7]. 
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But priorities within the maintenance schedule were also seen to be 
important for maintaining the reliability of RIS information. 
We have had to fight fairly hard to get sufficient manpower to 
maintain the system. Work is done on a priority system on other 
parts of the site. These [RIS information] priorities are not as 
high for fitters who don't require the information the system 
provides and more particularly for their managers who set the 
priorities. It's easier to see a plant component broken rather 
than to notice information providing equipment that isn't 
working.. Maintenance managers need education and time to see the 
benefits of the system. Possibly, in the future, we should move 
towards more technically oriented people working on maintaining 
the equipment and that might also allow some savings in the 
number of employees we require. But it's difficult for our 
present fitters to see that more information is pretty much 
always better [10]. 
Confidence in RIS's information was also seen to effect usability. 
Again a compromise had to be made. 
The tool must be usable and it maybe that we have to sacrifice 
some accuracy for expediency, i.e. ease of use. Although 
hopefully this won't be the case [3]. 
As we noted in the previous chapter choices over what data should be 
captured and at what level of resolution they should be recorded 
reflected wider concerns of the overall purpose of RIS, the 
limitations of the "technology ", the usability of the "technology ", 
and the usefulness of the information it provided. 
There was a compromise made as to the number of operational data 
collection points out of that mass of ironwork out there on the 
refinery that would be collated for production planning 
purposes [9]. 
Thus the structuring of information was also effected by concerns 
about the quality of the data upon which RIS depended. RIS's recursive 
use of information in a number of different applications placed 
the 
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technical "quality" of the system and its usability in a competition 
for attention throughout the development. There was a huge potential 
for the magnification of small errors as information was aggregrated 
through a variety of seriated application programmes. 
User Views on the Structure and Presentation of RIS Information 
Information, as opposed to data, was deemed to be that which was 
imbued with usefulness through processing with reference to technical, 
business, and ideally commercial objectives. Issues surrounding RIS 
information thus pertain to the manipulation and aggregration of data 
and the modes of presentation of the results of such activities. 
For the production programmers the information provided by the RIS 
system was generally "what was required" [12]. There was agreement in 
the department that RIS represented a major step forward from the 
previous system support that was available [13]. 
The system gives you the information you use [14]. 
Our systems used to be like an old clapped out mini. RIS is like 
a Golf GTi in comparison. The expenditure needed to produce a 
Rolls Royce is just not justifiable. On the whole, we're happy 
with the Golf [13]. 
Users were not, however, uncritical of the facilities provided 
and 
indeed, as we noted above, of the information those 
facilities were 
intended to manipulate. 
Costing in this place is a cock up and needs 
a damn good shake 
up [13]. 
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Other concerns cut across the largely metaphorical divisions between 
system, information and data. Problems were noted but not attributed 
to any particular locus. Indeed as the quote below suggests, errors 
multiplied across these three regions and were often inseparable. Work 
was required on the part of the users to undo the damaging results of 
these cumulative perturbances of refining "reality ". 
You need to take a big pinch of salt with the [LP] models [of the 
refinery and the various pieces of plant that make up the whole 
system]. It takes a lot of effort sometimes to make sure that the 
various management reports bear at least some relation to each 
other [14]. 
Certain functions available on the system were considered to be "next 
to useless" [13]. For example the information on the qualities of 
refining components and products only identified whether the substance 
was on or off specification. Users were given no indication of how 
much over spec. the product may be [12,13]. Such a deficiency is 
particularly glaring when viewed in relation to the commercial 
orientation RIS was intended to engender. 
If it's too good a mix we could be losing profit [13]. 
In the words of a member of the Head Office supply team: 
The main thing is to know what the current qualities are 
so that 
we can communicate them to the traders and they can then 
make the 
best use of them. I mean if we don't have access 
to the quality 
then we have to say to the traders that this is our 
normal but we 
can only guarantee a fairly low level of quality. 
So it's higher 
than we would've hoped to sell for the price 
we can ask for the 
worst 10%, or whatever. If we can get access 
to actual qualities 
then we can get a better guarantee and therefore 
maximise the 
profitability, the sale value [15]. 
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Other concerns were raised about the data on product quality that was 
produced by the laboratory based RIS subsystem. Users had to "hunt" 
[13] for reports, there was no indication given on the system that 
updated qualities were available [12]. A delay was introduced in the 
availability of this information since "all the tests are done before 
the results are produced" [12]. Similarly, production programmers were 
not entirely satisfied with the wider reporting facilities provide. 
Retrieving things did not seem "natural" and finding things was 
"troublesome" [16]. 
I'd like some highlighting when I log in, you know, for exception 
reports. I know these facilities won't help in spotting trends 
but I don't want to have to check everything every time I use the 
system [13]. 
Similar concerns were raised about the adequacy of the trending 
facilities provided in the database reporting package. Again, a 
diversity of views is apparent. For some users trending was not 
something they expected to find "useful" although when the facilities 
were provided uses were found for them [14]. Other users who were 
initially keener on the provision of trending facilities pointed to 
inadequacies in the nature of those facilities [16]. For example, one 
of the senior process engineers in the refinery noted that.. 
RIS trending has to be against time and that's not always 
the 
resource required for process engineering. A process engineer 
often needs to compare two different data sources and examine 
the 
trends in their co- variation [emphasis in original] [17]. 
Others noted inadequacies that pertained to the presentation 
of 
information through the trending system, rather 
than to the 
functionality of that system [16], although these 
differences are 
probably more usefully considered as a matter of 
degree. One of the 
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Head Office Supply Department users indicted the presentation of 
database reports on a number of counts and recalls a conversation with 
one of the system builders concerning these problems. 
We talked about the layout of the reports, how appalling they 
looked. In 1991 we should be able to present a better style of 
screen than some boring set of green numbers on a black 
background. I mean you want some graphics, or something flashing, 
something which brings your attention to something, to the most 
critical area. A bit more imaginative than what they are now.. It 
should be user encouraging and friendly and enticing. I mean I 
think the way the trending system presents its graphs is very 
poor. Have you seen them? You get no y axis, and if you've got 
four graphs in one you have to look down the bottom at this 
minute print which tells you that they're all on a different 
basis. So even if you've got four straight lines running along 
together you can't read those.. as telling you.. that they're all 
at the same level because they're different scales. It's terribly 
confusing. I mean you can manually alter it but it takes you a 
further five minutes to reconfigure it, to read on the scale you 
want it to read. I mean once you've seen it and you logoff and 
you come back in the next day you've got to re -set that up. 
You've got to change it from auto to manual, you've got to change 
the minimum and maximum, and even then.. it won't write on the 
side of the y axis what it is. I think it's just that the graphs 
are so badly presented and but they've got a bit of 
colour on them I suppose [15]. 
These issues again lead us back to consideration of the relationship 
between the system builders and the users of the system. Providing 
"what the users want" was by no means unproblematic. 
Configuring the Users' Requirements 
There was a fundamental uncertainty within the refinery 
and the wider 
BP group concerning what the users' requirements 
were, and how they 
should be satisfied. We examined the views 
of the system builders on 
this issue in the preceding chapter. Overall, 
there was no more 
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consistency between the users' views than there was between the 
formers'. A member of the lab with responsibility for the development 
of RIS's laboratory subsystem summed up the general problem as he saw 
it: 
There's a huge potential for communication problems between 
application development and the lab staff. The lab can't say what 
they want in terms of IT support and IT can't explain the use of 
their services to laboratory staff [18]. 
Some users did not see the responsibility for the provision of 
appropriate usable information as lying with them. For example, a 
member of the Reliability and Loss Control Group had this to say on 
the matter: 
All the information is in RIS, it just needs to be all pulled 
together. I see that as the responsibility of the programmers in 
the RIS team: to increase the usefulness of the information by 
actually calculating the specific information that Measurement 
and Loss Control requires. We don't have sufficient computing 
expertise and time constraints on us mean we can't do it 
ourselves. After, it's not the job of the Measurement and Loss 
Control Department to write programs [10]. 
There is a stark contrast here with the comments provided by the 
system builders. Whilst the majority of them agreed that they were the 
only ones with sufficient computer expertise to write programs, they 
saw the block on the successful achievement of this objective to be 
the users' inability to know what they wanted. This did provide them 
with opportunities to use their experience to colonise the definition 
and provision of future business requirements and hence future 
users, 
but big gaps were pointed to between users' "levels of 
imagination and 
realisation of the potential of the system" [19]. Other 
users had very 
different views. Those who were computer literate, 
particularly those 
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in process engineering, seemed to resent attempts to closely pre -empt 
their specific information needs with the system. They wanted access 
to RIS information on their own terms and were particularly unhappy 
about the prospect of having to go through an application support 
department to get it. 
We were offered the ability to transfer data direct from RIS to 
Lotus for analysis. I say offered, but staff from this department 
were pushing hard for such facilities.. Although we're not all 
programmers in the technical department the majority of us are 
basically computer literate and therefore sophisticated users by 
the standards of this place. We see this sort of access as the 
only sensible route.. What we're aiming for is a parameterised 
download of RIS information via an on- screen menu. Ideally we 
want to maximise use by the user with the minimum involvement of 
user support.. There shouldn't be any need for us to seek 
application support. It basically just slows us down and we're 
capable of the majority of the tasks required. Our only real 
problems come if we actually need to change the SQL source 
code [17]. 
The Lotus download function was seen to have been "configured to be as 
flexible as possible" but users in the technical department were keen 
to see moves underway to "make it even more so" [17]. Here we see 
another group of users who certainly don't want to be told what they 
want. 
We can see here again how claims to expertise facilitated power 
and 
enabled the definition of current and future user requirements, 
their 
satisfaction, and hence through reflection in the "mirror" 
of 
representation, the pre- definition of future users. In 
the following 
section we examine the orientation of the 
application support 
department and users' views on the training provided 
to facilitate a 
smooth integration of RIS usage into refinery activities. 
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Training and Application Support 
Views on the adequacy of the training provided for effective RIS 
utilisation varied both between individual users and over time. As we 
noted in the previous chapter, the system builders described their 
later attempts at training provision as having gone "really well" [7]. 
This stands in stark contrast to the comments provided by users on the 
training made available to them when a limited set of RIS information 
first became available. One senior member of the production 
programming department described the initial training simply as 
"Crap!" [13]. As a result the system was not, at first, utilised by 
staff in production programming. These concerns reflected and extended 
opinions on the nature of the system's provisions and its ability to 
satisfy users' needs. The system's lack of ease of use increased the 
perceived need for training on appropriate and effective usage 
patterns. Organisational issues again exacerbated the problem. Users 
had little time to "play" with the system to try to ameliorate for the 
inadequacies of the training provision by discovering the system's 
capabilities and behaviour for themselves. 
But that's what you'd expect. This isn't a professional company. 
This is Mickey Mouse Oil! [13]. 
The perceived inadequacy of training, coupled with the desire 
to 
restrict direct access to novel RIS information to a few 
key users, 
led to a heightened importance for application 
support in the 
achievement of a successful implementation. Political 
battles over the 
importance of RIS type projects had not gone 
away, and senior refinery 
staff were acutely aware that RIS at Grangemouth 
had to prove itself. 
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The system must, in the final analysis, be used.. I have no doubt that the RIS system will do all the things it should, although I do still have some doubts particularly with regard to whether or not the potential benefits are realised in practice, and more 
particularly, that they are seen to be realised [11]. 
At the end of phase 2 of the RIS development, in June /July 1991, 
ownership of the LP models utilised in RIS passed to the Production 
Programming Department whilst responsibility for the wider computing 
side of the system passed to the Computer Services Committee [4]. As 
we noted earlier, four members of the CSC had worked as part of the 
RIS team during the earlier stages of building the system [2,20]. 
The CSC team responsible for RIS provided and fulfilled a number of 
services and roles within the refinery. They solved users' problems 
regarding access to RIS data (often the problem was that the data was 
not yet on RIS); they sorted out users' difficulties with using RIS's 
interface screens; they maintained and provided software that allowed 
the downloading of RIS data for Lotus analysis; and they carried out 
general use monitoring and checking of data integrity [20]. 
The CSC support team can be seen to take a median view towards RIS and 
the satisfaction of user needs between those of the system builders 
and those of the actual users. They were keen on facilitating 
relatively free and open access to RIS information for more expert 
users, but were also cognizant of the "dangers" of such an approach. 
These dangers were not however seen to be as significant as some of 
the system builders had suggested. 
Even if the process engineers do manage to create a query that 
would seriously effect other users, it would only be for a very 
short duration. It is very unlikely that the mis- entering of 
download parameters would cause a serious problem. They are more 
likely just to get rubbish or get logged off [20]. 
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Even less experienced users could be granted such access for a one off 
enquiry, although such access would itself only be provided as a "one 
off ". The favoured approach of the CSC was to maintain some control 
and knowledge of usage by providing user departments with a.. 
wide ranging generalised report. Individual department members 
will then be able to pick and choose from this data set to meet 
their particular needs [20]. 
Requirements for such facilities were expected to increase as more 
data became available on the system. At the time of interviewing, data 
available tended to be restricted to a specialised focus on either 
tank or lab data. As we noted in the previous chapter, although 
downloads from multiple files were theoretically possible, such access 
was not, in the spring of 1991, practically attainable without 
recourse to application support [21]. 
The CSC instituted a "Help Desk" to act as a filter between users and 
the "CSC proper" [20]. Telephonists logged users' queries about the 
system onto a computerised list that the CSC then worked through, 
providing answers and solutions to users when and where this was 
"possible" [20]. The CSC "advised" users and user departments on 
whether or not their request necessitated the introduction of re- 
usable access facilities or could be met by a one off report provided 
by CSC programming staff. User departments were charged for the 
provision of such services, as we noted in the previous chapter. 
The CSC's role of user helper shared certain characteristics with the 
"nanny" state and this orientation is in line with the wider view of 
users held by systems staff at the refinery. For example, the CSC 
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could and would reject requests from users for a re- usable interface 
if they thought it more advisable and cost effective to seek wider 
support for such usage and introduce the sort of access require as 
part of a more generally available, standard reporting route [20]. 
In all instances maintaining the integrity of the system was seen by 
by the CSC to be their core responsibility. For example "bugs" on the 
system discovered by the users were attended to "A.S.A.P. ". The CSC 
was, after all, a Computer Support Committee, not a user support 
function. 
This final point heightens an interesting difference in the relative 
power associated with the two groups of organisational participants 
who had more or less direct dealings with the RIS system: the users 
and the computing specialists who built and maintained the system. 
Whilst the latter group had a relatively wide knowledge of the system 
and could claim far reaching expertise, the former tended to only have 
experience of, and hence authority to speak about, an isolated portion 
of the overall system. As a member of the Reliability and Loss Control 
Department put it: 
Everybody tends to use a small part of the system and I suppose 
that potentially that's a bad thing. It can lead to blinkering on 
the part of the users. There's a very clear distinction between 
the users and the system analysts. The system analysts write the 
systems and they grow like great monoliths with no one person 
using more than a very selective part of the system [10]. 
Thus again we see the emergence of the problem of competing local and 
wider concerns. In the last section in this chapter we go on to 
examine how the users invoked their own conceptions of the wider 
refinery production system in an attempt to contextualise and hence 
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control their relations with the emerging "monolithic" RIS system 
which sought to enrol them. 
Precedent, Practice and Practicalities 
Users at Grangemouth had managed oil production at the refinery for 
many years prior to the introduction of the RIS system. They had used 
various sources of information and expertise, and had, by all 
accounts, been relatively successful in their endeavours. The 
refinery's geographical location and its links to the Forties pipeline 
made it a strategically important site in the UK and this must have 
contributed to the decision in the eighties to keep Grangemouth as the 
only major BP refinery in the UK. However, one would imagine that its 
past and future value added performance must have been seen to be at 
least satisfactory for such a decision to be taken. 
Users at the refinery, particularly those users in the production 
programming department, could lay claim to expertise in the oil 
management of the site. And this expertise was not predicated on the 
existence of the RIS system but on other prior techniques of 
production management and control. This provided prospective users 
with a potent resource upon which to draw in the struggle to establish 
new roles and understandings of their activities in the face of the 
emerging RIS system. 
We noted earlier that the general orientation of the system builders 
in their provision of user services was to.. 
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give people as much information as they need to do their job, 
without trying to do the job for them [2]. 
RIS was seen to be an information system, not an automation of 
refinery processes, and in such circumstances precedentially 
sanctioned understandings and methods of working could conspire to 
circumvent the use of RIS, at least to a certain extent. RIS data and 
information was recognised as being partially remote from refining 
"reality ", as it was defined by Grangemouth staff, and human 
involvement [14] was deemed to be essential for the prevention of 
reification of the system's somewhat dubious representations. Acting 
blinkeredly on the recommendations of reified computer based models of 
reality was seen to be potentially disastrous and contextualised user 
expertise provided some defence against these dangers. The age of the 
site and its somewhat ad hoc construction made these dangers all the 
more real. 
I think the perception is that at a certain level of detail 
process plants like this are a bit like weather systems. There is 
a degree of unpredictability built into them and to retain 
responsibility for that continuous operation you probably need to 
put some human being in charge of it. Somebody who, if you like, 
can put up the umbrella when it's actually raining rather than 
when the weather forecast says it should be [22]. 
Staff in the production programming department still had "a lot of 
faith in paper systems" since they were "often simpler and quicker to 
use" [13]. Largely informal, personal contacts, with operators, lab 
staff and Head Office personnel were seen to be the route through 
which novel problems and queries would be solved and answered. 
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When you just want a small piece of information it's quicker to 
telephone the lab rather than exit the system you're using, enter 
RIS, get the information, exit RIS, and go back into your 
original system [23] 
Most of the information to do the job comes from personal contact 
with the blenders.. I frequently check with the blenders to try 
and trace the cause of problems I've noticed on the system, such 
as why a particular product has been downgraded [14]. 
Given this characterisation of production programming it is easy to 
see how the e-mail system whose introduction was contemporaneous with 
RIS's was seen to be the most important change in computer support for 
production programming activities. Users seemed to be keener on 
exploiting the opportunities provided by computer mediated 
communication than on the use of computer produced information. 
The e -mail system has provided some really big benefits. That's 
definitely the change that's helped the most [13]. 
I use e -mail all the time [24]. 
Moreover, the refinery's attempts to gain BS5750 Quality Assurance 
accreditation [25] meant that e -mail gained some precedence over 
previously widely used telephone contacts. BS5750 accreditation 
necessitated some formalisation of these previously "informal" 
contacts. 
If we note problems with a unit's performance we 'phone the unit 
supervisor to find out what's wrong with it and then inform the 
blenders.. When BS5750 comes in we'll have to contact them via e- 
mail as well so that the contact is documented [26]. 
Other changes in working practices predicated upon the introduction of 
enhanced computerised support were seen to be less welcome. Previously 
developed successful applications of simple computer tools were 
partially displaced by RIS and concerns were raised about the 
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consequences of such actions. One of the refinery's Oil Accountants 
who was a regular user of the COMA (Computerised Oil Management 
Accounting) system was particularly peeved by changes made to this 
tool in order to facilitate its integration with RIS. His concerns 
were not restricted to the RIS system. RIS was merely the latest of a 
long line of disturbances to his working that provided him with few 
tangible benefits. 
The COMA system is perfectly OK for my needs. The only problem is 
that every time a new system is introduced COMA has to be changed 
even if it's running perfectly well. They never change the new 
system to suit the old [6]. 
For users in the production programming department RIS was seen by 
some to be too much of a move towards automation. Existing practices 
interacted here with notions of the importance of contextualised 
expertise and knowledge. Prior to the introduction of RIS, production 
plans and schedules had been constructed by production programming 
staff on Lotus spreadsheets, using information from the Sciconic LP 
models. As we noted in the previous chapter, there was a relatively 
high level of expertise in the use of spreadsheets at Grangemouth 
refinery [27]. Rather than being seen as a tedious re- keying of 
information and a waste of time, processing of information and plans 
using spreadsheets was seen to have distinct advantages. Not least of 
which was a human "check" on the reasonableness of the plans produced. 
The spreadsheet is very good at identifying where differences 
have occurred. All differences require explanation - if the 
spreadsheet can't explain it we have to investigate further [28]. 
LP plans derived from the system needed "tidying up" [23] and they 
were tidied up using a Lotus spreadsheet. 
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We use spreadsheets to make up the blending requirements. We take 
the original qualities in the tanks, what we want to end up with, 
and then mess about with the components on the spreadsheet until 
we get what's required. That's then printed out and goes down as 
instructions to the blenders [23]. 
Analysis and checking of plans and reports using Lotus was seen to be 
particularly important for "vetting" purposes [13]. Use of 
spreadsheets made information and plans "checkable" [13] and this was 
seen to be "the most important function of spreadsheet analysis" [13]. 
Attempts to increase the automation in the production of plans and 
schedules were seen to be inappropriate by production programmers as 
it required "contextual knowledge not held on the information systems" 
[23]. Indeed, complaints were made about RIS's inability to 
accommodate and reconcile free style commentaries providing 
explanations of deviations from the routine operation of plans and 
pieces of plant with RIS information on the "technical" status of 
14 
those plans and pieces of plant. Again we see users wanting a 
computer based storage and communication system rather than a 
"technical" information system. 
It is worth noting however, before concluding consideration of the 
users' views on RIS, that some of them had very different demands. 
Staff at BPOUK's Head Office wanted certain plans about future 
refinery production produced and distributed by the RIS system. Their 
positioning in the refinery production network meant that this was the 
sort of information they required. They wanted to treat the refinery 
as something of a modularised "black box ". Given inputs, they wanted 
to know outputs and vice versa. Only with such certain and 
deterministic information could they provide the traders with 
opportunities to generate value. 
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Grangemouth produces their production plans with MIMI for the 
next week to two weeks, at the most. And we [want the system 
designers to] somehow get an interface that takes the production 
rates out of MIMI into RIS and extrapolates forward, quantity and 
quality. I mean we're working to this plan and we believe this 
plan is right and it's the correct model. It's the best data we 
have on the future. We shouldn't be allowing people to say, "No, 
I don't think it's quite like that, if I were you I'd allow for 
this ". In this day and age we shouldn't be doing that. Those 
things should already be accounted for and embodied in the model. 
If it isn't, if somebody does now and again say, "Look! ", which 
they're going to do, then the model should be improved [15]. 
The Head Office users relative distance from the practicalities of 
refining on an imperfect site are made clear. Traders needed to 
believe in the certainty of the information they were provided with 
internally in order to be able to manage and make money out of the 
external uncertainty with which they were confronted. Refinery 
production programming staff were no more able to provide a definitive 
plan with the system than traders were able to provide a definitive 
figure for the oil price in two weeks time. Users recognised the 
importance of their expertise to do their job but the tasks of others 
were seen to be relatively programmatic and routinised. We also see in 
the above quote the re- raising of the initial objective that was seen 
to lie behind the introduction of the first RIS system at Rotterdam. 
Thus we see continued contingency in the development of RIS, right up 
to and including the production of specific user applications. RIS had 
to enrol the site and its users and it had to become embedded in 
current practices. As a result the users, the system, the site and 
itS techniques and practices mutually shaped each other through the 
logics of re(- )presentation. In the discussion chapter that follows we 
consider RIS's relations and effects in terms of the two theoretical 
chapters that preceded our empirical material. This section enables us 
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to examine in more detail the links between the RIS development and 
the emerging "New Commercial Agenda" [29] discussed in the 
introductory chapters. In the epilogue to this thesis we then examine 
how RIS had to enrol with explicit introductions of this new agenda, 
the "BS5750 Part 2 Accreditation" and "Project 1990" which sought to 
inculcate a new, dynamic culture throughout the BP Group. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The second and third chapters of this thesis sought to fulfil a number 
of objectives. Firstly, they were intended to sensitise the reader to 
the concerns of the research and the approach adopted to meet those 
concerns. Secondly, they sought to open up space in which the 
empirical material could be presented. The confusion that may be seen 
to characterise the development and instantiation of RIS is made more 
acceptable and understandable by the prior presentation of this 
theoretical grounding. The theoretical chapters also considered the 
dangers of the approach adopted, providing further justification for 
the mode of empirics employed, a mode which sought to ameliorate these 
dangers. We were concerned not to impose a pre -established grid of 
analyses upon the accounts provided by organisational participants. 
Rather, we sought to let them tell the story, in their own terms. 
In this discussion section we seek to translate the terms of 
organisational participants into the terms of associology, discourse 
and re(- )presentation, in order to offer some judgements on the 
processes involved in the emergence of RIS and their outcomes. 
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Labelling the Enunciator 
Chapter four considers the emergence of the concept and first concrete 
instantiations of RIS within the BP Group. We saw how prior production 
relations and their representations were disrupted through their own 
"gigantic" extension and application. Rationalities of hierarchical 
and lateral integration, associated with an older commercial agenda, 
led to a refinery building programme that sought to meet an expected 
continued increase in demand for refined products. However, 
recalcitrant political reality in the Middle East disrupted and 
betrayed these predictions. And this recalcitrance and the "problems" 
it engendered may be seen to be at least partially associated with the 
prior activities of Western Governments and Oil Companies in the 
region. 
Rationalities, such as the "marginal economics" of refinery 
operations, were applied to partially "solve" the problem through the 
creation of intermediary markets for refined products. Within BP a 
corporate restructuring introduced /reinforced new representations of 
activities, and the links between them, that sought to accommodate 
these emergent markets. Slicing the organisation up in new ways 
"revealed" the poor performance of refining and marketing in the newly 
created BP Oil and entities that had been seen to be necessary 
extensions of the organisation's network became rendered as "surplus 
capacity ". Having revealed a number of its refineries as surplus, the 
organisation sought to remove the excess. For those refineries that 
remained this further increased the complexity of operations, 
establishing dynamic relationships with sellers, buyers and exchange 
partners, both within and outside the group. We can glimpse here the 
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emergence of a new "Moral Order of Representation" (Woolgar, 1991), 
throwing into relief new conceptions of the boundaries of the BP 
organisation and the entities that constitute it (Hines, 1988). The 
emerging new agenda of the wider commercial world may be seen to be 
deeply implicated in these changes, as both a condition and 
consequence of this representational transformation. 
Managerial complexities were particularly pronounced at Rotterdam 
refinery and exacerbated by a newly problematical geographical 
separation between supply co- ordination and production. Within the 
group these emergent complexities were counterfactually (Scarry, 1985) 
re- presented. Rather than being seen as a sign of (partially self 
induced) uncertainty, previously a "bad" (Beck, 1992a; 1992b), the 
unpredictability of the new production relations was rendered as the 
dynamism of the "new commercial scene" which presented significant 
"market opportunities ". The Supply Information System (SIS) [1] was 
the first pass solution to the "teething" problems associated with 
trading in the new conditions that would allow the exploitation of 
these "opportunities ". The system made information on refinery stocks 
available to "decision- makers" remote from the refinery, facilitating 
direct remote control. As such, the system may be seen to be something 
of a hangover from the era of total integration and centralised 
control. In the emergent circumstances, increasing the informational 
resources available to remote decision makers served merely to 
accelerate the deterioration of co- ordinated supply. It did however, 
reveal the "need" for a more radical intervention in refinery 
management. At Rotterdam management of operations was seen to be 
reaching "crisis point ". 
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Rotterdam's "problems" were to be solved by the intervention of a 
corporate "SWAT" team, the Manufacturing and Supply Business 
Development Unit (BDU). Problematization [2] of oil management at 
Rotterdam was rendered in a manner that established the BDU as an 
obligatory passage point. We may label the BDU the "enunciator" or 
"prince" of RIS (Latour, 1988; 1991). The "cult of information" 
(Roszak, 1986) and the "congenitally failing" (Miller and O'Leary, 
1993) nature of managerial practices, conspired to ensure that 
problems caused by the prior diffusion of IT would be (dis)solved 
through the application of a more sophisticated IT based solution. In 
1985 they started to enunciate a statement, and that statement was RIS 
at Rotterdam. The first systems intervention at Rotterdam had 
successfully mobilized representations of the refinery but refinery 
management had been poorly enrolled in the system. The system betrayed 
the refinery and its managers and therefore the starting point for a 
new systems solution had to be the refinery itself. The BDU 
recommended the creation of an integrated oil management system that 
sought to fulfil part of the perceived need for a new form of wide, 
coherent, corporate production plan. The organisational magic wand of 
systems (Willmott, personal communication) had to meet the 
contradictions at the heart of the new commercial agenda head on: 
centrifugal pressures for devolution coupled with centripetal 
pressures to retain control over newly autonomis&d services (Power, 
forthcoming). Hence the emergence of a network of refinery based 
information systems, ideally with a common core. 
305 
Interessement and Enrolment Surrounding Rotterdam RIS 
Interessement during the early stages of the first RIS implementation 
seems to have been relatively straightforward, although it must be 
said that the researcher has little direct evidence of how this 
occurred. Time and distance may have together enabled the black -boxing 
of the processes involved. The BDU was seen to represent the 
"strategic" objectives of the corporate centre of BP. It mobilized 
notions of competitiveness, technological dynamism and increased 
potential for profitable trading. And, perhaps most importantly, it 
was offering managers at Rotterdam a "tool" to help them to manage 
their refinery, potentially giving them access to all the rather sexy 
notions associated with the system. The creation of intermediate 
markets, the programme of refinery shutdowns and the emergence of 
immediate electronic trading, had already served to break many of the 
links of the refinery's prior network of relations, an essential pre- 
requisite of a successful interessement. And the BDU's proposed 
solution offered to re- integrate the expertise of refinery managers, 
nearer to the operational coal -face. 
The BDU re- presented the interests of the group, the refinery, and 
refinery managers, as being served by the emergent RIS system. Key 
entities were (successfully) enrolled and RIS at Rotterdam was 
realised. The brevity of consideration of the emergence of Rotterdam 
RIS is not intended to suggest that its production was in some sense 
less contingent or more easily achieved than subsequent instantiations 
- the system cost over $20 million to produce. Rather, more detail is 
available on the Bulwer and Grangemouth implementations, and thus it 
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is upon those versions of the system, particularly the latter, that we 
focus. 
The application of calculative rituals to the first RIS development 
demonstrated the commercial advantage provided by the system, and 
despite the "somewhat suspect" motivations behind this first 
implementation, a number of key corporate entities became convinced 
that RIS, both as an idea and as a realised system, offered an 
advantage that was not organisationally specific. RIS, as a charcoal 
grey, if not an entirely black -box, was decontextualised from the 
relations of its production and made mobile. The concept of RIS was 
seen to be entirely mobile, as was approximately 50% of its systemic 
physical instantiation at Rotterdam. 
Mobilizing RIS at Rotterdam: Stabilising OMS at Bulwer Island 
The "context" of RIS's second instantiation was seen to be very 
different from that where the original "text" was produced (see 
Latour, 1991). A great deal of work had to be done on both the text 
and context (and their re- presentations) in order to enable the 
creation of the Bulwer Island OMS. The new commercial agenda's desire 
for the maintenance of a translated form of central control over 
autonomised units, coupled with rationalities offering economies of 
scale, had already conspired to hold out the dream of a centrally 
supportable common system core. But the difference of the Bulwer 
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situation and the spirit of technological confidence and dynamism 
pervading the group at the time of the Bulwer implementation were such 
that numerous changes to the Rotterdam core were sanctioned. A new key 
sub -system application was accepted with significant implications for 
the shape the overall system's core database. These changes seem to 
have been accepted since Bulwer's OMS was seen to be the Mark II of 
RIS, the start of the next generation of refinery information systems, 
an improved tool that having been translated would now be more 
transportable. 
The entities representing refining activities in the business and data 
models employed at Bulwer Island were the same as those used at 
Rotterdam. However, the relationships between them were modelled quite 
differently. The two systems presented a facade of similarity that 
was incapable of fulfilling the common core role to which it was 
assigned. Still, systems following the Bulwer lead would have a common 
core, or so it seemed. However, the deviations from Rotterdam's core, 
embodied in the Bulwer OMS did not produce a satisfactory system, 
although this was not immediately apparent. The intricacies of the 
links between representational elements, particularly recursive links, 
betrayed the objectives prescribed for the system. Its 
"representations" degenerated into "simulations" (Baudrillard, 1983). 
The system created and compounded a series of "normal accidents" 
(Perrow, 1984) forcing some severe technological backtracking. Changes 
(unsuccessfully) made to Bulwer system also revealed the programme of 
RIS implementations to be a succession, rather than a progression. 
Stability at one application site was not necessarily transportable 
and the speed of subsequent developments at other sites prevented 
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problematic outcomes being apparent before their causes were adopted 
elsewhere. The rate of RIS's diffusion may be seen to institutionalise 
failures. 
Interessement at Grangemouth 
In Chapter five we started to examine the emergence of the Grangemouth 
RIS. The site already had a number of computerised systems in place 
but their development had not been informed by the desire for 
centralised integration that lay behind the deployment of RIS. In 1987 
Rotterdam was still the exemplary system within the BP Group, the 
starting point for future implementations. Grangemouth was not as 
affected by the development of intermediary markets as Rotterdam had 
been. The refinery had also been the victim of previous system 
oversells. As a result there was seen to be no demand from the site 
for a RIS type system until a corporate will made the introduction of 
such a system virtually inevitable. Again the Manufacturing and Supply 
BDU may be seen as the enunciator of a statement, the statement being 
the 1987 Strategy Study. The different representations of context at 
Grangemouth and Rotterdam necessitated a different problematization at 
Grangemouth. A system to facilitate optimisation of refinery 
operations at Grangemouth was not required because of an obvious 
"crisis ". Rather, the spread of commercialism within the group's 
refining sector was seen to make improvements to the value added 
performance of the refinery and its wider network desirable. Most of 
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the opportunities for such improvements were seen to be "oil based" 
and these aims were translated into the objective of producing an 
overall reliable refinery plan "in four hours ". 
Interessement at Grangemouth was harder work in the absence of a 
commonly accepted pressing need, and the weight of the wider group's 
strategic objectives was required to ensure co- operation at the 
refinery. The BDU were keen to translate existing systems into an 
overall integrated system that would allow staff at the refinery to 
"maximise the value added to feedstocks ". Again dual justifications 
for such an approach seem apparent. Firstly there is the obvious 
economic benefit of not having to "re- invent the wheel" and secondly, 
the BDU, by adopting such a strategy may be seen to be cognizant of 
the refineries current position, facilitating the enrolment of 
Grangemouth employees and the extant materiality of the site. The BDU 
was keen to present itself as representative of the interests of 
Grangemouth management. Opportunities for novel enquiries of a central 
database of oil based information were represented as resources for 
refinery managers, even though there was seen to be little need for 
such facilities on site. 
The importance of links with the refinery network as a whole are also 
apparent here. The Process Instrumentation Project, already underway, 
was enrolled in the study as was the Oil Stock Control Accounting 
System (OSCA) being developed by BP Oil International. The 
translations necessitated by RIS's representations, were to alter maps 
of the refinery, modes of mapping the refinery, and the refinery 
itself. These issues became more apparent later in the development, 
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particularly with regard to the Feasibility Study's calls for a "Flow 
Meter Uncertainty Reduction System" and improvements to the machinery 
used for blending and introducing additives in the tank farm area. 
The BDU also sought to enlist the commitment of refinery personnel by 
acknowledging their situated expertise. Refinery personnel were to be 
provided with a tool to help them do their jobs, not an extension of 
automation to remove their jobs (even when that was what some 
organisational participants wanted). And they were to vet the spread 
of representations in the system to prevent it becoming "self - 
fulfilling", providing further evidence that they would be in control 
of the system, rather than the other way round. The dangers of a self - 
fulfilling system may be seen to represent an explicit acknowledgement 
of the simulational (Baudrillard, 1983; Cooper, 1993) potential of the 
system to be developed. 
A more detailed study was suggested that would be better able to enrol 
refinery personnel, whilst the benefits of proceeding, demonstrated in 
the Strategy Study by some rather dubious rituals of calculation, 
served to ensure that this occurred. The resulting Feasibility Study 
was considered in detail in Chapter six. 
Enrolling Grangemouth 
The Grangemouth RIS so- called Feasibility Study may be seen as a 
series of documents that exemplifies the translation process, most 
particularly the phase of enrolment. RIS at Rotterdam betrayed the BDU 
through its inability to deal with a subsequent joint venture and 
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betrayal by Bulwer's OMS became apparent soon after. Sites that had 
been successfully enrolled by these emergent systems had been unable 
to sustain the mobilization of entities, particularly refinery users. 
Systems had been seemingly successfully built but their usefulness had 
been strictly limited as the specifics of the networks in which they 
were enrolled unravelled. As a result, the system design team had to 
do a great deal of work to ensure that RIS at Grangemouth stayed on 
the rails. Firm management was seen to be the key to success, 
reminding us that the new commercial agenda does not constitute an 
abandonment of managerialism, merely a progressive transformation. 
The importance of firm management was partially derived from the then 
exemplary system built at Rotterdam (the joint venture which betrayed 
Rotterdam's RIS was not mentioned in the Feasibility Study). 
Rotterdam's RIS was the first BP IS project to "come in on time and on 
budget and do what it was meant to do ". Moreover, strong project 
management was deemed to be necessary to ensure that the commonality 
of the core database at the heart of each RIS system was maintained. 
There was however a curious importance attached to "faith" in the 
system. Despite the numerous calculative regimes employed in a number 
of justificatory trials, "faith" and not only so- called fact was seen 
to play a key role in the maintenance of organisational support for 
the system. Without those involved in the project having faith in the 
system, and more importantly, exhibiting it, the powers that be would 
not be convinced and the project would have difficulty proceeding (see 
also, Dugdale and Jones, 1993). 
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The Feasibility Study built upon the recommendations of the Strategy 
Study, although the level of similarity between the two reports' 
suggested development paths was diluted as the Feasibility Study 
progressed. By the time of the production of the Final Report, a 
number of significant changes had been suggested and accepted. 
Representing Similarities Between Grangemouth and Rotterdam 
Large numbers of Grangemouth staff (40 in the "Business Requirements" 
Stage) were enrolled in the project in an attempt to achieve a 
successful translation. Their involvement served to further inculcate 
the inevitability of RIS within the refinery and to dissipate the 
feeling of imposition associated at the site with externally ceded 
systems projects. The system design team noted the narrowness of view 
of current refinery staff and sought to transform them for, and with, 
the emergent RIS system. A particularly important vehicle for 
enrolment was seen to be the adoption of a Joint Application 
Development (JAD) approach to system implementation. However, much of 
the system had already been (temporarily) stabilised by the time users 
were involved: Rotterdam's RIS was to be the departure point (and 
indeed arrival point!) for most sub -systems and particularly for the 
central database. Invocation of JAD, much like invocation of HRM in 
other settings (see Keenoy and Anthony, 1992) must be seen in terms of 
its rhetorical power to produce truth, not in terms of the prior truth 
of its depictions of organisational reality. 
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In order to ensure that apparently "cost free" (and of course common) 
Rotterdam software was the starting point for RIS at Grangemouth the 
system design team invested a great deal of effort in representing the 
two refineries as similar. Moreover, they even rescheduled activities 
to ensure the availability of Rotterdam staff to work on the project. 
Such a move also provided grounds for early implementation of aspects 
of the system, serving to further ensure that (a Rotterdam based) RIS 
development would go ahead at Grangemouth. 
One major departure from the Rotterdam approach was sanctioned by the 
team. This was the adoption of the MIMI Production Programming system 
that had been employed at Bulwer Island. MIMI had potential for expert 
systems development and the keen technological innovators of the 
system design team were eager to import such potential into the 
relatively Luddite Grangemouth refinery. MIMI had been adopted by 
other refineries and hence it was "essential" that Grangemouth adopted 
it too, in order to prevent the perpetuation of a "site specific 
solution" at the refinery. Interestingly, the non -economic costs of 
such a decision were seen to be in terms of the control of the 
system's potential flexibility. Again we see the implications of the 
contradiction between flexibility and control (usually re- presented as 
"coherence ") at the heart of the new commercial agenda. RIS systems 
had to make refinery operations both flexible and predictable. Head 
Office users were also enrolled, demonstrating the challenges to 
extant organisational boundaries that emerging RIS systems may be seen 
to (re)produce. 
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MIMI at Grangemouth was to have as much commonality with MIMI at 
Bulwer as possible, but the rest of the system had to exhibit its 
commonality with Rotterdam. These two embodied precedential guides to 
design may be seen to be symptomatic of the entire RIS deployment 
story. Adopting tried and tested solutions from elsewhere was an 
important part of the justificatory and legitimatory networking 
surrounding the RIS development. 
Re- Presenting Rotterdam: New Rules of Commonality 
In early 1990, despite the intentions embodied in the five volume 
Feasibility Study, Grangemouth adopted the Bulwer Island database as 
the core for development of RIS at the site. As we noted, Bulwer's 
OMS, having destroyed Rotterdam's (potentially common) core, held out 
the promise of future commonality and coherence and hence economies of 
scale. OMS was seen to be "data driven" and "more of a toolkit to 
assist managers ". Commonality was no longer to be achieved, by 
representing refineries as similar, rather it was to be derived from a 
simple framework able to accommodate data driven site specific detail. 
The (successful) development of Rotterdam RIS which had previously 
been represented as a result of "firm management ", was now seen to be 
a fortunate outcome of a combination of ad hoc techniques. Although 
Bulwer Island had patently not employed "sound project management" 
principles, they had adopted "sound design practices ", particularly 
the use of a simple framework within a data driven system. Performance 
problems at Bulwer were already apparent, but either glossed or 
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represented as soluble if lessons were learnt. The main casualty of 
these changes seems to have been the potential for free, unmediated, 
flexible inquiries of the central database. Problems were to be solved 
through "the careful tuning of inquiries ", presumably by systems' 
professionals. 
The Bulwer system was finally established as an obligatory passage 
point through its incorporation in the "Overall Design Report" for 
Grangemouth RIS produced in May 1990. This document established a 
design framework for Grangemouth RIS that was intended to facilitate 
the modularisation of subsystem development. The adoption of the 
Bulwer starting point may be seen to exemplify the mood of 
technological dynamism and optimism that was still growing the group's 
refining sector at the time. This approach was, not surprisingly, 
particularly pronounced in the minds of the system professionals from 
BP and Scicon who were to build the system. 
Mobilizing the System, Staff and the Refinery Network 
The general approach adopted by the system designers was intended to 
"deliver a commercial advantage" to the refinery through integrated 
and improved representations of various refinery and wider group 
activities. The lack of a call for such information prior to RIS's 
implementation being re- presented as a need for such information. 
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As Bulwer's performance problems became more apparent less 
technological solutions to refinery management problems became the 
order of the day. The system at Grangemouth was explicitly designed to 
provide "an overview of performance" not to facilitate "technical 
control ". The aim was to provide common, widely available and more 
commercially oriented information on the refinery's activities in 
order to further instantiate the emergent new commercial agenda in the 
artefacts of the organisation. Artefacts may be seen to be more 
durable (Latour, 1991) than mere rhetoric, rules and conventions. They 
exhibit an irreversibility (Callon, 1991) and an invisibility (once 
built) that enables them to function more effectively than 
understandings embodied only in the body. Despite the creative and 
integrative mechanisms of the self, the body remains "a volume in 
perpetual disintegration" (Foucault, 1977). 
The form taken by RIS at Grangemouth was a compromise between the 
tried and tested solutions favoured by indigenous staff and the "blue 
skies" solutions favoured by the system builders. Although given the 
mood of technological backtracking that was sweeping through refining 
following the system "failures" at Bulwer and Rotterdam, the balance 
tended to favour the former. Technology may be seen to be important to 
the new commercial agenda, particularly in its early stages, but 
situated expertise enabling exploitation of that technology to further 
the interests of the employing organisation is seen to be even more 
important, and increasingly so. 
Systems staff at Bulwer were now re- presented as "overstretching" 
themselves and "trying to go too far with the technology available ". 
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Earlier suggestions of expert system functionality at Grangemouth were 
soon forgotten, in favour of "simple algorithms" [3]. 
Re- Enrolling Site Specifics 
Initial support for Grangemouth's existing systems had been diluted 
during the Feasibility Study, with suggestions for the adoption of 
systems from outside. These had been adopted through their embodiment 
in the Bulwer core. However, as the system was being built the 
importance of the specifics of the Grangemouth site and its prior 
production relations became more important. Grangemouth was seen to be 
an old plant with "built in unpredictability ". The complexity of the 
refinery network, coupled with the age of the plant was seen to result 
in inherent uncertainty that systems interventions could not wish 
away. Some attempts were made to accommodate this view, although 
technological solutions, such as automation of valves, were 
represented as uneconomic. Rather, space had to be created to ensure 
that human expertise drove the site. One quote sums up this 
orientation particularly clearly: 
I think the perception is that at a certain level of detail 
process plants like this are a bit like weather systems. There is 
a degree of unpredictability built into them and to retain 
responsibility for that continuous operation you probably need to 
put some human being in charge of it. Somebody who, if you like, 
can put the umbrella up when it's actually raining rather than 
when the weather forecast says it should be. (Interview, Systems 
Manager 1, Grangemouth Refinery) 
318 
Organisational participants were not however, to be given a system 
that required no accommodation on their part. Instead there was a 
perceived need to "adjust human resources to technical capabilities ". 
The system, the site and the system's prospective users may be seen to 
be mutually shaping through the vehicle of (selective) re- 
presentations of each others' attributes and interests. 
These compromises were perhaps most apparent in the system builders' 
deliberations and negotiations surrounding the database reporting 
system. Various options reflected various representations of the 
capabilities and desires of staff and managers at the site, as well as 
representations of the "technological" capabilities of the emergent 
system. In the end "limited user imagination ", "lack of need for such 
reports" and "the dangers of open access" together resulted in the 
majority of users being provided with entirely pre- defined reports, 
with some "more advanced" users being given limited flexibility of 
access to aspects of the database. Such access was mediated by the 
Computer Services Committee, at least in the first instance. Users 
could manipulate sections of predefined reports using spreadsheets, 
again reflecting the increasing importance of site specific realities 
and routines as delivery of the final system progressed. 
Ensuring Continued Mobilization 
A great deal of effort was also devoted to ensuring that the completed 
system would be used. Benefits Management procedures were employed to 
ensure the maintenance of user mobilization. Previous implementations 
had revealed how users at the site could betray the system once 
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implemented by not using it, and thus not delivering the potential 
commercial benefits the system was intended to produce. Some of these 
practices may be seen to be overtly coercive, reflecting the key 
importance of demonstrable improvement in commercial performance as a 
result of RIS implementation. 
The system must, in the final analysis, be used.. I have no doubt 
that the RIS system will do all the things it should, although I 
do still have some doubts particularly with regard to whether or 
not the potential benefits are realised in practice, and more 
particularly, that they are seen to be realised. (Interview with 
Senior Manager, Grangemouth Refinery) 
Planning and improving planning were seen to be the route to 
commercial success. Improvements in planning and the commercial 
exploitation of these improvements had to be demonstrated. The markets 
in which traders were dealing were future oriented, and thus the 
construction and colonisation of reliable, functional representations 
of future performance was seen to be essential. 
Enlightened planning practices, embodying appropriately integrated 
representations of activities and markets, were required to square the 
circle of autonomous flexibility with coherence, predictability and 
control. Numerous translations were required to achieve these 
objectives, as we noted. Instantiation of the new commercial agenda, 
particularly in the representations and artefacts of the organisation, 
is revealed as incredibly complex and contingent, and indeed, often 
contradictory. And there was still no guarantee that refinery 
personnel would submit entirely to the transformed roles ascribed to 
(prescribed for) them. 
320 
Resistance Through Re- Enrolment in Prior Networks 
Despite the numerous attempts to enrol and mobilize users in the 
furtherance of the new commercial agenda through their relations with 
the emergent RIS, refinery personnel were able to subvert aspects of 
the project with many of their prior working practices. Previously 
sanctioned representations of organisational reality were utilised to 
undermine many of the re- presentations embodied in RIS. Such processes 
also served to bolster the esteem granted to the situated expertise of 
refinery personnel. 
RIS had increased the visibility of representations that had always 
been regarded as slightly dubious, but had been easily circumvented 
pre -RIS. Moreover, RIS's recursive use of information created a huge 
potential for the the magnification of small errors allowing the 
spectre of the Bulwer failure to haunt the Grangemouth system. The 
lack of respect for the system and its information that such concerns 
engendered facilitated modes of working that by passed the system. RIS 
data and information was represented as remote from refining 
"reality ", as it was defined by Grangemouth staff, and human 
involvement was deemed to be essential for the prevention of 
reification of the system's representations. Some staff resented 
changes that had to be made around the RIS development to facilitate 
its "bedding down ", particularly if they did not expect to be users of 
RIS in the future. 
Staff's faith in paper systems was retained since they were "often 
simpler and quicker to use" and the telephone continued to provide 
them with access to human expertise. Indeed, the element of 
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computerisation deemed to be most useful on site was the introduction 
of e -mail facilities. As we noted in the previous chapter, users 
seemed keener on computer mediated communication than on computer 
generated information. 
Despite the "tool to support activities" orientation of the system 
builders, many users felt that RIS still represented too much of a 
move towards automation. Aspects of the system's functioning allowed 
some circumvention of human involvement when expertise was seen to 
have been embodied in the system. For many this involvement had played 
an important "checking" role and its removal, particularly when 
coupled with the dubiousness of certain of RIS's representations, was 
a dangerous and foolhardy step. "Contextual knowledge not held on the 
information system" was required to run a refinery safely and 
productively. 
However, the beauty of the new commercial agenda lies in its ability 
to (re)direct resistance towards its own ends. The ends of the agenda 
represent near universal "goods" (Power, personal communication) and 
particularly in the context of a recessional economic climate, space 
for resistance is almost entirely delimited to questioning of means. 
With the emergence of the "politics of the product" (Miller and 
O'Leary, 1993) the only accounts that count are those that explicitly 
seek to contribute to organisational well-being. There is obviously 
space here for the re- presentation of organisational interests to 
serve self interests (see for example, Munro and Kernan, 1993). 
However, the self (re)creating effects of the agenda serve to 
partially ameliorate these "dangers" for the organisation. 
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Professionals and managers increasingly have to present themselves as 
able to bring about improvements in the organisation's performance, in 
the future. A meritocracy based upon predicted performance is as much 
of a chimera as one based upon past achievements. Still, the act of 
re- presenting oneself in such a manner acts, in the long run, to 
change the self in the direction of representational convenience. "The 
world becomes more like our representations and less like the world" 
(Cooper, 1993, p. 10). The self is a thing of this world and there are 
no a priori grounds for making it a special case. The self is by no 
means immune to re- presentational transformation. 
Conclusions 
The development of the three RIS type systems at Rotterdam, Bulwer 
Island and Grangemouth, considered in this thesis, allows us to 
examine the intertwinings of discourse and notions of representation 
in the emergence of managerial technologies [4]. We saw how the "need" 
for RIS was created at Rotterdam and the self sustaining rationale for 
the diffusion of IT at work. The "problems" of refining, however 
created, were to be solved with a systems solution. Rotterdam's RIS 
was a somewhat surprising success leading system builders in the 
organisation to try to "overstretch" themselves to improve upon it at 
the second RIS instantiation at Bulwer Island. 
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The role of technology in the new commercial agenda is both problem 
and solution. The agenda demands the development and adoption of the 
latest technology, but only when marshalled to meet more "fundamental" 
organisational objectives, embodied in users and ideally designers. 
The latter can attempt to build in these objectives to the technology 
as it emerges just as the technology builds its objectives into 
designers and users. But as the Bulwer experience showed within the BP 
Group, the "technology" can go too far. In attempting to represent the 
complexities of refining in recursive models greater complexity may 
indeed be re- presented. 
The fits and starts surrounding the Grangemouth implementation reflect 
the emergence of this understanding within the Group. RIS at 
Grangemouth was to be Rotterdam like, Bulwer like, and eventually 
Grangemouth like. Only then could it enrol the site specific expertise 
essential to its success. Where the system itself prevented the 
achievement of commercial advantage, new and old modes of working were 
employed to circumvent it. Discourse, prior practices and prior 
technology together enabled users to discount the technology when it 
could be deemed to be inappropriate. For, in the new commercial agenda 
the institutionalised understandings that constitute managerialism and 
embody and inform managerial objectives are not silenced, they are 
simply more effectively employed and more deeply embedded in the 
bodies of employees and the artefacts of organisation. 
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During the latter stages of the research undertaken at Grangemouth, 
two key organisational initiatives began to impact upon the refinery. 
BP Oil UK was in the process of seeking BS5750 Quality Assurance Part 
2 Accreditation and the BP Group as whole had embarked upon a 
structural and cultural change programme, known as "Project 1990 ". 
Together these two initiatives may be seen to constitute an explicit 
attempt to introduce the new commercial agenda to the organisation. 
From our perspective they may be seen to represent a corporate rubber 
stamping of changes already underway. These initiatives may have 
contaminated the material gathered by the researcher, but the 
prevalence of aspects of the new agenda in the accounts provided by 
organisational participants before these changes had had significant 
impact at the refinery and the ease with which those participants 
produced such accounts suggests that this was not the case. The 
initiatives will undoubtedly have helped legitimate the new agenda as 
it emerged within the group, providing organisational participants 
with a range of new justificatory resources. But Project 1990 in 
particular may be seen to represent a recognition and ratification of 
change processes already underway rather than a source of 
radicalisation itself, despite suggestions to the contrary made by 
some of its key proponents. 
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BS5750 Quality Assurance Part 2 Accreditation 
BS5750 Part 2 is a Quality Assurance Programme produced by the British 
Standards Institute that seeks to assure quality through a 
proceduralisation of production and management processes [1]. 
Getting the procedures written down in a format that meets BSI 
and then ensuring that people work to these procedures. It's as 
simple as that [2]. 
Benefits to the refinery of accreditation were seen to be "managing to 
get things right first time" through the imposition of a "uniform.. 
and standardised" way of doing things [2]. The cost to the refinery of 
achieving accreditation was estimated to be between £0.3 and £0.5 
million [3]. If procedures became too tight, organisational 
participants could invoke Project 1990 to loosen them up. 
Project 1990 
Project 1990 was seen to arise from "a sense of unease in the 
management of BP that we were not as efficient as we should be in 
making decisions and using people" [4]. It sought to increase the 
flexibility of various elements of the organisation as well as that of 
the organisation as a whole. The project was seen to be the baby of 
the Group's new Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Robert Horton, 
who had experienced the "can do attitude" [4] in America and sought to 
engineer it within the whole of the BP Group. Project 1990 was 
actually an organisational restructuring initiative but was 
immediately followed by a culture change programme, the two 
initiatives being seen as synonymous by many of the Group's employees. 
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It's quite helpful as a model to look at the whole thing as a 
three cornered stool... You can alter the organisation, you can 
tinker with the processes and change those to support the new 
organisation, but the third leg is really crucial, and that, for 
want of a better work, we call culture. Because unless you can 
motivate, interest, equip people to work in ways that support 
rather than contradict the new organisation and the new 
processes, the whole damn thing won't work [4]. 
Changes were introduced by taking all employees through workshops 
where they examined what the "new desired behaviours" were and 
developed a... 
game plan for themselves about what they need to do, and what 
they need to start thinking about their people doing and then 
thirdly, utilise all those tools to come up with better working 
practices [4]. 
The project was seen to be "big bikkies ". It was split into three 
phases and costs for phase 2 for BP Oil alone were estimated to be 
"about five million quid" [4,5]. 
And that just includes you know, consultants' fees, fares, 
hotels, you know, all that, the hardware if you like. It does not 
include the enormous amount of costing of people's time. I mean 
if you included that you could probably quadruple the figure [4]. 
Re- presenting RIS 
In the face of these two large scale programmes, seen to be supported 
from "the very top" RIS was re- presented within the organisation as 
part and parcel an overall shift in orientation. Three major strategic 
initiatives were subsumed into one grand strategy. RIS had to be seen 
as part of the solution, not part of the problem, if it were to stand 
any chance of bedding down and maintaining the mobilization of 
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enrolled entities. It would have been foolhardy, even suicidal, for 
the system to engage in a trial of strength with such forces. Alliance 
rather than confrontation was the order of the day. 
One of the system builders at Grangemouth noted that RIS "would've 
worked an awful lot better if that culture had been in place when we 
started" [6]. Whilst another noted that RIS and Project 1990.. 
were watered from the same change. The change is to make BP's 
refineries more commercially effective and to put a commercial 
focus on their operations. RIS is one facet of that development 
and the organisation[al changes are] another facet of that 
development [7]. 
And although the BS5750 initiative was seen to be "largely customer 
driven" [8] an effective RIS system was seen to be a central part of 
the accreditation process and of the maintenance of accreditation. It 
was also to be significantly affected by the drive for accreditation. 
All of that [the system's side] has to be highly specified as 
well, and the big difficulty was ensuring that interfaces, you 
know, reflect in one department what happens in another.. So that 
was a bit of a nightmare [2]. 
RIS, even when nearing completion at Grangemouth, had to ensure that 
it was represented as part of the explicit introduction of the new 
commercial agenda. As the thesis has shown, this was not too difficult 
since RIS was deeply implicated in the implicit introduction of the 
new agenda that preceded its corporate ratification. These final 
points serve to demonstrate that translation is a process that is 
never complete, only more or less temporarily stabilised. Entities 




It seems appropriate that the last words of this thesis should be 
those of one of the organisational participants at the refinery. The 
researcher was having a drink and a pleasant chat with one of the 
refinery's senior managers at a local bar. They were discussing 
Project 1990 in particular but also more general changes underway in 
the refinery. The manager told an epochal story that exemplifies the 
themes of this thesis and demonstrates their (re)creative purchase on 
the individuals who encountered and (re)produced them. 
I was at a fair at the weekend and entered an event in which the 
competitors had to get a trained dog to retrieve a number of 
hidden items in the shortest possible time. Most of the other 
competitors attempted to closely direct the dog as it searched 
for the objects. I just pointed it in the right direction and 
encouraged it, you know, let the dog use its own intelligence and 
training on the ground, to do the task itself. And I won! [9]. 
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